Tam Marti, Quam Mercurio.

The Ho.ble and learned Knight
S.r Walter Raleigh.
Ro: Vaughan scu.

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REMAINS

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Sir *Walter Raleigh*;

Viz. H.19.74.

Maxims of State.

Advice to his Son: his Sons advice to his Father.

His Sceptick.

Observations concerning the causes of the Magnificencie and Opulency of of Cities.

Sir *Walter Raleigh*'s Observations touching Trade and Commerce with the *Hollander* and other Nations, Proving that our Sea & Land Commodities inrich and strengthen other Countreys against our own.

The Prerogative of Parliaments in *England*, proved in a Dialogue between a Councellour of State and a Justice of Peace.

His Letters to divers persons of quality.

LONDON,
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MA-

MAXIMS OF STATE.

OF GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENT is of two sorts. 1. *Private*, of himself. *Sobriety*. Of his Family; called *Oeconomy*.

2. *Publick*, of the Common-wealth, called *Policie*. A man must first Govern himself, ere he be fit to Govern a Family: And his Family, ere he be fit to bear the Government in the Common-wealth.

Of Policie.

Policie is an Art of Government of a Commonwealth, and some part of it according to that State, or form of Government, wherein it is settled for the publick good.

State, is the frame or set order of a Commonwealth, or of the Governours that rule the same, especially of the chief and Sovereign Governour that commandeth the rest.

The State or Sovereignty consisteth in five points.

1. Making or annulling of Laws.
2. Creating and disposing of Magistrates.
3. Power over life and death.
4. Making of War, or Peace.
5. Highest or last appeal.

Where these five are, either in one or in more, there is the State.

These five points of State, rest either in,

1. One *Monarchie* or Kingdome.
2. Some few chief men for virtue and wisdome, called an *Aristocrasie*.
3. Many, called a *Free State*, or *Popular State*.

These three sorts of Government have

have respect to the common good, and therefore are just, and Lawful *States*.

These 3. degenerate into 3. other Governments. *viz.*

1. *Monarchie*	into	1. *Tyrannie.*
		2. *Oligarchie.*
2. *Aristocracie.*		3. *Common-wealth* or Government of all the common and baser sort, and therefore called a *Common wealth* by an usurped *Nick-name.*
3. *Popular Estate,*		

These all respect their own, and not the publick good, and therefore are called Bastard *Governments.*

I.

Monarchie.

A *Monarchie*, or Kingdome, is the *Government* of a *State* by one Head, or chief, tending to the common benefit of all.

Mo-

Monarchie, or *Kingdoms*, are of three ſorts touching the right or poſſeſſion of them, *viz.*

1. *Hereditarie*, by deſcent, as the *Engliſh*, *French*, &c.

2. *Elective*, by ſuffrage of the other *Orders*, or ſome of them, as the *Polonian*.

3. *Mixt*, or of both kinds, *viz.* by deſcent, yet not tied to the next of bloud, as the ancient *Ieviſh State*.

Monarchies are of two ſorts touching their power, or Authority, *viz.*

1. *Intire*. Where the whole power of ordering all *State* matters, both in peace and war, doth by law & cuſtome appertain to the Prince, as in the *Engliſh* Kingdome, where the Prince hath power to make Laws, League, & War; To create Magiſtrates; to pardon life: Of appeal, *&c.* Though to give a contentment to the other degrees, they have a ſuffrage in making Laws, yet ever ſubject to the Princes pleaſure, nor Negative will.

2. *Limited* or *reſtrained*, that hath no full power in all the points or matters of State, as the Militarie King that hath not the Sovereigntie in time of peace, as the making of Laws, *&c.* But in Warre only, as the *Polonian* Kings.

II. *Ari-*

II.

Aristocracy, or Senatory State,

AN *Aristocracie* is the Government of a Commonwealth by some competent number of the better sort, preferred for wisdome and other virtues for the publick good.

Aristocracies are of three sorts, *viz.* Where the *Senators* are chosen, for 1. *Virtue*, *Riches*, and the common good, as the *Venetian*.

2. *Virtue*, and the publick good without respect of wealth, as sometimes the *Roman*, when some of the *Senators* were fetched from the plough, and some from the Schools.

3. *Virtue* and wealth more respecting their private, than their publick good, which inclineth towards an *Oligarchie*, or the Government of the Richer or Nobler sort, as in *Rome* towards the end.

III.

III.

Free State, or Popular State.

THe *Popular State* is the Government of a *State* by the choiſer ſort of people, tending to the publick good of all ſorts; *viz.* with due reſpect of the better, Nobler, and Richer ſort.

In every *Iuſt State*, ſome part of the Government is, or ought to be imparted to the people; As in a Kingdome a voice or ſuffrage in making Laws; and ſometimes alſo, in levying of Armes (if the charge be great, and the Prince forced to borrow help of his Subjects) the matter rightly may be propounded to a Parliament, that the tax may ſeem to have proceeded from themſelves. So conſultations, and ſome proceedings in Iudicial matters, may in part be referred to them. The reaſon, leaſt ſeeing themſelves to be in no number, nor of reckoning, they miſlike the ſtate, or kind of Government: And where the multitude is diſcontented, there muſt needs be many Enemies to the preſent *State*. For which cauſe, Tyrants, (which

(which allow the people, no manner of dealing in *State* matters) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons, and all other means whereby they may resist, or amend themselves, as in *Russland*, *Turkey*, &c.

IV.
Tyrannie.

A *Tyrannie* is the swerving, or distorting of a *Monarchie*, or the *Government* of one, tending not to the publick good, but the private benefit of himself and his followers. As in the *Russe* and *Turkish Government*, where the *State* and *Wealth* of other orders, are employed onely to the upholding of the greatnesse of the King or Emperour. This is the worst of all the Bastard *States* because it is the perverting of the best Regiment, to wit, of a *Monarchie*, which resembleth the Sovereign Government of God himself.

V.
Oligarchie, or the Government of a few.

AN *Oligarchie* is the swerving, or the corruption of an *Aristocracie*;

or

or the *Government* of some few, that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort, without any respect of the publick good. The chief end of these *Governours*, is, their own greatnesse and enriching. And therefore their manner is, to prepare fit means to uphold their Estates. This *State* is not wholly so bad, as is the *Tyrannie*, and yet worse than the *Common-wealth*, because it respecteth the good of a few.

VI.

Common Wealth.

A *Common-wealth* is the swerving or depravation of a Free, or *popular State*, or the Government of the whole multitude of the base and poorer sort, without respect of the other Orders.

These two *States*, to wit; The *Oligarchie*, and *Common-wealth*, are very adverse the one to the other, and have many bickerings between them. For that the Richer or Nobler sort, suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect, because they are superiour, but in some respects onely, to wit, in Riches, Birth, Parentage, &c. On the other side, the *Common people* suppose, there ought to be an equality

in

in all other things, and some *State matters*; because they are equal with the Rich or Noble, touching their *Libertie*, whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equal or superiour, as touching *Government* and fitnesse thereunto, because they are such, to wit, because they are Rich, Noble, Free, &c. But because they are *Wise*, *Virtuous*, *Valiant*, &c. and so have fit parts to *Govern a State*.

The several *States* are sometimes mixed, and inter-wrought one with the other, yet ever so, as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other, as in the humours and complexions of the body. So in the *Roman State*, the people had their *Plebiscita*, and gave the suffrage in the election of Magistrates: Yet the *Senate* (as the *State* stood) for the most part swayed the *State*, and bare the chief rule. So in the *Venetian State*, the Duke seemeth to represent a *Monarch*, and the *Senate* to be his Councel: Yet the *Duke* hath no power in *State matters*, but is like a head set on by art, that beareth no brain. And so that *State* is *Senatorical* or *Aristocratical*.

Causes

Causes of States and Commonwealths in general.

Causes of *States*, or of *Commonwealths* are of 3. sorts, *viz.*

1. *Founding*, or settling a *State* where to be considered. — 1. *Measure* 2. *Parts*, and their *Qualities*.
2. *Preserving* a *State*.
3. *Changing*, and *altering* a *State*.

Founding a State.

In *founding* a *State* are to be considered 2. things.

1. *Proportion.*
2. *Parts.*

Proportion, is a just measure or *Mediocritie* of the *State*, whereby it is framed and kept in that Order, as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind, to wit, so that a Monarch be not too Monarchical, nor strict, or absolute, as the *Russe* Kings; nor *Aristocratical*, that is over-mated or eclipsed by the Nobilitie, as the *Scottish* Kingdome, but ever respective to the other degrees. That *Aristocracie* be not too magnificent nor intire to it self, but com-

communicate with the people ſome commodities of *State* or *Government*, as the *Venetians* and ſometimes the *Roman* allowed the people to elect certain Magiſtrates out of themſelves, to have a Tribune, to make *Plebiſcita*, &c. So a *Free State* or *Commonwealth* that it be not over popular, *viz.* That it depreſs not too much the richer, wiſer, nor learneder ſort; but admit them to offices with a *Caution* out of the rules and myſteries of that *State*. That they ſeek no alteration of the preſent *State*. The reaſon, becauſe the *moderate States* in their ſeveral kinds (as all other things that obſerve the mean) are beſt framed for their continuance, becauſe they give leſſe cauſe of grudge, envy, and affecting the *Wealth*, *Honour*, and *Liberty*, which they ſee in others that *govern* the *State*; and ſo are leſſe ſubject to ſtirs: and commotions, and eaſieſt kept in their preſent *State* wherein they are ſet.

Parts.

THe *parts of the State*, or thoſe *Magiſtrates* that bear place or ſway in the publick *Government*.

Parts or *partakers* of *Publick Government*, are

1. Com-

1. *Councel* or *Senate*, which consulteth of all matters pertaining to Warre and Peace, Magistrates, *&c.* in admitting of whom there ought to be a more special care, that they may be men expert in *matter of Policie*, because it is their *Trade* and *Vocation*, as men use to chuse Pilots, and Masters of Ships, such as know the Art of *Navigation*, and not Husband-men, *&c.* And so the contrarie.

2. *Magistrates* and *Officers*, which are to be executioners of that which is consulted, and found to be expedient for the *Common-wealth*, wherein are to be observed, the kinds of Magistrates, than they be such as fit that kind of *Government*; The time of their continuance, and the manner of their election or appointing, by whom, out of whom, and in what manner they be chosen.

3. *Iudges*, To determine in *Civil*, and *Criminal matters*, where are to be observed, out of whom they are to be chosen; what kinds are necessary, and the manner of *Iudgement* and *Iudicial* proceeding.

In Magistrates are to be observed.

I. Kinds of Magistrates as,

I. Civil.

1. Superiour, which are to be such & of that kind as agree with the State, as Consuls for a year, and not perpetuall Dictatours in a Senatorie State. Prætors, & Censors, that oversee manners & orders of the people.

For a Kingdom, Lieutenant of Shires, Marshalls, Masters of Horse, Admiralls, &c.

Inferiour, as conservatours of Peace, Constables, &c.

Overseers of youth, that take care for their education for civil and warlike exercise.

Clarks of the Market that provide for the quantity, and price of victual.

Ediles for Buildings, Streets, Bounds.

Queſtours, or *Treaſurers*, to keep and diſpence the publick Treaſury.

Actuaries, or *Recorders*, which keep the publick *Record.*

Goalers to keep *priſons* and *Priſoners.*

Surveyors of woods and fields, *&c.*

2. *Eccleſiaſtical.*

1. As *Biſhops* or *Paſtours*, *Elders*, *Wardens.*

2. *Time of Magiſtrates*, whereof ſome are perpetual, ſome for a time, *viz.* for more years, a year, half a year, according to the neceſſity of the *Common-wealth*, and not perpetual; or at leaſt not *Hereditary* in a Kingdom. Yearly in an *Ariſtocracie*, or half yearly

yearly in a *Free-State.*

3. *Manner* of choice, by whom and how to be chosen, where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage, and not by Lot.

Causes preserving a State, or Common-wealth.

In preserving of *States* 2. things required.

1. *Mysteries*, or *Sophisms*
   1. *General to all States.*
   2. *Paticular* for every several *State.*
2. *Rules*, or *Actions.*
   1. *General*, for all *States.*
   2. *Particular*, for every *State.*

Mysteries, or Sophisms.

Mysteries, or *Sophisms* of *State*, are certain secret practises, either for the avoiding of danger, or averting such effects as tend to the preser-

vation of the preſent *State*, as it is ſet or founded.

State Myſteries are of two ſorts.

1. *Generall*: That pertain to all *States*; as firſt, to provide by all means, that the ſame degree, or part of the *Common wealth*, do not exceed both in *Quantity* and *Quality*. In *Quantity*, as that the number of the *Nobility*, or of great perſons, be not more, than the *State* or *Common-wealth* can bear. In *Quality*, as that none grow in wealth, Liberty, Honours, &c. more than it is meet for that degree; For as in weights, the heavier weights bear down the Scale: So in Common-wealths, that part of degree that excelleth the reſt in *Quality* and *Quantity*, overſwayeth the reſt after it, whereof follow alterations, and converſions of *State*. Secondly, to provide by all means, that the middle ſort of people exceed both the extreams, (*viz.*) of *Nobility* and *Gentry*, and the baſe raſcal, and beggarly ſort. For this maketh the *State* conſtant and firm, when both the *Extreams* are tyed together by a middle ſort, as it were with a band, as for any conſpiracie of the rich and beggarly ſort together, it is not to be feared. To theſe two points, the *Particular*

lar rules in *Sophiſms* of every *Common-wealth*, are to be applied.

2. *Particular*: That ſerve for preſervation of every *Common wealth*, in that form of *State* wherein it is ſetled, as in a Kingdome. That the *Nobility* may be accuſtomed to bear the *Government* of the *Prince*, eſpecially ſuch as have their dwelling in remote places from the *Princes* eye, it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the *Princes Court*, under preſence of doing them honour, or being deſirous to ſee, and enjoy their preſence; and to have their children, eſpecially their eldeſt, to be attendant upon the Prince, as of ſpecial favour towards them and theirs, that ſo they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the Prince, and be as *Hoſtages* for the good behaviour, and faithfull dealing of their Parents, eſpecially, if they be of any ſuſpected note. To that end ſerves the *Perſian* practiſe, in having a Band, or Train of the *Satrapa*'s children, and other Nobles to attend the Court; which was well imitated by our Train of *Henchmen*, if they were of the Nobler ſort. Again, ſometimes to borrow ſmall ſums of his Subjects, and to pay them again, that he may after borrow

greater ſums and never pay: So in an *Oligarchie*, leaſt it decline to a *Popular State*, they deceive the people with this and the like *Sophiſms*, (*viz.* They compell their own ſort, to wit, the rich men, by great penalties, to frequent their Aſſemblies for chooſing of Magiſtrates, for proviſion of Armour, warlike Exerciſes, making an Execution of Laws, *&c.* By that means ſeeming to bear a hard hand over the richer, but to ſuffer the poorer, and meaner ſort to be abſent, and to neglect thoſe Aſſemblies under pretence, that they will not draw them from their buſineſſe, and private earnings: Yet withall to cite thither ſome few of them, (*viz.*) ſo many as are eaſily over-matched by the richer ſort, to make a ſhew, that they would have the people or poorer ſort, partakers likewiſe of thoſe matters, yet terrifying thoſe that come to their Aſſemblies, with the tedioufneſſe of conſultations, greatneſſe of Fines, if they ſhould miſ-do, to the end, to make them unwilling to come again, or to have to do with thoſe *Conſultations*, by which means, the richer ſort do ſtill *govern* the *State*, with the peoples liking, and good contentment.

Axioms

Axioms.

Axioms or *Rules* of preſerving the *State* are,
1. *General*, that ſerve for all *Common-wealths.*
2. *Particular*, that ſerve for every *ſeveral State.*

General Rules.

1. THe firſt and principal *Rule* of *Policy* to be obſerved in all *States*, is to profeſſe, and practiſe, and maintain the true worſhip and *Religion* of Almighty God preſcribed unto us in his word, which is the chief end of all *Government.* The *Axiom*, That God be obeyed ſimply without exception, though he command that which ſeemeth unreaſonable, and abſurd to *Humane policy*; as in the *Iews Common-wealth*: That all the men ſhould repair yearly to one place to worſhip God four times, leaving none to defend their coaſt, though being beſet with many Enemies. Nor to ſow the ſeventh year, but to ſuffer the ground to reſt untilled without reſpect or fear of famine, *&c.*

2. To avoid the cauſes of *Converſion*, whereby States are overthrown, that are ſet down in the Title of converſions; For that *Common-wealth* (as naturall bodies) are preſerved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and *State* thereof, and are ſo cured by contrary medicines.

3. To take heed, that no *Magiſtrate* be created or continued, contrary to the Laws and policy of that *State*. As that in a *Senate*, there be not created a perpetual *Dictator*, as *Cæſar* in *Rome*. In a Kingdome, that there be no *Senate*, or *Convention* of *equall power* with the Prince in *State* matters, as in *Poland*.

4. To create ſuch *Magiſtrates* as love the *State* as it is ſetled, and take heed of the contrary practiſe, as to advance Popular perſons in a Kingdome, or *Ariſtocratie*. And ſecondly, to advance ſuch as have skill to diſcern what doth preſerve, and what hurteth or altereth the preſent *State*.

5. To that end to have certain Officers to pry abroad, and to obſerve ſuch as do not live and behave themſelves in fit ſort, agreeable to the preſent *State*, but deſire rather to be under ſome other ſorm, or kind of *Government*.

6. To

6. To take heed that Magiſtracies be not ſold for money, nor bribe in their Offices, which is eſpecially to be obſerved in that *Common-wealth*, which is governed by a few of the richer ſort; For if the Magiſtrate gain nothing but his *Common Fees*, the common ſort, and ſuch as want honour, take in good part that they be not preferred; and are glad rather that themſelves are ſuffered to intend private buſineſſe. But if the *Magiſtrate* buy and ſell matters, the common people are doubly grieved, both becauſe they are debar'd of thoſe preferments, and of that gain they ſee to grow by them, which is the cauſe that the *German Oligarchies* continue ſo firm, for both they ſuffer the poorer ſort to grow into wealth, and the richer ſort are by that means freed, and ſecured from being under the poor.

7. To take heed that the *State*, as it is ſetled and maintained, be not over-ſtrict, nor exceed in his kind; (*viz.*) That a Kingdom be not too Monarchicall, nor a *Popular State* too *Popular*: For which cauſe it is good, that the Magiſtrates ſometimes yield of his right touching honour, and behave themſelves familiarly with thoſe that are equall unto them in other parts, though

inferiour for place and office; And ſometimes popularly with the common people, which is the cauſe that ſome *Common-wealths*, though they be very ſimply, and unskilfully ſet, yet continue firm, becauſe the Magiſtrates behave themſelves wiſely, and with due reſpect towards the reſt that are without honour; and therefore ſome kind of *Moderate Popularity* is to be uſed in every *Common-wealth*.

8. To take heed of ſmall beginnings, and to meet with them even at the firſt, as well touching the breaking and altering of Laws, as of other rules which concern the continuance of every ſeveral *State*. For the diſeaſe and alteration of a *Common-wealth*, doth not happen all at once, but grows by degrees, which every common wit cannot diſcern, but men expert in POLICIE.

9. To provide, that that part be ever the greater in number and power, which favours the *State* as now it ſtands. This is to be obſerved as a very Oracle in in all Common-wealths.

10. To obſerve a mean in all the degrees, and to ſuffer no part to exceed, or decay overmuch. As firſt for prefer-

ferments, to provide that they be rather ſmall and ſhort, than great and long; and if any be grown to overmuch greatneſſe, to withdraw or diminiſh ſome part of his honour. Where theſe *Sophiſms* are to be practiſed (*viz.*) to do it by parts and degrees; to do it by occaſion, or colour of law, and not all at once. And if that way ſerve not, to advance ſome other, of whoſe virtue and faithfulneſſe, we are fully aſſured, to as high a degree, or to a greater honour, and to be the friends and followers of him that excelleth, above that which is meet. As touching wealth, to provide, that thoſe of the middle ſort (as before was ſaid) be more in number; and if any grow high, and over-charged with wealth, to uſe the *Sophiſms* of a *Popular State*, *viz.* to ſend him on Embaſſages, and Foreign Negotiations, or imploy him in ſome Office that hath great charges, and little honour, &c. To which end, the *Edileſhip* ſerved in ſome Commonwealths.

11. To ſuppreſſe the Factions, and quarrells of the Nobles, and to keep other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and Factions.

12. To

12. To increaſe or remit the Common Taxes and Contributions, according to the wealth, or want of the People and *Common-wealth.* If the people be increaſed in Wealth, the Taxes and Subſidies may be increaſed. If they be poor, and their Wealth diminiſh, ſpecially by dearth, want of Traffick, *&c.* to forbear Taxes and Impoſitions, or to take little. Otherwiſe grudge and diſcontentments muſt needs follow. The *Sophiſms* that ſerve for Impoſitions, are theſe, and other of like ſort, To pretend buſineſſe of great charge, as War, building of Ships, making of Havens, Caſtles, Fortifications, *&c.* for the Common defence; ſometimes by Lotteries and like deviſes, wherein ſome part may be beſtowed, the reſt reſerved for other expences; but Princely dealings needs no pretences.

13. To Provide that the *Diſcipline* & *Training* of youth of the better ſort be ſuch as agreeth with that *Common-wealth:* As that in a Kingdome, the ſons of Noble men to be attendant at the Court, that they may be accuſtomed to obedience towards the Prince. In the *Senatory State*, that the ſons of the *Senatours* be not idlely, norover-

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daintily brought up, but well instructed & trained up in *Learning*, *Tongues*, and *Martial Exercise*; that they may be able to bear that place in the Common-wealth, which there Father held, and contrarywise, in a *Popular State*.

14. To take heed, least their *Sophisms*, or secret practises for the continuance & maintenance of that *State*, be not discovered; least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves, but wisely used, and be with great secrecie.

Particular Rules.

Rules and *Axioms*, for preserving of a Kingdome. { *Hereditary.* / *Conquered.*

Kingdomes Hereditary, are preserved at home by the ordering.

1. HImself, *viz.* By the tempering and moderation of the Princes *Power* and *Prerogative*. For the lesse and more *temperate* their *Power* and *State* is the more firm, and stable is their

their Kingdom and Government; because they seem to be further off from a Master-like, and *Tyrannical Empire*; and lesse unequal in condition to the next degree, to wit, the *Nobility*, and so lesse subject to grudge and envie.

2. *Nobility*, &c. By keeping that degree and due *proportion*, that neither they exceed in number more than the Realm, or *State* can bear, as the *Scottish* Kingdom, and sometime the *English*, when the Realm was overcharged with the number of *Dukes*, *Earls*, and other *Nobles*; whereby the *Authority of the Prince* was eclipsed, and the Realm troubled with their *Factions and Ambitions*. Nor that any one excel in Honour, power, or wealth, as that he resemble another King within the Kingdom, as the house of *Lancaster* within this Realm. To that end, not to load any with too much Honour or preferment, because it is hard even for the best, and worthiest men, to bear their greatnesse, and high Fortune temperately, as appeareth by infinite examples in all *States*. The *Sophisms* for preventing, or reforming this inconvenience, are to be used with great caution and wisdom. If any

great

great perſon be to be abated, not do deal with him by *calumniation* or *forged matter*, and ſo to cut him off without deſert, eſpecially if he be gracious among the people, after the *Machiavilian Policie*, which beſides the injuſtice, is an occaſion many times of greater danger towards the Prince. Not to withdraw their Honour all at once, which maketh a deſperate *diſcontentment* in the party, and a commiſeration in the people, and ſo greater love, if he be gracious for his virtue, and publick ſervice. Not to baniſh him into foreign Countreys, where he may have opportunity of practiſing with *Foreign States*, whereof great danger may enſue, as in the example of *Coriolanus*, *Henry* the fourth, and ſuch like. But to uſe theſe, and the like *Sophiſms*, *viz.* To abate their greatneſſe by degrees, as *David*, *Ioabs*, *Iuſtinian*, *Belliſarius*, &c. To advance ſome other men to as great, or greater Honour, to ſhadow, or over-mate the greatneſſe of the other. To draw from him by degrees his friends, and followers by *preferments*, *rewards*, and other good and lawful means; eſpecially, to be provided that theſe great men be not imployed in great or powerful affairs of the

the *Common wealth*, whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the *State*.

3. *People*, *viz*. So to order and behave himself, that he be loved and reverenced of the *People*. For that the Prince need not greatly fear home conspiracies, or foreign Invasion, if he be firmly loved of his own people. The reason, for that the Rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise, nor any refuge, being discovered and put to flight, if the multitude affect their Prince: But the common people being once offended, hath cause to fear every moving, both at home and abroad. This may be effected by the Prince, if he use means and art of getting the favour of the people, and avoid those things that breed hatred & contempt; *viz*. if he seem as a *Tutor*, or a *Father* to love the people, and to protect them, if he maintain the peace of his Kingdome; For that nothing is more popular, nor more pleasing to the people, than is peace.

4 If he shew himself oftentimes graciously, yet with *State* and *Majestie* to his people, and receive complaints of his suppliants, and such like.

5. If

5. If he ſit himſelf ſometimes in open *Courts*, and place of *Juſtice* that he may ſeem to have a care of Juſtice among his people. If he beſtow many benefits and graces upon that Citie, which he maketh the *ſeat of his Empire*, and ſo make it ſure and faithfull unto him, which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdome, as the heart in the middle of the body, or the Sun in the middle of Heaven, both to divide himſelf more eaſily into all the parts of his Dominions; and leaſt the furtheſt parts at one end move, whileſt the Prince is in the other. If he goe in progreſſe many times to ſee his Provinces, eſpecially, thoſe that are remote.

6. If he gratifie his *Courtiers* and *Attendants* in that ſort, and by ſuch means, as that he may ſeem not to pleaſure them with the hurt and injury of his people, as with *Monopolies*, and ſuch like.

7. If he commit the handling of ſuch things as procure envy, or ſeem grievous to his Miniſters, but reſerve thoſe things which are gratefull, and well pleaſing to himſelf, as the *French* Kings, who for that purpoſe, as may ſeem, have erected their *Court* at *Pa-*

ris,

ris, which acquitteth the Prince from grudge and envy, both with the *Nobles* and the *people*.

8. If he borrows ſometimes ſums of money of his people, though he have no need, and pay the ſame juſtly without *defalcation* of any part by his Exchequer, or other Officer.

9. If he avoid all ſuch things as may breed *hatred* or *contempt* of his perſon, which may be done, if he ſhew himſelf not too *light*, *inconſtant*, *hard*, *cruel*, *effeminate*, *fearful*, and *daſtardly*, &c. But contrariwiſe *Religious*, *Grave*, *Juſt*, *Valiant*, &c. Whereby appeareth the falſe doctrine of the *Machiavilian Policie*, with far the better means to keep the people in obedience, than love, and reverence of the people towards the Prince.

10. If the Prince be well furniſhed with Warlike proviſion, which is to be rumoured, and made known abroad: if it be known, that he is reverenced, and obeyed by his people at home.

11. If he provide ſo much as lieth in him, that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not overmuch in power and Dominion; which if it happen, he is to joyn ſpeedily with other Princes, which

are

are in like danger to abate that greatneſſe, and to ſtrengthen himſelf and the reſt againſt it. An overſight of the Chriſtian Princes towards the King of *Spain*.

12. If he get him Intelligencers by reward, or other means, to detect or hinder the deſigns of that Prince, with whom he hath differences, if any thing be intended againſt his *State*. Or at leaſt have ſome of his own Lydging abroad about that Princes *Court*, under colour of Embaſſage, or ſome other *pretence*; which muſt be men of *skill* and *Dexterity* to ſerve for that turn.

13. To obſerve the Laws of his Countrey, and not to encounter them with his *Prerogative*, nor to uſe it at all where there is a *Law*, for that it maketh a ſecret and juſt grudge in the peoples hearts, eſpecially if it tender to take from them *their commodities*, and to beſtow them upon other of his COURTIERS and *Miniſters*.

14. To provide eſpecially, That that part, *which favoureth the State* as it ſtandeth, be more potent then the other which *favoureth it not* or deſireth a change.

15. To

15. To make ſpecial choiſe of good and ſound men to bear the place of *Magiſtrates*, eſpecially of ſuch as aſſiſt the *Prince of his Counſels, and Policies*, and not to learn overmuch to his own advice, contrary to the rule of *Machiavil*, who teacheth; *That a Prince can have no good counſel, except it be in himſelf;* his reaſon, *becauſe if he uſe the counſel of ſome one, he is in danger to be over wrought, and ſupplanted by him;* and if he counſel with more, *Then he ſhall be diſtracted with the differences in opinions.* As if a Prince of great, or mean wiſdome, could not take the *Iudgement of all his councellours* in any point of *Policie*, or of ſo many as he himſelf thinketh good, and to take it either by word, or in writing; and himſelf then in private peruſe them all, and ſo *after good and mature deliberation*, make choice of the beſt, without any diſtraction or binding himſelf to the *direction of one* For the Proverb is true. *that two eyes ſee more then one;* and therefore the adviſes, and *Conſultations* of *a Senatory State*, is compared by ſome *to a Feaſt, or dinner, where many contribute towards the ſhot, by which means they have more variety of diſhes, and ſo better fare: and yet every man may make choice of*

that

that diſh that ſerveth him beſt for his health and appetite.

16. The Prince himſelf is to ſit ſometimes in place of publick juſtice, and to give an experiment of his wiſdom and equity, whereby great reverence and eſtimation is gotten, as in the example of *Solomon*, which may ſeem the reaſon, why our Kings of *England* had their Kings Bench in Place of publick juſtice, after the manner of the ancient Kings that ſate in the Gate; where for better performing of this Princely duty, ſome ſpecial cauſes may be ſelected, which may throughly be debated and conſidered upon by the Prince in Private, with the help and advice of his learned Councel, and ſo be decided publickly, as before is ſaid, by the Prince himſelf; At leaſt, the Prince is to take accompt of every Miniſter of publick Iuſtice, that it may be known, that he hath a care of Iuſtice, and doing right to his people, which makes the Iuſtices alſo to be more carefull in performing of their duties.

17. To be moderate in his Taxes, and impoſitions; and when need doth require to uſe the Subjects purſe, to doe it by Parliament, and with their con-

conſents, making the cauſe apparent unto them, and ſhewing his unwillingneſſe in charging them. Finally, ſo to uſe it, that it may ſeem rather an offer from his Subjects, than an exaction by him.

18. To ſtop ſmall beginnings; unto this end to compound the diſſentions that riſe amongſt the Nobles, with caution, that ſuch as are free be not drawn into parts, whereby many times the Prince is endangered, and the whole *Common wealth* ſet in a *combuſtion*; as in the example of the *Barons War*, and the late Wars of *France*, which grew from a quarrel betwixt the *Guiſian Faction*, and the other *Nobility*.

19. To ſtir up the people, if they grow ſecure, *and negligent of Armour*, and *other proviſion* for the *Commonwealth*, by ſome rumour or fear of danger at home, to make more ready when occaſion requireth. But this ſeldom to be uſed, leaſt it be ſuppoſed a falſe Alarm, when there is need indeed.

20. To have ſpecial care, that his children, eſpecially, the heir apparent, have ſuch bringing up as is meet for a King, *viz.* in learning, ſpecially of mat-

matters pertaining to *State*, and in Martial exercise, contrary to the practise of many Princes, who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure, and to spend their time in hunting, *&c.* which by reason of their defects, afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of *State*.

II.

Kingdoms new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by these means.

FIrst, if they have been Subjects before to his Ancestours, or have the same tongue, manners, or fashions, as have his own Countrey, it is an easy matter to retain such Countries within their obedience, in case the Princes blood of the said Countrey be wholly extinct. For men of the same *qualitie*, *tongue*, and *condition*, do easily *shole*, and *combine themselves together*, so much the rather, if the people of that Countrey have served before, and were not accustomed in their *own Liberty*, wherein especially is to be observed

ſerved, that the Laws and cuſtoms of that purchaſed Countrey be not altered nor innovated, or at leaſt it be done by little and little. So the *Burgurdians* and *Acquitans* were annexed to *France*. The reaſon, becauſe *partly they have been accuſtomed to ſerve, and partly, for that they will not eaſily agree about any other to be their Prince, if the Bloud Royal be once extinguiſhed.* As for the invaſion of a foreign Countrey, whereunto the Prince hath no right, or whereof the right heir is living: It is not the part of a juſt Civil Prince, much leſs a Chriſtian Prince to enforce ſuch a countrey; and therefore, the *Machiavillian* practiſes in this caſe, to make ſure work by extinguiſhing wholly the *Bloud Royal*, is lewd and impertinent: The like is to be ſaid of murthering the Natives, or the greateſt part of them, to the end he may hold the reſt in ſure poſſeſſion. A thing not onely againſt *Chriſtian Religion*, but it is inhumane injuſtice, cruel, and barbarous.

2. The ſafeſt way is, (ſuppoſing a right) that ſome good part of the Natives be tranſplanted into ſome other place, and our Colonies, conſiſting of ſo many as ſhall be thought meet,

meet, be planted there in ſome part of the Province, *Caſtles*, *Forts*, and *Havens*, ſeized upon, and more provided in fit places, as the manner was of the *Babylonian Monarch*, which *Tranſplanted* 10. *Iews*: And of the *Romans* in *France*, *Tribes of the Germany*, *Britany*, and other places. The reaſon:

1. For that otherwiſe Forces of Horſe and Foot, are to be maintained within the *Province*, which cannot be done without great charge.
2. For that the whole *Province* is troubled and grieved with removing and ſupplying the Army with victualls, carriages, *&c.*
3. For that Colonies are more ſure and faithfull, than the reſt.

As for the Natives that are removed from their former ſeats, they have no means to hurt, and the reſt of the Natives being free from the inconvenience, and fearing that themſelves may be ſo ſerved if they attempt any thing raſhly, are content to be quiet.

The *Turks* practiſe in *Aſia*, where the chief grounds and dwellings are poſſeſſed by the Souldiers,

whom they call *Timariatæ.*

That the Prince have his ſeat and his reſidence, in his new purchaſe, eſpecially, for a time, till things be well ſetled; eſpecially if the *Province* be great and large, as the *Turks* in *Greece:* The reaſons;

1. Becauſe the preſence of the Prince availeth much to keep things in order, and get the good will of his new Subjects.

2. They conceive that they have refuge by the Princes preſence, if they be oppreſſed by the Lieutenants, and inferiour Governours: Where it will be convenient for the winning the peoples hearts, that ſome example be made of puniſhing of ſuch as have committed any violence or oppreſſion.

3. Becauſe being preſent, he ſeeth and heareth what is thought and attempted; and ſo may quickly give remedy to it, which being abſent, he cannot do, or not do in time.

7. If the Prince himſelf cannot be preſent to reſide, then, to take heed that the charge of Governing, or new pur-

purchaſe be committed to ſuch as be ſure men, and of other meet quality that depend wholly upon the Princes favour, and not to Natives, or other of their own Subjects, that are gracious for their *Nobility*, or *Virtue*; eſpecially, if the *Province* be great, and ſomewhat far diſtant, which may ſoon ſeduce the unſetled affections of thoſe new ſubjects; As for ſuch *Governours*, as depend wholly upon the Princes favour, being not born, but created *Noble*, they will not ſo eaſily ſuffer themſelves to be won from their duty, and in caſe they would revolt, yet they are not able to make any great ſtrength, for that the people obey them but as inſtruments and Miniſters, to keep them in Subjection, and not for any ill will.

5. To have the children of the chief Noble men, and of greateſt Authority, Hoſtages with them in ſafe keeping, the more the better: For that no bond is ſtronger; than that of nature, to contain the Parents and Allies in obedience, and they the reſt.

6. To alter the laws but by degrees one after another, and to make other that are more behoovefull for the eſta-

bliſhing of the preſent *Government.*

6. To keep the people quiet and peaceable, and well affected ſo much as may be, that they may ſeem by being conquered, to have gotten a protectour, rather than a Tyrant; For the *Common-People*, if they enjoy peace, and be not diſtracted nor drawn from their buſineſſe, nor exacted upon beyond meaſure, are eaſily contained under obedience; Yet notwithſtanding, they are to be diſ-uſed from the practiſe of Arms, and other Exerciſes which increaſe courage, and be weakned of *Armor*, that they have neither ſpirit, nor will to rebell.

7. If there be any faction in the Countrey, to take to him the defence of the better and ſtronger part, and to combine with it, as *Cæſar* in *France.*

8. To look well to the *Borders*, and confining *Provinces*, and if any rule there of great, or equall power to himſelf, to joyn league with ſome other *Borderers*, though of leſſe ſtrength, to hinder the attempts (if any ſhould be) by ſuch neighbour Prince. For it happeneth often, that a Countrey infeſted by one neighbour Prince, calleth in an

another, of as great, or greater power, to assist and rescue it from the other that invadeth it; So the *Romans* were called into *Greece*, by the *Ætolians*; the *Saxons*, by the *Britains*, the *Danes*, by the *Saxons*.

9. To leave their Titles and dignities to the Natives, but the command and Authority, wholly to his own.

10. Not to put much trust, nor to practise too often the *Sophisms* of Policie, especially those that appertain to a Tyrannicall State, which are soon detected by men of Judgement, and so bring discredit to the Prince, and his Policy among the wiser, and better sort of his Subjects, whereof must needs follow very ill effects.

The *Sophisms* of Tyrants, are rather to be known, than practised, (which are for the supporting of their Tyrannicall States, by wise and good Princes, and are these, and such like as follow.

Rules Politick of Tyrants.

RVles practised by *Tyrants* are of 2 sorts, *viz.*

1. *Barbarous*, and *Professed*, which is

proper to thoſe that have got head, and have power ſufficient of themſelves, without others help, as in the *Turkiſh*, and *Ruſſe* Government.

2. *Sophiſticall*, and *Diſſembled*; As in ſome States that are reputed for good and lawfull *Monarchies*, but inclining to Tyrannies, proper to thoſe which are not yet ſetled, nor have power ſufficient of themſelves; but muſt uſe the power and help of others, and ſo are forced to be Politick *Sophiſters*.

I.

Sophiſms of a Barbarous and Profeſſed Tyranny.

TO expell and baniſh out of his Countrey all honeſt means, whereby his people may attain to learning, wiſdome, valour and other virtues, that they might be fit for that eſtate, and ſervile condition. For that theſe two, learning, and martiall exerciſe, effect two things moſt dangerous to a Tyranny: *viz.* Wiſdome and Valour. For that men of ſpirit and underſtanding, can hardly endure a Servile State.

To

To this end, to forbid learning of Liberall Arts, and Martiall exercise; As in the *Russe Government* so *Iulian* the *Apostate* dealt with the Christians. Contrariwise, to use his people to base occupations and Mechanicall Arts, to keep them from idlenesse, and to put away from them all high thoughts, and manly conceits, and to give them a liberty of drinking drunk, and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sorted, and so made unfit for great enterprises. So the *Egyptian* Kings dealt with the *Hebrews*; So the *Russe* Emperour with his *Russe* people: And *Charles* the Fifth with the *Netherlanders*, when he purposed to enclose their priviledges, and to bring them under his absolute Government.

2. To make sure to him, and his State, his *Military* men by reward, liberty, and other means, especially, his Guard, or *Prætorian Band*; That being partakers of the spoil and benefit, they make like that *State*, And continue firm to it; as the *Turk*, his *Ianizaries*; the *Russe*, his *Boyarens* &c.

3. To unarm his people of weapons, money, and all means, whereby they

may resist his power; And to that end, to have his set and ordinary exactions &c. Once in two, three, or four years, and sometimes yearly, as the *Turk* and *Russe*; who is wont to say, *That his people must be used as his flock of sheep*, viz. *Their fleece taken from them, least it overlade them, and grow too heavy; That they are like to his beard, that the more it was shaven the thicker it would grow.* And if there be any of extraordinary wealth, to borrow of them in the mean while, till the Tax come about, or upon some divised matter, to confiscate their goods, as the common practise is of the *Russe* and *Turk*.

4. To be still in Wars, to the end, his people may need a Captain: and that his Forces may be kept in practise, as the *Russe* doth yearly against the *Tartar*, *Polonian*, and *Sweden*, &c.

5. To cut off such as excell the rest in wealth, favour, or nobility; or be of a pregnant, or aspiring wit, and so are fearfull to a Tyrant; and to suffer none to hold office, or any honour, but onely of him; as the *Turk* his *Bashaes*; and the *Russe* his *Ruezzes*.

6. To forbid Guilds, Brotherhoods, Feastings and other Assemblies among the

the people, that they have no means or opportunity to conſpire, or conſer together of publick matters, or to maintain love amongſt themſelves, which is very dangerous to a Tyrant, the *Ruſſes* practiſe.

7. To have their Beagles, or liſtner in every corner, and parts of the Realm; eſpecially, in places that are moſt ſuſpect, to learn what every man ſaith, or thinketh; that they may prevent all attempts, and take away ſuch as miſlike their *State*.

8. To make *Schiſm*, and Diviſion among his Subjects, *viz.* To ſet one Noble man againſt another, and one Rich man againſt another, that through Faction & diſagreement among themſelves, they may be weakned, and attempt nothing againſt him, and by this means entertaining wiſperings, and complaints, he may know the ſecrets of both parts, and have matter againſt them both, when need requireth. So the *Ruſſe* made the Faction of the *Zemsky*, and the *Oppreſsiony*.

9. To have ſtrangers for his Guard, and to entertain *Paraſites*, and other baſe and ſervile fellows, not too wiſe, and yet ſubtile, that will be ready for reward to do and execute what he

commandeth, though never so wicked and unjust. For that good men cannot flatter, and wise men cannot serve a Tyrant.

All these practises, and such like, may be contracted into one or two, *viz.* To bereave his subjects of will and power to do him hurt, or to alter the present State. The use is caution, not Imitation.

II.

Sophisms of the Sophisticall, or subtile Tyrant, to hold up his State.

1. TO make shew of a good King, by observing a temper and mediocrity in his Government, and whole course of life; To which end, it is necessary, That this subtile Tyrant, be a cunning Polititian, or a Machiavilian at the least, and that he be taken so to be, for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded, and is thought thereby: not unworthy for to Govern others.

2. To make shew not of severity, but of gravity, by seeming reverent, and

and not terrible in his ſpeech, and geſture, and habit, and other demeanour.

3. To pretend care of the Common-wealth; And to that end, to ſeem loath to exact Tributes, and other charges; and yet to make neceſſity of it, where none is: To that end to procure ſuch War as can bring no danger toward his *State*, and that might eaſily be compounded, or ſome other chargeable buſineſſe; and to continue it on; that he may continue his exaction and contribution ſo long as he liſt. And thereof to imploy ſome in his publick ſervice, the reſt to hoord up in his Treaſury, which is ſometimes practiſed even by lawfull Princes, as *Edward* the Fourth in his Wars againſt *France*, when have levied a great ſum of money throughout his Realm, eſpecially of the *Londoners*, he went over Seas, and returned without any thing doing.

4. Sometimes to give an account by open ſpeech, and publick writing, of the expence of ſuch Taxes and Impoſitions, as he hath received of his ſubjects, that he may ſeem to be a good husband and frugal, and not a robber of the Common-wealth.

5. To

5. To that end, to beſtow ſome coſt upon publick buildings, or ſome other work for the Common good, eſpecially upon the Ports, Forts, and chief Cities of his Realm, that ſo he may ſeem a benefactour, and have a delight in the adorning of his Countrey, or doing ſome good for it.

6. To forbid feaſtings, and other meetings, which increaſe love, and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters, under pretence of ſparing coſt for better uſes, To that end the Curfieu Bell was firſt ordained by *William the Conquerour*, to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour.

7. To take heed that no one grow to be over-great, but rather, many equally great, that they may envy, and contend one with anorher; and if he reſolve to weaken any of this ſort, to do it warily and by degrees; If quite to wreck him, and to have his life, yet to give him a lawfull tryal, after the manner of his Country; And if he proceed ſo far with any of great power and eſtimation, as to do him contumely, or diſgrace, not to ſuffer him to eſcape, becauſe contumely and diſgrace, are things contrary unto Honour,

nour, which great ſpirits do moſt deſire, and ſo are moved rather to a revenge for their diſgrace, than to any thankfulneſſe, or acknowledging the Princes favour for their pardon or diſmiſſion: True in *Atheiſts*, but not in true *Chriſtian Nobility*.

8. To unarm his people, and ſtore up their weapons, under pretence of keeping them ſafe, and having them ready when ſervice requireth, and then to arm with them ſuch, and many as he ſhall think meet, and to commit them to ſuch as are ſure men.

9. To make ſchiſm or diviſion under hand among his Nobility, and betwixt the Nobility and the people, and to ſet one Rich man againſt another, that th y combine not together, and that himſelf by hearing the griefs and complaints, may know the ſecrets of both parts, and ſo have matter againſt them both, when it liſteth him to call them to an account.

10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong, ſpecially, about womens matters, by attempting the chaſtity of their Wives or Daughters, which hath been the ruine of many Tyrants, and converſion of their States. As of *Tarquinius*

quinius, by *Brutus*, *Appius*, by *Virginius*, *Pisistratus*, by *Harmodius*, *Alexander Medices*, Duke of *Florence*, *Aloisus* of *Placentia*, *Rodericus*, King of *Spain*, &c.

11. To that end, to be moderate in his pleasures, or to use them closely that he be not seen; For that men sober, or watchfull, or such as seem so, are not lightly subject to contempt, or conspiracies of their own.

12. To reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enterprize; or do any speciall action for the Common-wealth, in that manner as it may seem, they could not be better regarded, in case they lived in a *Free State*.

13. All rewards and things gratefull, to come from himself, but all punishments, exactions, and things ungratefull, to come from his Officers, and publick Ministers; And when he hath effected what he would by them, if he see his people discontented withall, to make them a Sacrifice to pacifie his Subjects.

14. To pretend great care of Religion, and of serving God, (which hath been the manner of the wickedest

Ty-

Tyrants) for that people do leſſe fear any hurt from thoſe, whom they do think Virtuous and Religious, nor attempt likely to doe them hurt, for that they think that God protects them.

15. To have a ſtrong and ſure Guard of forreign Soldiers, and to bind them by good turns, that they having at leaſt profit, may depend upon him and the preſent State; As *Caligula*, the *German* Guard, where the Nobility are many and mighty. The like practiſed by Lawfull Kings, as by the *French* King.

16. To procure that other great perſons be in the ſame fault, or caſe with them, that for that cauſe they be forced to defend the TYRANT, for their own ſafety.

17. To take part, and to joyn himſelf with the ſtronger part; if the Common people, and mean degree be the ſtronger, to joyn with them; if the Rich and Noble, to joyn with them. For ſo that part with his own ſtrength, will be ever able to overmatch the other.

18. So to frame his manners and whole behaviour, as that he may ſeem,

if

if not perfectly good, yet tolerably evil, or somewhat good, somewhat bad.

These Rules of Hypocriticall Tyrants are to be known, that they may be avoided, and met withall, and not drawn into imitation

Preservation of an Aristocracie.

RUles to preserve a *Senatory State*, are partly taken from the common Axioms, and partly from those that preserve a Kingdome.

Preservation of an Oligarchie, *by* } Sophisms. } Rules.

1. IN Consultations and Assemblies about publick affairs, to order the matter, that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Assemblies, and Councels; but to impose a Fine upon the richer sort, If they omit that duty. On the other side, to pardon the people, if they absent themselves, and to bear with them under

der pretence, that they may the bettert intend their Occupations, and not be hindred in their trades, and earnings.

2. In election of Magistrates, and Officers: To suffer the poorer sort to vow, and abjure the bearing of Office, under colour of sparing them, or to enjoyn some great charge, as incident to the Office, which the poor cannot bear. But to impose some great Fine upon those that be rich, if they refuse to bear Office, being Elect unto it.

3. In judicial matters: In like manner to order, that the people may be absent from publick Trials, under pretence of following their business. But the richer to be present, and to compel them by Fines, to frequenr the Court.

4. In Warlike exercise and Arms: That the poor be not forced to have Armor, Horse, *&c.* under pretence of sparing their cost, nor to be drawn from their trades by Martiall exercises; but to compel the Richer sort to keep their proportion of Armor, Horse, *&c.* by excessive Fines, and to exercise themselves in Warlike matters, *&c.*

5. To

5. To have ſpecial care of inſtructing their children in liberal Arts, Policy, and Warlike exerciſe, and to obſerve good order and diſcipline. For as *Popular States* are preſerved by the frequency, and Liberty of the people, ſo this Government of the Richer, is preſerved by diſcipline, and *good order* of *Governours*.

6. To provide good ſtore of warlike furniture, eſpecially of *Horſe* & *Horſemen*, and of *Armed men*, viz *Pike*, &c. which are proper to the Gentry, as *ſhot*, and light furniture are for a *Popular Company*.

7. To put in practiſe ſome points of a *Popular State*; viz. To lade no one man with too much preferment; To make yearly or half years Magiſtrates, &c. For that the people are pleaſed with ſuch things, and they are better ſecured by this means from the rule of one. And if any grow to too much greatneſs, to abate him by the *Sophiſms* fit for this State.

8. To commit the Offices and Magiſtracies, to thoſe that are beſt able to bear the greateſt charges for publick matters, which both tendeth to the conſervation of this State, and pleaſeth the people, for that they reap ſome re-

relief, and benefit by it.

9. To the same end, To contract marriages among themselves; the rich with the rich, *&c.*

10. In some things which concern not the *Points*, and *matters of State*, as Electing Magistrates, Making Laws, *&c.* to give an equality, or sometimes a preferment to the Common People, and not to doe, as in some *Oligarchies* they were wont; *viz.* To swear against the People, to suppresse and bridle them; but rather contrary, To minister an Oath at their admission, *That they shall do no wrong to any of the People*; and if any of the richer offer *wrong* to any of the *Commons*, to shew some example of severe punishment.

For other *Axioms* that preserve this State, they are to be borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a *Popular*, and *Tyrannical State*; for the strict kind of *Oligarchie* is kin to a Tyranny.

Preservation of a popular State; { *Sophisms.* / *Rules* or *Axioms.*

1. IN publick Assemblies and Consultations about matters of State, creating of Magistrates, publick Justice, and Exercise of Arms, to practise the contrary to the former kind of Government, to wit, an *Oligarchie.* For in Popular States, the Commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those Assemblies, Magistrates, Offices, Warlike Exercise, *&c.* By mulcts and rewards, and the richer sort are to be spared, and not to be forced by fine, or otherwise, to frequent these Exercises.

2. To make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men, and not to swear against them, as the manner hath been in some Popular States; but rather to prefer them in all other matters, that concern not the State and publick Government.

3. To elect Magistrates from among the Commons by Lot, or Ballating, and not to choose any for their wealths sake.

4. To take heed, that no man bear office twice, except it be Military, where the pay, & salary, *&c.* is to be reserved in their

their own hands, to be disposed of by a Common Councel, &c. And to see that no man be too highly preferred.

5. That no Magistracy be perpetual, but as short as may be, to wit, for a year, half a year, &c.

6. To compell Magistrates, when their time expireth, to give an accompt of their behaviour and government, and that publickly before the Commons.

7 To have publick Salaries and allowance of their Magistrates, Judges, &c. And yearly dividents for the common people, and such as have most need among them.

8. To make Judges of all matters out of all sorts, so they have some aptness to perform that duty.

9. To provide that publick Judgements and Trials be not frequent; and to that end to inflict great Fines and other punishments upon Pettifoggers & Dilators, as the law of requital, &c. Because for the most part the richer and nobler, and not the Commons are indited and accused in this Commonwealth, which causeth the rich to conspire against the State; whereby many times the popular State is turned into an *Oligarchie*, or some other Govern-

ment

ment. Hereto tendeth that Act of Civil Law, made againſt Accuſers and Calumniatours: *Ad Senatus-conſultum Turpilianum*, l. 1. *de Calumniatoribus.*

10. In ſuch free States as are popular, and have no revenue, to provide that publick Aſſemblies be not after: becauſe they want ſalary for Pleaders and Oratours; And if they be rich; yet to be wary, that all the revenue be not divided amongſt the Commons. For, that this diſtribution of the Common revenue among the multitude, is like a purſe or barrel without a bottom. But to provide, that a ſufficient part of the revenue be ſtored up for the publick affairs.

11. If the number of the poor encreaſe too much in this kind of State, to ſend ſome abroad out of the Cities into the next Countrey places, and to provide above all, that none do live idely, but be ſet to their trades. To this end, to provide that the richer men place in their Farms and Copie-holds, ſuch decayed Citizens.

12. To be well adviſed what is good for this State, and not to ſuppoſe that to be fit for a popular State, that ſeemeth moſt popular; but that which is, be for the continuance thereof: And

to

to that end, not to lay into the *Exchequer* or *Common Treasury*, such goods as are confiscate, but to store them up as holy and consecrate things, which except it be practised, confiscations, & fines of the Common people would be frequent, and so this State would decay by weakening the people.

Conversion of States in general.

CONversion of a State, is the declining of the Common-wealth either to some other form of Covernment, or to his full and last period appointed by God.

Causes of Conversions of States are of two sorts: General and Particular.

GEneral, (*viz*) 1. Want of Religion: *viz.* of the true knowledge and Worship of God, prescribed in his Word; and notable sins that proceed from thence in Prince and people, as in the examples *Saul, Vzziah*, the Jewish State; the four Monarchies, and all other.

2. Want

2. Want of wisdome and good Councel to keep the State, the Prince, Nobles, and people in good temper, and due proportion, according to their several order and degrees.

3. Want of Justice either in administration (as ill Laws, or ill Magistrates) or in the execution, as rewards not given where they should be, or there bestowed where they should not be, or punishments not inflicted where they should be.

4. Want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend it self, *viz.* Of provision, as Armor, Money, Captains, Souldiers, *&c.* Execution, when the means or provision is not used, or ill used.

5. *Particular*: To be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules, that are prescribed for the preservation of the Common-wealth.

Particular causes of Conversion of States, are of two sorts.

1. *Foreign*: By the over-greatnesse of invasion of some foreign Kingdome or other State of meaner power,

power, having a part within our own, which are to be prevented by the providence of the chief, and rules of policy for the preserving of every State: This falleth out very seldome for the great difficulty to overthrow a forreign State.

2. *Domestick.*
- Sedition or open violence by the stronger part.
- Alteration without violence.

Sedition.

Sedition is a power of inferiours opposing it self with force of Armes against the superiour power, *Quasi ditto secedens.*

Causes of Sedition are of two sorts.

1. *General*
- *Liberty.*
- *Riches.*

When they, that are of equal quality in a Commonwealth, or do take themselves so to be, are not regarded equally in all, or in any of these three.

Or, when they are

	so unequal in quality, or take themselves so to be, are regarded but equally, or with less respect than those
Honour.	that be of lesse defect in these three things, or in any of them.

1. IN *the Chief*: Covetousnesse or oppression, by the Magistrate or higher Power, (*viz.*) when the Magistrates, especially the Chief, encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure, either with the publick or (private calamity, whereby the Governours grow to quarrel among themselves as in *Oligarchies*) or the other degrees conspire together, and make quarrel against the Chief, as in Kingdoms: The examples of *Wat Tyler Iack Straw*, &c.

2. *In the Chief*: Injury, when great Spirits, and of great power, are greatly wronged & dishonoured, or take themselves so to be, as *Coriolanus*, *Cyrus minor*, Earl of *Warwick*. In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong.

3. Preferment, or want of preferment; wherein some have over much, and

and so wax proud and aspire higher: or have more or lesse than they deserve, as they suppose, & so in envie and disdain, seek Innovation by open Faction, so *Cæsar*, &c.

4. Some great necessity or calamity, So *Xerxes* after the foil of his great Army. And *Senacherib* after the losse of 185. in one night.

2 Particular. Chief.

1. *Envy*, when the chief exceed the mediocrity before mentioned, and so provoketh the Nobility, and other degrees, to conspire against him, as *Brutus Cassius*, &c. against *Cæsar*.

2, *Fear*, *viz.* Of danger when one or more dispatch the Prince by secret practise or force, to prevent his own danger, as *Artabanus* did *Xerxes*.

3. *Lust or Lechery*, as *Tarquinius Superbus*, by *Brutus*; *Pisistratidæ*, by *Armodius*; *Appius* by *Virginius*.

4. *Contempt*, For vile quality & base behaviour, as *Sardanapalus* by *Arbaces*, *Dionysius* the younger by *Dion*.

Other degrees. 5. *Contumely*; when some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit, who standeth upon his honour and reputation, as *Caligula* by *Chareas*.

Other degrees. 6. *Hope* of *Advancement*, or some great profit, as *Mithridates*, *Anobarsanes*.

Alteration without violence.

CAuses of alteration without violence are; 1. *Excesse* of the State; when by degrees the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was, or should have been setled, and exceedeth in power, riches, and absoluteneſſe in his kind, by the ambition and covetousnes of the chief immoderate taxes, and impositions, &c. applying all to his own benefit, without respect of other degrees and so in the end changeth it self into another State or form of Government, as a Kingdome into a Tyranny, an *Oligarchy* into an *Aristocracy*.

2. *Excesse*, of some one or more in the Common-wealth; *viz.* When some one or more in a Common-wealth grow

grow to an excellency or exceſſe above the reſt, either in honour, wealth, or virtue; and ſo by permiſſion and popular favour, are advanced to the Sovereignty: By which means, popular States grow into *Oligarchies*; and *Oligarchies* and *Ariſtocracies* into *Monarchies*. For which cauſe the *Athenians* and ſome other free States, made their Laws of *Oſtraciſmos*, to baniſh any for a time that ſhould excell, though it were in virtue, to prevent the alteration of their State; Which becauſe it is an unjuſt Law, 'tis better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the means, that none ſhould grow to that heighth and excellency, than to uſe ſo ſharp and unjuſt a remedy.

FINIS.

A METHOD How to make use of the Book before, in the reading of the Storie.

DAVID *being seventy yeares of age, was of Wisdome, Memory, &c. sufficient to govern his Kingdome;* 1. Reg. Cap. 1.

Old age is not ever unfit for publick Government.

DAVID *being of great years, and so having a cold, dry, and impotent body, married with* Abishag, *a fair maid, of the best complexion through the whole Realm, to revive his body, and prolong his life,* 1. Reg. Chap. 1. vers. 3.

Ex

Example of the like practise in *Charles* the Fifth.

DAvid *being old and impotent of bodie, by the advice of his Nobles and Phisitians, married a young Maid called* Abishag, *to warm and preserve his old bodie.*

Observation.

WHether David *did well in marrying a Maid? and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man, to marrie a young woman; or on the other side, for an old, worn, and decrepite woman, to marrie a young and lustie man.*

For the Affirmative.

ARG *The end of marriage is Society and mutuall comfort; but there may be Societie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old, and young partie.* Ergo 'tis Lawfull.

Answ. *Societie and comfort is a cause & effect of marriage; but none of the princi-*

pal

pal ends of marriage: which are:

1. Procreation of children, and so the continuance of mankind.
2. The avoiding of Fornication.

As for comfort and societie, they may be betwixt man and man, woman and woman, where no marriage is, and therefore no proper ends of marriage,

The Negative.

ARG 1. *That conjunction, which hath no respect to the right and proper ends, for which marriage was ordained by God, is no lawfull marriage. But the conjunction betwixt an old impotent and young partie, hath no respect to the right end, for which marriage was ordained by God.* Therefore is no lawfull marriage.

2, *No contract, wherein the partie contracting, bindeth himself to an impossible condition, or to doe that which he cannot doe, is good or lawful. But the contract of marriage by an impotent person with a young partie, bindeth him to an impossible condition to doe that which he cannot doe, viz. to perform the duties of Marriage; Therefore it is unlawfull,*

For the same cause, the civil Law determineth a nullity in these marriages, except the woman know before the infirmity of the man, in which case she can have no wrong, being a thing done with her own knowledge and consent, because Volenti non fit injuria: —In legem Julian. de adulteriis leg. Si Uxor, &c.

It provideth further, for the more certainty of the infirmitie, That three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage, because that men that have been infirm at the first, by reason of sickneſſe or some other accident, afterwards proved to be sufficient: De repudiis leg. in causis.

Defence for *David*, in marrying *Abishag*.

1. IT was rather a Medicine, than a marriage, without any evil, or disordered affection.

2. It was by the perswasion of his Nobles, and Physitians.

3. It was for the publick good, to prolong the life of a worthy Prince..

4. It was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid, who was made

acquainted with the Kings *infirmity, and to what end ſhe was married unto him; who if ſhe did it for the common good, and for duties ſake, having withal the gift of continency, ſhe is to be commended; if for ambition, or ſome vain reſpect, it is her own, and not* Davids *fault.*

Political Nobilitie.

Adonijah aſpiring to the Kingdome.

First, took the advantage of Davids *affection and kindneſſe towards him, and make him ſecure of any ill dealing.*

Secondly, of his age and infirmities, disabling his Father as unfit for Government.

Thirdly, blazed his title, and Right to the Crown.

Fourthly, got him Chariots, Horſemen, and Foot men, and a guard to make ſhew of State.

Fiftly, being a comely, and goodly Perſon, made a popular ſhew of himſelf, and his qualities.

Sixt

Sixtly, joyned to himself in Faction Joab, *the Generall of the Army, who was in displeasure for murthering of* Abner, *and* Amaza, *and feared that* David *would supply* Benajah *in his place, and so was discontented. And* Abiather *the high Priest, that was likewise discontented with* David, *for the preferment of* Zadok.

Seventhly, had meetings with them, and other his confederates under pretence of a vow, and offering at the Fountain of Raguel, *in the confines of* Judea.

Eighthly, made a shew of Religion by Sacrificing, &c.

Ninthly, made himself familiar with the Nobles and people, and entertained them with feasting.

Tenthly, drew into his part the chief Officers of the Court, and Servants to the King, by rewards, Familiarity &c.

Eleventhly, disgraced and abased the Competitour, and such as he knew would take part with him, and concealeth his ambition, and purpose from them.

Twelfthly, had Jonathan *a Favourite of the Court, and near about the King to give him intelligence, if any thing were discovered, and moved at the Court, whilest*

whileſt himſelf was in hand about his practiſe.

OBSERVATIONS.

Ways of ſuch as aſpire to the Kingdome, & marks to diſcern them.

1. They wind into the Princes favour by ſervice, officiouſneſſe, flatterie, &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyaltie and faithfulneſſe, thereby to make him ſecure of their practiſes.

2. They take advantage of the Princes infirmities, age, impotencie, negligence, ſex, &c. And work upon that by diſabling the Prince, and ſecret detracting of his State, and Government.

3. They blaze their Title, and claim to the Crown, if they have any with their friends and favourites.

4. They provide them in ſecret of extraordinarie forces, and furniture for the Wars, make much of good Soldiers, and have a pretence (if it be eſpied) of ſome other end, as for the Kings honour, or ſervice, and to be in readineſſe againſt forreign enemies, &c.

5. They

5. *They make open ſhew of their beſt qualities, and comlineſſe of their perſons (which though it be vain as a dumb ſhew, it is very effectuall to win the liking of the popular ſort, which according to the rule of the election of Kings, in the* Bees *Common-wealth; think that* Forma eſt digna imperare) *Activitie, Nobilitie, Anceſtrie,* &c.

6. *To have their blazers abroad to ſee out their virtues, and to prepare their friends in every Province.*

7. *To draw into their part, and make ſure unto them of the chief Peers, and men of beſt quality, ſuch as are mightieſt and moſt gracious with the ſouldiers, and the Militarie men, and moſt ſubtile and politick, eſpecially ſuch as be ambitious and diſcontent with the State.*

8. *To have meetings for conference under ſome pretence of ſome ordinarie matter in ſome convenient place, not too near, nor too far off, but where friends may beſt reſort and aſſemble unto them without ſuſpition.*

9. *To take up a ſhew, and pretence of Religion more than before, and beyond the practiſe of their former life.*

10. *They uſe popular courteſie (which in a great perſon is very effectual) feaſting, liberality, gaming,* &c.

11. *To*

11. *To be over liberal, and win to them by gifts, familiaritie, &c. the chief Officiers of the Court, and Governours of State.*

12. *To have some near about the Prince, to keep them in credit, and common suspition, if any arise.*

13. *To disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithfull to the Prince, and present* State, *or to the competitour, and to bring them into contempt by slander, detraction, and all means they can, and to conceal the designs from them, lest they be discovered before they be ripe.*

14. *To have some spie near about the Prince, to advertise them if any inckling suspition arise, whilest themselves are practising.*

Note the practises of Absolom, 2 Sam. 16. *And of* Cyrus minor *in* Xenophon; Περὶ ἀναβάσεως. cap. 1.

Political Prince.

David being a most worthy and excellent Prince for wisdome, valour, religion, and

and juſtice, and ſo highly deſerving of the Common-wealth, yet grown into age, grew withall into contempt, & had many both of his Nobles, & common people, that fell from him; firſt with *Abſolom*, then with *Adonijah*, who affected the Kingdome, & rebelled againſt him: For remedie whereof, he ſtirred up himſelf to publick actions, which might ſhew his vigour & ſufficiencie to manage the affairs of his Kingdom.

1. *After the victorie againſt* Abſolom, *he forced himſelf to forbear mourning, and ſhewed himſelf to his diſcontented Army, when all were like to fall from him, for his unreaſonable ſorrow and lamentation for his Son.*

2. *Af-*

2. *After the victorie, he caused a generall convention to be assembled of the whole Nation, to bring him home with honour to* Jerusalem, *which was a renewing, and re-establishing of him,* 2 Sam. 19. 12.

3. *He gave an experiment of his power and authoritie, by deposing a person of great authoritie and estimation, to wit* Joab, *General Captain of the Armie, and advancing* Amasa *in his place.*

4. *He sent kind messages to* Jerusalem, *and to her chief and head towns, and speciall men of* Judea, *his contributes, putting them of their alliance with him, with these words,* That they were of his own flesh and blood, *with protestation of his speciall love and affection towards them, to provide them with the like kindnesse and affection towards him.*

5. *He assembled a Parliament of his whole Realm, and took occasion upon the designing of his successour, to commend unto them the succession of his house, and the continuance and maintenance of Gods true worship and religion then established, and gave a grave and publick charge to his Successour now designed, touching the manner of his Government, and maintaining of Religion,* 1 Chron. 12. 13.

6. *He shewed his bountie and magnificence*

cence in congesting matter for building of the Temple, as gold, silver, brasse, &c. And caused it to be published and made known to the Parliament and whole Nation, 1. Chron. 22. 13.

7. *He revived the Church-Government, and set it in a right order, assigning to every Church-Officer his place and function.*

8. *He suppressed the faction of* Adonijah, *and ordained* Solomon *his Successor*, 1 Kings 1. 21. *By these means he retained his Majestie and Authoritie in his old age, as appeareth by the effect; for that being bed-rid, he suppressed the faction of* Adonijah, *(which was grown mighty, and was set on foot) with his bare commandment, and signification of his pleasure, and so he died in peace.*

FINIS.

SIR WALTER RALEIGH'S INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS SONNE: AND TO POSTERITIE

Corrected and enlarged according to the Authour's own Copie.

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SIR WALTER RALEIGH TO HIS SON.

CHAP. I.

Virtuous persons to be made choice of for friends.

THere is nothing more becomming any wise man, than to make choice of friends, for by them thou shalt be judged what thou art: let them therefore be wise and virtuous, and none of those that follow thee for gain; but make election rather

ther of thy betters, than thy Inferiours, ſhunning alwayes ſuch as are poor and needy: for if thou giveſt twenty gifts, and refuſe to doe the like but once, all that thou haſt done will be loſt, and ſuch men will become thy mortall enemies: Take alſo ſpecial care, that thou never truſt any friend or ſervant, with any matter that may endanger thine eſtate; for ſo ſhalt thou make thy ſelf a bond-ſlave to him that thou truſteſt, and leave thy ſelf alwayes to his mercy: And be ſure of this, thou ſhalt never find a friend in thy young years, whoſe conditions and qualities will pleaſe thee after thou comeſt to more diſcretion and judgement, and then all thou giveſt is loſt, and all wherein thou ſhalt truſt ſuch a one, will be diſcovered. Such therefore as are thy inferiours, will follow thee but to eat thee out, and when thou leaveſt to feed them, they will hate thee; and ſuch kind of men, if thou preſerve thy eſtate, will alwayes be had: And if thy friends be of better quality than thy ſelf, thou mayeſt be ſure of two things: the firſt, That they will be more carefull to keep thy counſel, becauſe they have more to loſe then thou haſt: the ſecond, They will eſteem

thee

thee for thy self, and not for that which thou doest possesse; but if thou be subject to any great vanity or ill (from which I hope God will blesse thee) then therein trust no man; for every mans folly ought to be his greatest secret. And although I perswade thee to associate thy self with thy betters, or at least with thy Peers, yet remember alwayes that thou venture not thy estate with any of those great ones, that shall attempt unlawfull things, for such men labour for themselves, and not for thee; thou shalt be sure to part with them in the danger, but not in the honour; and to venture a sure estate in present, in hope of a better in future, is meer madnesse: And great men forget such as have done them service, when they have obtained what they would, and will rather hate thee for saying thou hast been a mean of their advancement, than acknowledge it.

I could give thee a thousand examples, and I my self know it, and have tasted it in all the course of my life; when thou shalt read and observe the Stories of all Nations, thou shalt find innumerable examples of the like: Let thy love therefore be to the best,

so

ſo long as they do well; but take heed that thou love God, thy Countrey, thy Prince, and thine own eſtate, before all others: for the fancies of men change, and he that loves to day, hateth to morrow; but let reaſon be thy School-miſtreſſe, which ſhall ever guide thee aright.

CHAP. II.

Great care to be had in the chooſing of a Wife

THe next and greateſt care ought to be in the choice of a Wife, and the onely danger therein, is beauty, by which all men in all ages, wiſe and fooliſh, have been betrayed. And though I know it vain to uſe reaſons or arguments, to diſwade thee from being captivated therewith, there being few or none, that ever reſiſted that Witchery; yet I cannot omit to warn thee, as of other things, which may be thy ruine and deſtruction. For the preſent time, it is true, that every man prefers his fantaſie in that appetite, before all other worldly deſires, leaving the

the care of honour, credit, and ſafety in reſpect thereof; But remember, that though theſe affections doe not laſt, yet the bond of Marriage dureth to the end of thy life; and therefore better to be born withall in a Miſtreſſe, than in a Wife, for when thy humour ſhall change, thou art yet free to chuſe again (if thou give thy ſelf that vain liberty.) Remember ſecondly, that if thou marry for Beauty, thou bindeſt thy ſelf all thy life for that, which perchance will neither laſt nor pleaſe thee one year; and when thou haſt it, it will be to thee of no price at all, for the degree dieth when it is attained, & the affection periſheth, when it is ſatisfied. Remember, when thou wert a ſucking Child, that then thou didſt love thy Nurſe, and that thou wert fond of her, after a while thou didſt love thy Drie-nurſe, and didſt forget the other, after that thou didſt alſo deſpiſe her; ſo will it be with thee in thy liking in elder years; and therefore, though thou canſt not forbear to love, yet forbear to link, and after a while thou ſhalt find an alteration in thy ſelf, and ſee another far more pleaſing than the firſt, ſecond, or third Love; yet I wiſh thee above all the reſt, have a care thou

doſt

doſt not marry an uncomely Woman for any reſpect; for comelineſſe in Children is riches, if nothing elſe be left them. And if thou have care for thy races of horſes, and other beaſts, value the ſhape and comelineſſe of thy Children, before alliances or riches: have care therefore of both together, for if thou have a fair Wife and a poor one, if thine own eſtate be not great, aſſure thy ſelf that Love abideth not with want; for ſhe is thy companion of plenty and honour, for I never yet knew a poor Woman exceeding fair, that was not made diſhoneſt by one or other in the end. This *Bathſh ba* taught her Son *Solomon*; *Favour is deceitfull, and Beauty is vanity*: ſhe ſaith further, *That a wiſe woman overſeeth the wayes of her houſhold, and eateth not the bread of Idleneſſe.*

Have therefore ever more care, that thou be beloved of thy Wife, rather than thy ſelf beſotted on her; and thou ſhalt judge of her love by theſe two obſervations: firſt, If thou perceive ſhe have a care of thy eſtate, and exerciſe her ſelf therein; the other, If ſhe ſtudy to pleaſe thee, and be ſweet unto thee in converſation, without thy inſtruction, for Love needs no teach-

ing, nor precept. On the other ſide, be not ſower or ſtern to thy wife, for cruelty engendereth no other thing than hatred: Let her have equall part of thy Eſtate whileſt thou liveſt, if thou find her ſparing and honeſt; but what thou giveſt after thy death, remember that thou giveſt it to a ſtranger, and moſt times to an enemy, for he that ſhall marry thy wife, will deſpiſe thee, thy memory, and thine, and ſhall poſſeſſe the quiet of thy labours, the fruit which thou haſt planted, enjoy thy love, and ſpend with joy and eaſe what thou haſt ſpared, and gotten with care and travell: Yet alway, remember that thou leave not thy wife to be a ſhame unto thee after thou art dead, but that ſhe may live according to thy eſtate; eſpecially, if thou haſt few Children and them provided for. But howſoever it be, or whatſoever thou find, leave thy wife no more than of neceſſity thou muſt, but onely during her widowhood; for if ſhe love again, let her not enjoy her ſecond love in the ſame bed wherein ſhe loved thee, nor flie to future pleaſures with thoſe feathers which death hath pulled from thy wings; but leave thy eſtate to thy houſe and children, in which thou liveſt up-

on

on earth whileſt it laſteth. To conclude, Wives were ordained to continue the generation of men, not to transferre them, and diminiſh them, either in continuance or ability; and therefore thy houſe and eſtate, which liveth in thy Son, and not in thy Wife, is to be preferred. Let thy time of marriage be in thy young and ſtrong yeares; for believe it, ever the young wife betrayeth the old husband, and ſhe that had thee not in thy flower, will deſpiſe thee in thy fall, and thou ſhalt be unto her but a captivity and ſorrow. Thy beſt time will be towards thirty, for as the younger times are unfit, either to chuſe or to govern a wife and family; ſo if thou ſtay long, thou ſhalt hardly ſee the education of thy Children, which being left to ſtrangers, are in effect loſt, and better were it to be unborn, than ill bred; for thereby thy poſterity ſhall either periſh, or remain a ſhame to thy name and family. Furthermore, if it be late ere thou take a wife, thou ſhalt ſpend the prime and ſummer of thy life with Harlots, deſtroy thy health, impoveriſh thy eſtate, and endanger thy life; and be ſure of this, that how many Miſtreſſes ſoever thou haſt, ſo many enemies thou ſhalt

purchaſe to thy ſelf; for there never was any ſuch affection, which ended not in hatred or diſdain. Remember the ſaying of *Solomon, There is a way which ſeemeth right to a man, but the iſſues thereof are the wages of death*; for howſoever a lewd woman pleaſe thee for a time, thou wilt hate her in the end, and ſhe will ſtudy to deſtroy thee. If thou canſt not abſtain from them in thy vain and unbridled times, yet remember that thou ſoweſt on the ſands, & doſt mingle the vital bloud with corruption, and purchaſeſt diſeaſes, repentance, and hatred only. Beſtow therefore thy youth ſo, that thou may'ſt have comfort to remember it, when it hath forſaken thee, and not ſigh and grieve at the account thereof: whileſt thou art young thou wilt think it will never have an end; but behold the longeſt day hath his evening, and that thou ſhalt enjoy it but once, that it never turns again, uſe it therefore as the Spring-time, which ſoon departeth, and wherein thou oughteſt to plant, and ſow all proviſions for a long and happy life.

CHAP. III.

Wiſeſt men have been abuſed by flatterers.

TAke care thou be not made a fool, by flatterers, for even the wiſeſt men are abuſed by theſe. Know therefore, that flatterers are the worſt kind of Traitours; for they will ſtrengthen thy imperfections, encourage thee in all evils, correct thee in nothing, but ſo ſhadow and paint all thy vices, and follies, as thou ſhalt never, by their will, diſcern evil from good, or vice from virtue. And becauſe all men are apt to flatter themſelves, to entertain the additions of other mens praiſes is moſt perillous. Do not therefore praiſe thy ſelf, except thou wilt be counted a vain glorious fool, neither take delight in the praiſes of other men except thou deſerve it, and receive it from ſuch as are worthy and honeſt, and will withall warn thee of thy faults; for flatterers have never any virtue, they are ever baſe, creeping, cowardly perſons. A flatterer is ſaid to be a beaſt that biteth ſmiling, it is ſaid by *Iſaiah* in this man-

ner: *My people, they that praiſe thee ſeduce thee, & diſorder the paths of thyfeet*: and *David* deſired God to cut out the tongue of a flatterer. But it is hard to know them from friends, ſo are they obſequious and full of proteſtations; for as a *Wolf* reſembles a *Dog*, ſo doth a flatterer a friend. A flatterer is compared to an *Ape*, who becauſe ſhe cannot defend the houſe like a *Dog*, labour as an ox, or bear burdens as a horſe, doth therefore yet play tricks, and provoke laughter: Thou mayeſt be ſure that he that will in private tell thee thy faults, is thy friend, for he adventures thy miſlike, and doth hazard thy hatred; for there are few men that can endure it, every man for the moſt part delighting in ſelf-praiſe, which is one of the moſt univerſall follies which bewitcheth mankind.

CHAP. IV.

Private quarrels to be avoided.

BE carefull to avoid publick diſputations at Feaſt, or at Tables, among

mong cholerick or quarrelſome perſons; and eſchew evermore to be acquainted or familiar with Ruffians, for thou ſhalt be in as much danger in contending with a brawler in a private quarrel, as in a battel, wherein thou mayeſt get honour to thy ſelf and ſafety to thy Prince and Countrey; but if thou be once engaged, carry thy ſelf bravely, that they may fear thee after. To ſhun therefore private fight, be well adviſed in thy words and behaviour, for honour and ſhame is in the talk, and the tongue of a man cauſeth him to fall.

Jeſt not openly at thoſe that are ſimple, but remember how much thou art bound to God, who hath made thee wiſer. Defame not any woman publickly, though thou know her to be evil; for thoſe that are faulty cannot endure to be taxed, but will ſeek to be avenged of thee, and thoſe that are not guilty cannot endure unjuſt reproach. And as there is nothing more ſhamefull and diſhoneſt, than to do wrong, ſo truth it ſelf cutteth his throat that carrieth her publickly in every place. Remember the divine ſaying, *He that keepeth his mouth, keepeth his life.* Do therefore right to all

men where it may profit them, and thou ſhalt thereby get much love, and forbear to ſpeak evil things of men, though it be true (if thou be not conſtrained) and thereby thou ſhalt avoid malice and revenge.

Do not accuſe any man of any crime, if it be not to ſave thy ſelf, thy Prince, or Countrey; for there is nothing more diſhonourable (next to Treaſon it ſelf) than to be an Accuſer. Notwithſtanding I would not have thee for any reſpect looſe thy reputation, or endure publick diſgrace; for better it were not to live, than to live a coward, if the offence proceed not from thy ſelf; if it do, it ſhall be better to compound it upon good terms, than to hazard thy ſelf, for if thou overcome, thou art under the cruelty of the Law, if thou art overcome, thou art dead or diſhonoured. If thou therefore contend, or diſcourſe in argument; let it be with wiſe and ſober men, of whom hou mayeſt learn by reaſoning, and not with ignorant perſons, for thou ſhalt thereby inſtruct thoſe that will not thank thee, and utter, what they have learned from thee, for their own But if thou know more than othe men, utter it when it may do thee honour

nour, and not in aſſemblies of ignorant and common perſons.

Speaking much alſo, is a ſign of vanity; for he that is laviſh in words, is a niggard in deeds; and as *Solomon* ſaith, *The mouth of a wiſe man is in his heart, the heart of a fool is in his mouth, becauſe what he knoweth or thinketh, he uttereth*: And by thy words and diſcourſes, men will judge thee. For as *Socrates* ſaith, *Such as thy words are, ſuch will thy affections be eſteemed; and ſuch will thy deeds as thy affections, and ſuch thy life as thy deeds.* Therefore be adviſed what thou doſt diſcourſe of, what thou maintaineſt; whether touching Religion, State, or vanity; for if thou erre in the firſt, thou ſhalt be accounted profane; if in the ſecond, dangerous; if in the third, indiſcreet and fooliſh: He that cannot refrain from much ſpeaking, is like a City without walls, and leſſe pains in the world a man cannot take, than to hold his tongue; therefore, if thou obſerveſt this rule in all aſſemblies, thou ſhalt ſeldome erre, reſtrain thy choller, hearken much, and ſpeak little; for the tongue is the inſtrument of the greateſt good, and greateſt evil that is done in the world.

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According ro *Solomon*, *Life and death are in the power of the tongue*: and as *Euripides* truly affirmeth, *Every unbridled tongue, in the end ſhall find it ſelf unfortunate*; for in all that ever I obſerved in the courſe of worldly things, I ever found that mens fortunes are oftner made by their tongues than by their virtues, and more mens fortunes overthrown thereby alſo, than by their vices. And to conclude, all quarrels, miſchief, hatred, and deſtruction, ariſeth from unadviſed ſpeech, and in much ſpeech there are many errours, out of which thy enemies ſhall ever take the moſt dangerous advantage. And as thou ſhalt be happy, if thou thy ſelfe obſerve theſe things, ſo ſhall it be moſt profitable for thee to avoid their companies that erre in that kind, and not to hearken to Talebearers, to inquiſitive perſons, and ſuch as buſie themſelves with other mens eſtates, that creep into houſes as ſpies, to learn newes which concerns them not; for aſſure thy ſelf ſuch perſons are moſt baſe and unworthy, and I never knew any of them proſper, or reſpected amongſt worthy or wiſe men.

Take heed alſo that thou be not found a liar; for a lying ſpirit is hatefull both to God and man. A liar is commonly a Coward; for he dares not avow truth. A liar is truſted of no man he can have no credit, neither in publick nor private; and if there were no more arguments than this, know that our Lord in S. *Iohn* ſaith, *That it is a vice proper to Satan*, lying being oppoſite to the nature of God, which conſiſteth in Truth; and the gain of lying is nothing elſe, but not to be truſted of any, nor to be believed when we ſay the truth. It is ſaid in the *Proverbs*, *That God hateth falſe lips; and he that ſpeaketh lies ſhall periſh.* Thus thou mayeſt ſee and find in all the Books of God, how odious and contrary to God a liar is; and for the world, believe it, that it never did any man good (except in the extremity of ſaving life;) for a liar is of a baſe, unworthy, and cowardly ſpirit.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Three Rules to be observed for the preservation of a mans estate.

AMongst all other things of the World, take care of thy estate, which thou shalt ever preserve, if thou observe three things; First, that thou know what thou hast, what every thing is worth that thou hast, and to see that thou art not wasted by thy Servants and Officers. The second is, that thou never spend any thing before thou have it; for borrowing is the canker and death of every mans estate. The third is, that thou suffer not thy self to be wounded for other mens faults, and scourged for other mens offenses; which is, the surety for another, for thereby millions of men have been beggered and destroyed, paying the reckoning of other mens riot, and the charge of other mens folly and prodigality; if thou smart, smart for thine own sins, and above all things, be not made an Asse

to

to carry the burdens of other men: If any friend desire thee to be his surety, give him a part of what thou hast to spare, if he presse thee farther, he is not thy friend at all, for friendship rather chooseth harm to it selfe, than offereth it: If thou be bound for a stranger, thou art a fool; if for a merchant, thou putteſt thy estate to learn to swim: if for a Church-man, he hath no inheritance: if for a Lawyer, he will find an evasion by a syllable or word, to abuse thee, if for a poor man, thou must pay it thy self: if for a rich man, it need not: therefore from Suretie-ship, as from a Man-slayer, or Enchanter, blesse thy selfe; for the best profit and return will be this, that if thou force him for whom thou art bound, to pay it himselfe, he will become thy enemy, if thou use to pay it thy selfe, thou wilt be a beggar; and believe thy Father in this, and print it in thy thought, that what virtue soever thou hast, be it never so manifold, if thou be poor withall, thou, and thy qualities shall be despised: Besides, poverty is oft times sent as a curse of God, it is a shame amongst men, an imprisonment of the mind, a vexation of

every

every worthy ſpirit; thou ſhalt neither help thy ſelf nor others, thou ſhalt drown thee in all thy virtues, having no means to ſhew them, thou ſhalt be a burthen, and an Eye-ſore to thy friends, every man will fear thy company, thou ſhalt be driven baſely to beg, and depend on others, to flatter unworthy men, to make diſhoneſt ſhifts: and to conclude, poverty provokes a man to do infamous and deteſted deeds: Let no vanity therefore, or perſwaſion draw thee to that worſt of wordly miſeries.

If thou be rich, it will give thee pleaſure in health, comfort in ſickneſs, keep thy minde and body free, ſave thee from many perils, relieve thee in thy elder yeares, relieve the poor, and thy honeſt Friends, and give means to thy poſterity to live, and defend themſelves, and thine own fame, where it is ſaid in the *Proverbs*, *That he ſhall be ſore vexed that is ſurety for a ſtranger, and he that hateth ſuretiſhip is ſure.* It is further ſaid, *The poor is hated even of his own neighbour, but the rich have many friends.* Lend not to him that is mightier than thy ſelf, for if thou lendeſt him, count it but loſt;

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be not surety above thy power, for if thou be surety, think to pay it.

CHAP. VI.

What sort of Servants are fittest to be entertained.

LEt thy servants be such as thou mayest command, and entertain none about thee but Yeomen, to whom thou givest wages; for those that will serve thee without thy hire, will cost thee trebble as much as they that know thy fare: if thou trust any Servant with thy purse, be sure thou take his account ere thou sleep; for if thou put it off, thou wilt then afterwards, for tediousnesse, neglect it. I my self have thereby lost more than I am worth. And whatsoever thy servant gaineth thereby, he will never thank thee, but laugh thy simplicity to scorn; and besides 'tis the way to make thy servants thieves, which else would be honest.

CHAP. VII.

Brave Rags wear ſooneſt out of Faſhion.

EXceed not in the humour of rags and braverie; for theſe will ſoon wear out of faſhion; but money in thy Purſe will ever be in Faſhion; and no man is eſteemed for gay Garments, but by Fools and Women.

CHAP. VIII.

Riches not to be ſought by evil means.

ON the other ſide, take heed that thou ſeek not Riches baſely, nor attain them by evil means, deſtroy no man for his wealth, nor take any thing from the Poor; for the crie and complaint thereof will pierce the Heavens. And it is moſt deteſtable before God, and moſt diſhonourable before worthy men, to wreſt any thing from

from the needy and labouring Soul. God will never prosper thee in ought, if thou offend therein: But use thy poor neighbours and Tenants well, pine not them and their children, to adde superfluity and needlesse expences to thy self. He that hath pitie on another mans sorrow, shall be free from it himself; and he that delighteth in, and scorneth the misery of another, shall one time or other fall into it himself. Remember this Precept, *He that hath mercy on the poor lendeth unto the Lord, and the Lord will recompense him what he hath given.* I do not understand those for poor, which are vagabonds and beggars, but those that labour to live, such as are old and cannot travell, such poor Widows and Fatherlesse children as are ordered to be relieved, and the poor Tenants that travell to pay their Rents, and are driven to poverty by mischance, and not by riot or careless expences; on such have thou compassion, and God will blesse thee for it. Make not the hungry soul sorrowfull, defer not thy gift to the needy, for if he curse thee in the bitternesse of his soul, his prayer shall be heard of him that made him.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

What Inconveniences happen to ſuch as delight in VVine.

TAke eſpecial care that thou delight not in Wine, for there never was any man that came to honour or preferment that loved it; for it transformeth a man into a beaſt, decayeth health, poiſoneth the breath, deſtroyeth naturall heat, brings a mans ſtomach to an artificiall heat, deformeth the face, rotteth the teeth, and to conclude, maketh a man contemptible, ſoon old, and deſpiſed of all wiſe and worthy men; hated in thy ſervants, in thy ſelf and companions; for it is a bewitching and infectious vice; And remember my words, that it were better for a man to be ſubject to any vice, than to it, for all other vanities and ſins are recovered, but a Drunkard will never ſhake off the delight of beaſtlineſſe; for the longer it poſſeſſeth a man, the more he will delight in it, and the elder he groweth, the

the more he ſhall be ſubject to it; for it dulleth the ſpirits, and deſtroyeth the body, as Ivie doth the old Tree; or as the worm that engendereth in the kernel of the Nut.

Take heed therefore that ſuch a cureleſſe Canker paſſe not thy youth, nor ſuch a beaſtly infection thy old age; for then ſhall all thy life be but as the life of a beaſt, and after thy death, thou ſhalt onely leave a ſhamefull infamy to thy poſterity, who ſhall ſtudy to forget that ſuch a one was their Father. *Anacharſis* ſaith, *The firſt draught ſerveth for health, the ſecond for pleaſure, the third for ſhame, the fourth for madneſſe*; but in youth there is not ſo much as one draught permitted; for it putteth fire to fire; and waſteth the naturall heat and ſeed of generation. And therefore, except thou deſire to haſten thine end, take this for a generall rule, That thou never adde any artificiall heat to thy body by Wine or Spice, untill thou find that time hath decayed thy naturall heat, and the ſooner thou beginneſt to help nature, the ſooner ſhe will forſake thee, and truſt altogether to Art: *Who have misfortune*, ſaith *Solomon*

lomon, who have ſorrow and grief, who have trouble without fighting, ſtripes without cauſe, and faintneſſe of eyes? even they that ſit at wine, and ſtrain themſelves to empty Cups: Plinie ſaith, *Wine maketh the hand quivering, the eys waterie, the night unquiet, lewd dreams, a ſtinking breath in the morning, and an utter forgetfulneſſe of all things.*

Whoſoever loveth Wine, ſhall not be truſted of any man; for he cannot keep a ſecret. Wine maketh man not onely a beaſt, but a mad man; and if thou love it, thy own Wife, thy Children, and thy friends will deſpiſe thee. In drink men care not what they ſay, what offence they give, they forget comlineſſe, commit diſorders; and to conclude, offend all virtuous and honeſt company, and God moſt of all, to whom we daily pray for health, and a life free from pain: and yet by drunkenneſſe, and gluttony, (which is the drunkenneſſe of feeding) we draw on, ſaith *Heſiod*, a ſwift, haſty, untimely, cruell, and an infamous old age. And S. *Auguſtine* deſcribeth Drunkenneſſe in this manner: *Ebrietas eſt blandus Dæmon, dulce venenum ſuave*

ſuave peccatum ; quam, qui habet, ſeipſum non habet ; quam qui facit, peccatum non facit, ſed ipſi eſt peccatum.

Drunkenneſſe is a flattering Devil, a ſweet poiſon, a pleaſant ſin; which whoſoever hath, hath not himſelf, which whoſoever doth commit, doth not commit ſin, but he himſelf is wholly ſin.

Innocentius ſaith, *Quid turpius ebrioſo cui fœtor in ore, tremor in corpore, qui promit ſtulta, promit occulta, cui mens alienatur, facies transformatur; nullum ſecretum ubi regnat ebrietas, & quid non aliud deſignat malum, fœcundi calices quem non fecere diſertum ;*

What is filthier than a drunken man to whom there is ſtink in the mouth, trembling in the bodie; which uttereth fooliſh things, and revealeth ſecret things; whoſe mind is alienate, and face tranſformed? Whom have not plentifull cups made eloquent and talking?

When DIOGENES ſaw a houſe to be ſold, whereof the owner was given to drink, I thought at the laſt, quoth

quoth *Diogenes*, he would ſpue out a whole houſe; *Sciebam inquit, quod domus tandem emoveret.*

CHAP. X.

Let God be thy Protectour and Directour in all thy Actions.

NOw for the World, I know it too well, to perſwade thee to dive into the practiſes thereof, rather ſtand upon thine own guard againſt all that tempt thee thereunto, or may practiſe upon thee in thy conſcience, thy reputation, or thy purſe; reſolve that no man is wiſe or ſafe, but he that is honeſt.

Serve God, let him be the Authour of all thy actions, commend all thy endeavous to him that muſt either wither or proſper them, pleaſe him with prayer leaſt if he frown, he confound all thy fortunes and labours,

labours, like the drops of Rain on the ſandy ground : let my experienced advice, and fatherly inſtructions, ſink deep into thy heart. So God direct thee in all his ways, and fill thy heart with his grace.

FINIS.

The dutifull

ADTICE

OF

A LOVING SON

To his

AGED FATHER.

SIR,

I Humbly beseech you, both in respect of the honour of God, your duty to his Church, and the comfort of your own soul, that you seriously consider in what tearms you stand; and weigh your self in a Christian ballance; taking for your counterpoise the judgements of God: Take heed in time that the Word

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TEKEL written of old againſt *Belſhazzar*, and interpreted by *Daniel*, be not verified in you, whoſe expoſition was, *You have been poized in the Scale, and found of too light weight.*

Remember that you are now in the waining, and the date of your pilgrimage well nigh expired, and now that it behoveth you to look towards your Countrey, your forces languiſheth, your ſenſes impair, your body droops, and on every ſide, the ruinous Cottage of your faint and feeble fleſh, threatneth the fall: And having ſo many harbingers of death to premoniſh you of your end, how can you but prepare for ſo dreadfull a ſtranger. The young man may die quickly, but the old man cannot live long: the young mans life by caſuality may be abridged, but the old mans by no phyſick can be long adjourned, and therefore if green yeares ſhould ſometimes think of the grave, the thoughts of old age ſhould continually dwell in the ſame.

The prerogative of Infancy is innocency; of Child-hood, reverence; of Man-hood, maturity; and of old age, wiſdome.

And seeing then that the chiefest properties of wisdom, are to be mindfull of things past, carefull for things present, and provident for things to come: Use now the priviledge of natures talent, to the benefit of your own soul, and procure hereafter to be wise in well doing, and watchfull in the fore-sight of future harmes. To serve the world you are now unable; and though you were able, yet you have little cause to be willing, seeing that it never gave you but an unhappy welcome, a hurtfull entertainment, and now doth abandon you with an unfortunate fare-well.

You have long sowed in a field of flint, which could bring nothing forth but a crop of cares, and afflictions of spirit, rewarding your labours with remorse, and affording for your gain, eternal danger.

It is now more than a seasonable time to alter the course of so unthriving a husbandry, and to enter into the field of Gods Church, in which, sowing the seed of repentant sorrow, and watering them with the tears of humble contrition, you may hereafter reap a more beneficial harvest, and gather

ther the fruits of everlasting comfort.

Remember, I pray you, that your spring is spent, your summer over-past, you are now arrived at the fall of the leaf; yea, and winter colours have long since stained your hoary head.

Be not careleſſe (saith Saint *Auguſtine*) *though our loving Lord bear long with offenders; for the longer he ſtayes, not finding amendment, the ſorer he will ſcourge, when he comes to judgement: And his patience in ſo long forbearing, is onely to lend us reſpite to repent, and not any wiſe to enlarge us leiſure to ſin.*

He that is toſſed with variety of stormes, and cannot come to his desired Port, maketh not much way, but is much turmoiled. So, he that hath passed many yeares, and purchased little profit, hath a long being, but a short life: For, life is more to be measured by well doing, than by number of yeares; Seeing that most men by many dayes do but procure many deaths, and others in short space attain to the life of infinite ages; what is the body without the soul, but a corrupt carcasse? And what is the soul without

God, but a Sepulchre of ſin?

If God be the Way, the Life, and the Truth, he that goeth without him, ſtrayeth; and he that liveth without him, dieth; and he that is not taught by him, erreth.

Well (ſaith *Saint Auguſtine*) *God is our true and chiefeſt Life, from whom to revolt, is to fall; to whom to return, is to riſe; and in whom to ſtay, is to ſtand ſure.*

God is he, from whom to depart, is to die; to whom to repair, is to revive; and in whom to dwell is life for ever. Be not then of the number of thoſe that begin not to live, till they be readie to die: and then after a foes deſert, come to crave of God a friends entertainment.

Some there be that think to ſnatch Heaven in a moment, which the beſt can ſcarce attain unto in the maintainance of many yeares; and when they have glutted themſelves with worldly delights, would jump from *Dives* Diet to *Lazarus* Crown, from the ſervice of Satan, to the ſolace of a Saint.

But be you well aſſured, that God is not ſo penurious of friends, as to hold himſelf and his Kingdome ſaleable,

able for the refuse and reversions of their lives, who have sacrificed the principal thereof to his enemies, and their own brutish lust; then onely ceasing to offend, when the ability of offending is taken from them.

True it is, that a thief may be saved upon the crosse, and mercy found at the last gasp: *But well* (saith S. *Augustine*) *though it be possible, yet it is scarce credible, that he in death should find favour, whose whole life deserved death; and that the repentance should be more excepted, that more for fear of hell, and love of himself, than for the love of God, and loathsomnesse of sin, crieth for mercy.*

Wherefore, good SIR, make no longer delays; but being so near the breaking up of your mortall house, take time before extremity, to pacifie Gods anger.

Though you suffer the bud to be blasted, though you permitted the fruits to be perished, and the leaves to drie up; yea, though you let the boughs to wither, and the body of your tree to grow to decay, yet (alas) keep life in the root, for fear least the whole tree become fewel for hell fire;

For ſurely where the tree falleth, there it ſhall lie, whether towards the South or to the North, to heaven, or to hell; and ſuch ſap as it bringeth forth, ſuch fruit ſhall it ever bear.

Death hath alreadie filed from you the better part of your natural forces, and left you now to be Lees, and remiſſalls of your wearyiſh and dying dayes.

The remainder whereof, as it cannot be long, ſo doth it warn you ſpeedily to ranſom your former loſſes; for what is age, but the Calends of death? and what importeth your preſent weakneſſe, but an earneſt of your approaching diſſolution? you are now imbarked in your finall voyage, and not far from the ſtint and period of your courſe.

Be not therefore unprovided of ſuch appurtenances as are behoovefull in ſo perplexed and perrilous a Journey; death it ſelf is very fearfull, but much more terrible in reſpect of the judgement it ſummoneth usunto.

If you were now laid upon your departing bed, burthened with the heavie load of your former treſpaſſes, and gored with the ſting and price of a feſtered

ſtered conſcience; if you felt the cramp of death wreſting your heart-ſtrings, and ready to make the ruefull divorce between body and ſoul: If you lay panting for breath; and ſwimming in a cold and pale ſweat, wearied with ſtrugling againſt your deadly pangs, O what would you give for an hours repentance; at what rate would you value a dayes contrition? Then worlds would be worthleſſe in reſpect of a littie reſpite; a ſhort truce would ſeem more precious then the treaſures of an Empire; nothing would be ſo much eſteemed as a ſhort time of truce, which now by days, and moneths, and years, is moſt laviſhly miſpent.

Oh how deeply would it wound your woefull heart, when looking back into your former life, you conſidered many hainous and horrible offences committed, many pious works and godly deeds omitted, and neither of both repented, your ſervice to God promiſed, and not performed.

Oh how unconſolable were your caſe, your friends being fled, your ſenſes affrighted, your thoughts amazed, your memory decayed, and your whole mind agaſt, and no part able to per-

form what it ſhould ; but onely your guilty conſcience peſtered with ſin, that would continually upbraid you with many bitter accuſations.

Oh what would you think then, being ſtripped out of this mortall weed, and turned both out of ſervice and houſe-room of this wicked world, you are forced to enter into uncouth and ſtrange paths, and with unknown and ugly company, to be convented before a moſt ſevere Judge, carrying in your conſcience your Inditement, written in a perfect Regiſter of all your miſdeeds, when you ſhall ſee him prepared to give ſentence upon you, againſt whom you have ſo often tranſgreſſed, and the ſame to be your Umpire, whom by ſo many offences you have made your enemie, when not onely the Devil, but even the Angels would plead againſt you, and your own ſelf, in deſpight of your ſelf, be your own moſt ſharp appeacher.

Oh what would you doe in theſe dreadfull exigents, when you ſaw the ghaſtly Dragon, and huge gulph of hell, breaking out with moſt fearfull flames, when you heard the weeping, wailing, and gnaſhing of teeth ; the

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rage of those hellish monsters, the horrour of the place, the terrour of the company, and the eternity of all those torments.

Would you then think them wise that should delay in so weighty matters, and idlely play away the time allotted, to prevent these intollerable calamities? Would you then count it secure, to nurse in your own bosome so many Serpents as sins? and to foster in your soul so many malicious accusers, as mortall and horrible offences? Would you not think one life too little to repent in for so many, and so great iniquities, every one whereof were enough to throw you into those unspeakable and intollerable torments.

And why then (alass) do you not at the least devote that small remnant, and surplusage of these your latter dayes, procuring to make an atonement with God; and to free your Soul and Conscience from that corruption, which by your fall hath crept into it.

Those very eyes that behold, and read this discourse, those very eares that are attentive to hear it, and that very understanding that considereth

and conceiveth it, ſhall be cited as certain witneſſes of theſe rehearſed things. In your own body ſhall you experience theſe deadly Agonies; and in your Soul ſhall you feelingly find theſe terrible fears; yea, and your preſent eſtate is in danger of the deepeſt harms, if you do not the ſooner recover your ſelf into that fold and family of Gods faithfull ſervants.

What have you gotten by being ſo long a cuſtomer to the World, but falſe ware, ſuitable to the ſhop of ſuch a merchant, whoſe traffick is toyl, whoſe wealth is traſh, and whoſe gain is miſerie? What intereſt have you reaped, that might equall your detriment in grace and virtue? Or what could you find in the vale of tears, that was anſwerable to the favour of God, with loſſe whereof you were contented to buy it?

You cannot now be inveigled with the paſſions of youth, which making a partiality of things, ſets no diſtance between counterfeit and currant; for theſe are now worn out of force, by tract of time are fallen into reproof, by triall of their folly.

Oh let not the crazie cowardneſſe of

fleſh and bloud, daunt the proweſſe of an intelligent perſon, who by his wiſdome cannot but diſcern how much more cauſe there is, and how much more needfull it is to ſerve God, than this wicked world.

But if it be the ungrounded preſumption of the mercy of God, and the hope of his aſſiſtance at the laſt plunge (which indeed is the ordinary lure of the Devil to reclaim ſinners from the purſuit of Repentance) Alas, that is too palpable a colluſion to miſlead a ſound and ſerviceable man, howſoever it may prevail with ſick and ill-affected judgements: who would rely upon eternal affairs, upon the gliding ſlipperineſſe, and running ſtreams of our uncertain life? who, but one of diſtempered wits, would offer fraud to the Decipherer of all thoughts; with whom diſſemble we may to our coſt, but to deceive him, is impoſſible.

Shall we eſteem it cunning to rob the time for him, and beſtow it on his enemies, who keepeth tale of the leaſt minutes, and will examine in the end how every moment hath been imployed. It is a prepoſterous kind of policie, in any wiſe conceit to fight

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againſt God, till our weapons be blunted, our forces conſumed, our limbs impotent, and our beſt time ſpent; and then when we fall for faintneſſe, and have fought our ſelves almoſt dead to preſume on his mercy.

Oh! no, no, the wounds of his moſt ſacred body, ſo often rubbed, and renewed by our ſins and every part and parcel of our bodies ſo divers, and ſundry Wayes abuſed, will be then as ſo many whet-ſtones and incentives, to edge and exaſperate his moſt juſt revenge againſt us.

It is a ſtrange piece of Art, and a very exorbitant courſe, when the Ship is ſound, the Pilot well, the Marriners ſtrong, the Gale favourable, and the Sea calm; to lie idely at the road, burning ſo ſeaſonable weather: And when the Ship leaketh, the Pilot ſick, the Marriners faint, the Storms boyſterous, and the Seas a turmoil of outragious Surges, then to launch forth, (hoiſe up ſail) and ſet out for a long voyage into a far Countrey.

Yet ſuch is the skill of theſe evening Repenters, who though in the ſoundneſſe of their health, and perfect uſe of their reaſon, they cannot reſolve to

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cut the Cables, and weigh the Anchour that with-holds them from God.

Nevertheleſſe, they ſeed themſelves with a ſtrong perſwaſion, that when they are aſtonied, their wits diſtracted, the underſtanding dusked, and the bodies and ſouls wracked, and tormented with the throbs and gripes of a mortall ſickneſſe; then forſooth they will begin to think of their weightieſt matters, and become ſudden Saints, when they are ſcare able to behave themſelves like reaſonable creatures

No, no, if neither the Canon, Civil, nor the Common Law will allow that man (periſhed in judgement) ſhould make any Teſtament of his temporall ſubſtance; how can he that is animated with inward garboils of an unſettled conſcience, diſtrained with the wringing fits of his dying fleſh, maimed in all his ability, and circled in on every ſide with many and ſtrange incumbrances, be thought of due diſcretion to diſpoſe of his chiefeſt Jewell, which is his Soul? and to diſpatch the whole manage of all eternity, and of the treaſures of Heaven, in ſo ſhort a ſpurt?

No, no, they that will loyter in ſeed-time, and begin to ſow when others reap;

reap; they that will riot out their health, and begin to cast their accounts when they are scarce able to speak; they that will slumber out the day, and enter their their journey when the light doth fail them; let them blame their own folly, if they die in debt, and be eternall beggars, and fall head-long into the lap of endlesse perdition.

Let such listen to S. *Cyprian*'s lesson; *Let*, saith he, *the grievousnesse of our sore be the measure of our sorrow; let a deep wound have a deep and diligent cure; Let no mans Contrition be lesse than his Crime.*

FINIS.

Sr. *VValter Raleigh's*
SCEPTICK.

The SCEPTICK *doth neither affirm, neither deny any Position: but doubteth of it, and opposeth his Reasons against that which is affirmed, or denied, to justifie his not consenting.*

THis first Reason ariseth, from the consideration of the great difference amongst living Creatures, both in the matter and manner of their Generations, and the severall Constitutions of their bodies.

Some living Creatures are by copulation, and some without it: & that either by Fire, as Crickets in fornaces; or corrupt water, as Gnats; or slime, as Frogs; or dirt, as Worms; or herbs, as Canker-worms; some of ashes, as Beetles; some

ſome of trees, as the Worms *Pſenas* bred in the wild Fig-tree; ſome of living creatures putrified, as Bees of Bulls, and Waſps of Horſes. By Copulation many creatures are brought forth alive, as Man; ſome in the Egge, as Birds; ſome in an unſhapen piece of fleſh, as Bears. Theſe great differences cannot but cauſe a divers and contrary temperament, and qualitie in thoſe creatures, and conſequently, a great diverſity in their fantaſie and conceit; ſo that they apprehend one and the ſame object, yet they muſt do it after a divers manner: for it is not abſurd to affirm, That creatures differ ſo much in temperature, and yet agree in conceit concerning one and the ſame object.

Seeing. But this will more plainly appear, if the inſtruments of Senſe in the body be obſerved: for we ſhall find, that as theſe inſtruments are affected and diſpoſed, ſo doth the Imagination conceit that which by them is connexed unto it. That very object which ſeemeth unto us White, unto them which have the Jaundiſe ſeemeth Pale, and Red unto thoſe whoſe Eyes are bloud-ſhot. Foraſmuch then as living

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creatures have ſome white, ſome pale, ſome red eyes, why ſhould not one & the ſame object ſeem to ſome white, to ſome red, to ſome pale? If a man rub his eye, the figure of that which he beholdeth ſeemeth long or narrow; is it then not likely, that thoſe creatures which have a long and ſlanting Pupill of the eye, as Goats, Foxes, Cats, &c. do convey the faſhion of that which they behold under another form to the imagination, than thoſe that have round Pupils do?

Who knoweth not, that a Glaſſe preſenteth the outward object ſmoother, or greater, according to the making of the glaſſe? If it be hollow, the object ſeemeth ſmaller than it is; if the glaſſe be crooked, then the object ſeemeth long and narrow. And glaſſes there be, which preſent the head of him that looketh in them, downwards, and the heels upwards. Now then, ſeeing the eye, which is the inſtrument of Sight, in ſome living creatures is more outward, in ſome more hollow, in ſome plain, in ſome greater, in ſome leſſe; it is very probable, that Fiſhes, Men, Lions, and Dogs, whoſe eyes ſo much differ, do not conceive the ſelf-ſame object after the

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ſame manner, but diverſly, according to the diverſitie of the eye, which offereth it unto the phantaſie.

Touching. The ſame reaſon holdeth in Touching; for ſeemeth it not abſurd to think, that thoſe creatures which are covered with Shells, thoſe which are covered with Scales, and which are covered with Hairs, and thoſe which are Smooth, ſhould all be alike ſenſible in Touching? and every one of them conveigh the image, or quality of the ſame object which they touch, in the very ſame degree of heat or cold, of drineſſe or moiſture, roughneſſe or ſmoothneſſe, unto the imagination?

Hearing. So might it be ſhewed in Hearing: for how can we think that the Ear which hath a narrow paſſage, & the Ear which hath an open & wide paſſage, do receive the ſame ſound in the ſame degree? or that the Ear whoſe inſide is full of hair, doth hear in the ſame juſt meaſure, that the Ear doth whoſe inſide is ſmooth? Since experience ſheweth, that if we ſtop, or half ſtop our Ears, the ſound cometh not to us in the ſame manner and degree that it doth if our Ears be open.

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Smelling. The like may be thought of Smelling: for man himſelf abounding with Fleagm, is otherwiſe affected in ſmelling, than he is, if the parts about the head be full of bloud; and many things afford a delightfull ſmell to ſome living creatures, which ſmell to other living creatures ſeemeth not to be ſo.

Taſting. In the Taſt the ſame reaſon appeareth; for to a rough and dry tongue, that very thing ſeemeth bitter (as in an Ague) which to the moiſter tongue ſeemeth not to be ſo. Divers creatures then having tongues drier, or moiſter, according to their ſeveral temperatures, when they taſt the ſame thing, muſt needs conceit it to be according as the inſtrument of their taſt is affected, either bitter, or ſweet, &c. For even as the hand in the ſtriking of the Harp, though the ſtroak be one, yet cauſeth a ſound, ſometimes high, ſometimes baſe, according to the quality of the ſtring that is ſtrucken: Even ſo one and the ſame outward object is diverſly judged of, and conceited, according to the ſeveral and divers qualities of the inſtrument of Senſe, which conveyeth it to the imagination. Oyntment is pleaſing

ſing to Man; but Beetles and Bees cannot abide it. Oyl to man is profitable; but it killeth Bees and Waſps. Cicuta feedeth Quails, & Henbane Sows; but both of theſe hurt Man. If a Man eat Ants he is ſick; but the Bear being ſick, recovereth by eating them.

If then one and the very ſame thing to the red eye ſeem red, to another pale, and white to another: If one and the ſame thing, ſeem not hot or cold, drie or moiſt, in the ſame degree to the ſeverall creatures which touch it: If one and the ſelf-ſame ſound ſeem more ſhrill to that creature which hath a narrow ear, and more baſe to him that hath an open ear: If the ſame thing, at the ſame time, ſeem to afford a pleaſant and diſpleaſant Smell to divers and ſeverall creatures: If that ſeem bitter in taſte to one, which to another ſeemeth ſweet, that to one hurtfull, which to another ſeemeth healthfull: I may report how theſe things appear divers to ſeverall creatures, and ſeem to produce divers effects.

But what they are in their own nature, whether red or white, bitter or ſweet, healthfull or hurtfull, I cannot tell. For why ſhould I preſume to pro-

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fer my conceit and imagination, in affirming that a thing is thus, or thus, in its own nature, becauſe it ſeemeth to me to be ſo, before the conceit of other living creatures, who may as well think it to be otherwiſe in each one nature, becauſe it appeareth otherwiſe to them than it doth to me?

They are living creatures as well as I: why then ſhould I condemn their conceit and fantaſie, concerning any thing, more than they may mine? They may be in the truth and I in errour, as well as I in truth, and they erre. If my conceit muſt be believed before theirs, great reaſon that it be proved to be truer than theirs. And this proof muſt be either by demonſtration, or without it. Without it none will believe. Certainly, if by demonſtration, then this demonſtration muſt ſeem to be true, or not ſeem to be true. If it ſeem to be true, then will it be a queſtion, whether it be ſo indeed as it ſeemeth to be; & to alledge that for a certain proof, which is uncertain and queſtionable, ſeemeth abſurd.

If it be ſaid, that the imagination of Man judgeth truer of the outward object, than the imagination of other li-

living creatures doth, and therefore to be credited above others, (beſides that which is already ſaid, this is eaſily refuted by comparing of Man with other creatures.

It is confeſſed, the Dog excelleth Man in ſmell, and in hearing: and whereas there is ſaid to be a two-fold diſcourſe, one of the mind, another of the tongue, and that of the mind is ſaid to be exerciſed in chuſing that which is convenient, and refuſing that which is hurtfull in knowledge, juſtice, and thankfulneſſe: This creature chuſeth his food, refuſeth the whip, fawneth on his Maſter, defendeth his houſe, revengeth himſelf of thoſe ſtrangers that hurt him. And *Homer* mentioneth *Argus* the Dog of *Ulyſſes*, who knew his maſter, having been from home ſo many years, that at his return all the people of his houſe had forgot him. This creature, ſaith *Chryſippus*, is not void of Logick: for when in following any beaſt, he cometh to three ſeverall wayes, he ſmelleth to the one, and then to the ſecond; and if he find that the beaſt which he purſueth be not fled one of theſe two wayes, he preſently without ſmelling any further to it, taketh the third way: which,

which, saith the same Philosopher, is as if he reasoned thus, the Beast must be gone either this, or this, or the other way; but neither this nor this; *Ergo*, the third: and so away he runneth.

If we consider his skill in Physick, it is sufficient to help himself: if he be wounded with a dart, he useth the help of his Teeth to take it out, of his Tongue to cleanse the wound from corruption: he seemeth to be well acquainted with the Precept of *Hippocrates*, who saith, that the Rest of the Foot is the Physick of the Foot, and therefore if his foot be hurt, he holdeth it up that it may rest: if he be sick, he giveth himself a Vomit by eating of Grasse, and recovereth himself. The Dog then we see is plentifully furnished with inward discourse.

Now outward speech is not needfull to make a creature reasonable, else a dumb Man were an unreasonable Creature.

And do not Philosophers themselves reject this as an enemy to knowledge? and therefore they are *silent* when they are instructed; and yet even as Barbarous and strange people of speech, but we understand it not, neither do we per-

perceive any great difference in their words: but a difference there ſeemeth to be, and they do expreſſe their thoughts and meanings one to another by thoſe words. Even ſo thoſe creatures, which are commonly called unreaſonable, do ſeem to parlie one with another; and by their ſpeech do underſtand one the other. Do not Birds by one kind of ſpeech call their young ones, and by another cauſe them to hide themſelves? Do they not by their ſeverall voices expreſſe their ſeverall paſſions of joy, of grief, of fear in ſuch manner, that their fellows underſtand them? Do they not by their voice foreſhew things to come? But we will return to that creature we firſt did inſtance in. The Dog delivereth one kind of voice when he hunteth, another when he howleth, another when he is beaten, and another when he is angry. Theſe creatures then are not void of outward ſpeech.

If then theſe creatures excell Man in ſenſe, and are equall to him in inward and outward diſcourſe, why ſhould not their conceits and imaginations conveigh the outward object in as true a manner as ours? and if ſo, then ſeeing their

their imaginations are divers, and they conceit it diverſly according to their divers temperaments, I may tell what the outward object ſeemeth to me; but what it ſeemeth to other creatures, or whether it be indeed that which it ſeemeth to me, or any other of them, I know not.

But be it granted, that the Judgement of Man in this caſe, is to be preferred before the Judgement of Beaſts; yet in Men there is great difference, both in reſpect of the outward ſhape, and alſo of the temperature of their bodies: For the bodie of the *Scythian* differeth in ſhape from the bodie of the *Indian*: the reaſon of it ariſeth (ſay the Dogmaticks) from a predominancie of humours in the one more than in the other; and as ſeverall humours are predominant, ſo are the phantaſies and conceits ſeverally framed and effected. So that our Countrey-men delight in one thing, the *Indian* not in that, but in another which we regard not. This would not be, if their conceits and ours were both alike; for then we ſhould like that which they do, and they would diſlike that which we would diſlike. It is evident alſo, that men differ very much

in the temperature of their bodies, elſe why ſhould ſome more eaſily digeſt Bief than ſhel-fiſh? and other be mad for the time, if they drink Wine? There was an old woman about *Arbeus*, which drunk three drams of *Cicuta* (every dram weighing ſixtie Barley corns, and eight drams to an ounce) without hurt. *Lyſis*, without hurt, took four drams of Poppie; and *Demophon*, which was Gentleman-Sewer to *Alexander*, was very cold when he ſtood in the ſun, or in a hot bath, but very hot when he ſtood in the ſhadow, *Athenagoras* felt no pain if a Scorpion ſtung him. And the *Pſilli* (a people in *Lybia*, whoſe bodies are venom to ſerpents) if they be ſtung by Serpents, or Aſps, receive no hurt at all.

The *Ethiopians*, which inhabit the river *Hydaſpis*, do eat Serpents and Scorpions without danger. *Lothericus* a Chirurgion, at the ſmell of a Sturgeon, would be for the time mad. *Andron* of *Argos*, was ſo little thirſtie, that without want of drink, he travelled through the hot and dry Countrey of *Lybia*. *Tiberius Cæſar* would ſee very well in the dark. *Ariſtotle* mentioneth of *Thratius*, who ſaid, that the image of

of a Man went alwayes before him.

If then it be ſo, that there be ſuch differences in Men, this muſt be by reaſon of the divers temperatures they have, and divers diſpoſitions of their conceit and imagination; for, if one hate, and another love the very ſame thing, it muſt be that their fantaſies differ, elſe all would love it, or all would hate it. Theſe Men then, may tell how theſe things ſeem to them good, or bad; but what they are in their own Nature they cannot tell.

If we will hearken to mens opinions, concerning one and the ſame mattet, thinking thereby to come to the knowledge of it, we ſhall find this to be impoſſible; for, either we muſt believe what all men ſay of it, or what ſome men onely ſay of it. To believe what all men ſay of one & the ſame thing, is not poſſible; for then we ſhall believe Contrarieties; for ſome men ſay, that that very thing is pleaſant, which other ſay is diſpleaſant. If it be ſaid, we muſt believe onely ſome men, then let it be ſhewed who thoſe ſome men are; for the *Platoniſts* will believe *Plato*, but the *Epicures Epicurus*, the *Pythagorians Pythagoras*, & other Philoſophers the

maſters of their own Sects: ſo that it is doubtfull, to which of all theſe we ſhall give credit. If it be ſaid, that we muſt credit the greateſt number; this ſeemeth childiſh: for there may be amongſt other Nations a greater number which deny that very point, which the greateſt number with us do affirm: ſo that hereof nothing can certainly be affirmed.

This argument ſeemeth to be further confirmed, if the differences of the Senſes of *Hearing*, *Seeing*, *Smelling*, *Touching*, and *Taſting* be conſidered; for that the Senſes differ, it ſeemeth plain.

Painted Tables (in which the art of Slanting is uſed) appear to the Eye, as if the parts of them were ſome higher, and ſome lower than the other, but to the Touch they ſeem not to be ſo.

Honey ſeemeth to the Tongue ſweet, but unpleaſant to the Eye: ſo Oyntment doth recreate the Smell, but it offendeth the Taſt. Rain-water is profitable to the Eyes, but it hurteth the Lungs. We may tell then, how theſe things ſeem to our ſeveral ſenſes, but what they are in their own nature we cannot tel: for why ſhould not a man

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credit any one of his ſenſes as well as the other?

Every object ſeemeth to be preſented diverſly unto the ſeverall inſtruments of Senſe. An Apple to the Touch ſeemeth ſmooth, ſweet to the Smell, and to the Eye yellow; but whether the Apple have one of theſe qualities onely, or more than theſe qualities, who can tell? The Organ hath many Pipes, all which are filled with the ſame blaſt of wind, varied according to the capacity of the ſeveral Pipes which receive it: even ſo the quality of the Apple may be but one, and this one quality may be varied, and ſeem yellow to the Eye, to the Touch ſmooth, and ſweet to the Smell, by reaſon of the divers inſtruments of the Senſe, which apprehend this one quality diverſly.

It may be alſo, that an Apple hath many qualities beſides; but we are not able to conceive them all, becauſe we want fit means and inſtruments to apprehend them. For ſuppoſe that ſome Man is born blind, and deaf, and yet can touch, ſmell, and taſt; this man will not think that there is any thing, which may be ſeen or heard, becauſe he wanteth the Senſes of hearing and

seeing; he will onely think there are those qualities in the object, which by reason of his three Senses he conceiveth: Even so the Apple may have many more qualities; but we cannot come to know them, because we want fit instruments for that purpose.

If it be replied, that Nature hath ordained as many instruments of Sense, as there are sensible objects; I demand, What Nature; for there it a confused controversie about the very Essence of Nature. Some affirming it to be one thing, others another, few agreeing: so that what the quality of an Apple is, or whether it hath one quality or many, I know not.

Let a man also consider, how many things that are separated, and by themselves, appear to differ from that which they seem to be, when they are in a mass or lump; the scrapings of the goats horn seems white, but in the horn hey seem black, but in the lump white. The stone *Tænarus*, being polished, seemeth white, but unpolished and rough, it seemeth yellow. Sands being separated, appear rough to the Touch, but a great heap, soft. I may then report, how these things appear, but whether they are so indeed, I know not.

Sir

Sr. *VValter Raleigh's*
OBSERVATIONS
Concerning the Cauſes of the Magnificencie *and* Opulencie of Cities.

THat the onely way to civilize & reform the ſavage and barbarous Lives, and corrupt Manners of ſuch people, is,

1. To be dealt withall by gentle and loving Converſation among them, to attain to the knowledge of their Language, and of the multitude of their ſpecial diſcommodities and inconveniencies in their manner of living.

2. The next is to get an admired reputation amongſt them, upon a ſolid and true foundation of Pietie, Juſtice, and Wiſdome, conjoyned with fortitude and power.

3. The third is, discreetly to possess them with a knowledge of the condition of their own estate. Thus *Orpheus* and *Amphion*, were said to draw after them the beasts of the field, *&c.*

And this must be first wrought by a visible representation, of the certaintie, truth, and sinceritie of these, together with the felicitie of a reformed estate.

All which is but to give foundation, bottom, and firm footing unto action, and to prepare them to receive wholesome and good advise, for the future profit and felicitie of themselves and their posteritie.

For the more commodious effecting of this Reformation in a rude and barbarous people, they are to be perswaded to withdraw and unite themselves into severall Colonies; that by it an interchangeable communication and commerce of all things may more commodiously be had, and that they may so live together in civility, for the better succour and welfare of one another: And thereby they may more easily be instructed in the Christian Faith, and governed under the Magistrates and Ministers of the King, or other

ther ſuperiour power, under whom this Reformation is ſought. Which courſe the Stoick tells, that *Theſeus* took, after he had taken upon him the Government of the *Athenians*, whereby he united all the people into one City, that before lived diſperſedly in many Villages. The like is put in practiſe at this day by the *Portugalls* and *Ieſuits*, that they may with leſſe difficultie and hinderance reform the rough behaviour, and ſavage life of the people of *Brazile*, who dwell ſcattered and diſperſed in caves and cottages made of boughs and leaves of the Palm-trees.

Alexander the Great built more than ſeventy Cities: *Seleucus* built three Cities, called *Apamea*, to the honour of his wife; and five called *Laodicea*, in memory of his mother; and five called *Seleucia*, to the honour of himſelf.

Safety for Defence of the People and their Goods, in and near the Town.

Situation for safety & Plenty.

IN the Situation of Cities, there is to be required a place of Safety, by ſome natural ſtrength, commodiouſneſſe for Navigation, and Conduct, for the attaining of plentie of all good things, for the ſuſtenance and comfort of mans life, and to draw trade and entercourſe of other Nations; as if the ſame be ſituate in ſuch ſort, as many people have need to repair thither for ſome natural commoditie or other of the Countrey, which by traffick and tranſportation of commodities, whereof they have more plentie than will ſupplie their own neceſſitie, or for receiving of things whereof they have ſcarcitie. And much bettet will it be, if the place afford ſome notable commoditie of it ſelf, from whence other Nations may more readily, and at better rate attain the ſame: likewiſe, and withall, be

be so fertil, pleasant, and healthfull of it self, that it may afford plentie of good things, for the delight and comfort of the inhabitants.

Multitude of Inhabitants. In former times, great Nations of Kings and Potentates have endured sharp conflicts, and held it high Policie, by all means to increase their Cities, with multitudes of inhabitants. And to this end the *Romans* ever furnished themselves with strength and power, to make their neighbour-people, of necessitie, willing to draw themselves to *Rome* to dwell, and overthrow their Towns and Villages of mean strength, down to the ground.

So did they for this cause utterly destroy many Cities, bringing alwayes the vanquished Captives to *Rome*, for the augmentation of that Citie.

Romulus, after a mighty fight with the *Sabines*, condescended to Peace, upon condition that *Tatius* their King should come with all their people to dwell at *Rome*: *Tatius* did accept, and made choice of the *Capitol*, and the Mount *Quirinalis* for his seat and Pallace.

The same course held *Tamberlane* the

the Great, whereby he enlarged the great *Samarcanda*, ſtill bringing unto it, the richeſt and wealthieſt Citizens he had ſubdued.

And the *Ottomans*, to make the City *Conſtantinople* rich and great, brought to it many thouſand Families, eſpecially Artificers out of the ſubdued Ciries, as *Mahomet* the great from *Trebizond*, *Selim* the Firſt from *Cairo*, and *Soliman* from *Tauris*.

Authority and neceſſity, without the conſideration of the conveniencies, and commodiouſneſſe of Situation above mentioned, are of ſmall moment in the foundation of a Citie; thereby onely it would be unlikely, either to grow or continue in Magnificencie or Opulencie: for if Profit, Height, and Delight go not companions therewith, no Authority or neceſſity can retain much People or Wealth.

But if the place whereupon a Citie is to be founded, be commodious for the aforeſaid conveniencies, which help greatly for the felicity of this life; then, no doubt; the ſame is likely to draw much abundance of people and riches unto the ſame, whereby it may, by the help of Arts and Induſtrie, in

time

time, become magnificent and glorious.

Unto the good estate, greatnesse, and glory of a City, those things hereafter mentioned doe greatly avail, and are of much importance, *viz.*

Religion. Religion, which is of such force and might, to amplifie Cities and Dominions, and of such attractive virtue to repleniſh the same with people and wealth, and to hold them in due obedience, as none can be more; for without adoration of some Dietie, no Common-wealth can subsist.

Witnesse *Ierusalem, Rome, Constantinople*, and all other Cities that have been famous for the profession of Religion, or Divine Worship. And no marvel, for there is not any thing in this world of more efficacie and force to allure and draw to it the hearts of Men, than God. which is the *summum bonum*. He is carefully desired, and continually sought for of all creatures; for all regard Him as their last end and refuge.

Light things apply themselves upwards, heavy things downwards; the Heavens to Revolution, the Herbs to flowers, Trees to bear fruit, Beasts to present their kind, and Man in seeking his tranquility and everlasting glo-

ry.

But forasmuch as God is of so high a nature as the sence and understanding of Man cannot conceive it, every man directly turnes himself to that place where he leaves some print of his power, or declares some sign of his assistance. And to such persons whom he seemeth more especially to have revealed himself.

Academies. Academies, and Schools of Learning with convenient immunities and priviledges for Scholars, and means for Recreation for Delight, are of great importance to enlarge and enrich a citie: forasmuch as men long for honour and profit, and of Arts and liberal sciences some bring certain wealth to men, and some promotions & preferments to honourable functions: for by this means, not onely young men, & those that are desirous of Learning and Virtue in the same Commonwealth, will be retained in their own Countrey; but also strangers will be drawn home to them. And the more will this be available if occasion be given to Scholars and students, to rise to degrees of Honour and preferment by their learned exercises, and that by the Policie of the same citie, good

Wits

Wirs be accounted of, and rewarded well: that the ſame Academies and Schools be ſtored with plentie of Doctours and learned men, of great fame and reputation.

Courts of Iuſtice. Courts of Iuſtice, with due execution of the ſame in a citie, doe much enable, enlarge, & enrich it; for it faſteneth a great liking in a citie ro virtuous men, and ſuch as be wealthy, that therein they may be free, and in ſafety from the violence of the oppreſſions of couetous and wicked men: and there will be rather reſort thither to inhabit, or traffick there as occaſions may miniſter unto them. And many others that have cauſe of ſuit will repair thither, whereas they may be ſure to find Iudgement and Iuſtice duely executed, whereby the citie muſt needs be enlarged and enriched: for our lives, and all that ever we have are in the hands of Iuſtice: ſo that if Iuſtice be not adminiſtred amongſt men, in vain is there any ſocietie and commerce, or any other thing can be profitable or ſafe; ſo much is love and charity failed, and iniquitie increaſed upon the face of the earth.

The

Artificers. The excellencie and multitude likewiſe of Artificers exerciſing their manuall Arts and Trades, do marvellouſly encreaſe and enrich a State, whereof ſome are neceſſary, ſome commodious for a civil life, other ſome are of pomp and ornament, and other ſome of delicacie and curioſity, whereof doth follow concourſe of people that labour and work, and current money which doth enrich and ſupply Materials for Labourers, and work-men, buying and ſelling, tranſportation from place to place, which doth employ and encreaſe the artificious and cunning parts of the wit of Man; and this art and exquiſitneſſe of workman-ſhip and skill is ſo powerfull herein, that it far excells the ſimple commodities and materials that Nature produceth; and is alone ſufficient of it ſelf to make a City or State, both magnificent and glorious: and the daily experience we have in theſe our dayes, and in former times, doth manifeſtly approve the ſame, and make evident without all contradiction.

Some naturall benefits that a City alſo may have for the excellency of Art,

or workman-ſhip of ſome ſpecial commodities above any other place, either through the quality of the Water, or other matter whatſoever, or ſome hidden myſterie of the inhabitants in working thereof, may be a great help for the enlargement and enriching of a City.

The command of a Countrey that affordeth ſom proper commoditie, is of it ſelf ſufficient mighrily to bring a City to great wealth, and to advance it to great power, and draweth thereby dependency and concourſe, much advantagious alſo, as well for the publick weal as the private perſon.

A City alſo may be Lord of much Merchandiſe and traffick, by means of the commodious ſituation to many Nations, to whom it ſerveth and hath relation to, as Ware-houſes, Roomth and Store-houſes, by reaſon whereof, the Nations adjoyning do uſe to reſort thereunto to make their proviſions of ſuch things. And this conſiſteth in the largeneſſe of the Ports, the fitneſſe of the gulphs and creeks of the Seas, in the Navigable rivers and channels, and the plain and ſafe wayes that leadeth to the City,

or

or that come, or turn by or near it. *Privi-ledge.* Priviledge and freedome from Customes and exactions, doth greatly encreaſe the Trade, and draw inhabitants to a citie, whereby the ſame may become both rich and powerfull; whereof the Marts and Fairs, and Markets bear good witneſſe, which are frequented with great concourſe of people, Tradeſmen and Merchants, for no other reſpect, but that they are there free and frank from Cuſtomes and exactions. And the cities in *Flanders* are lively teſtimonies hereof, where the Cuſtomes are verie ſmall.

By reaſon whereof all ſuch as have erected new Cities in times paſt to draw concourſe of people unto it, have granted large immunities, and priviledges at the leaſt, to the firſt inhabitants thereof.

The like have they done that have reſtored Cities emptied with Plague, conſumed with Wars, or afflicted with Famine, or ſome other ſcourge of God. In reſpect whereof, Freedome of Cities, hath been often granted to ſuch as would with their families, inhabit there, or would bring Corn

and

and other neceſſaries for proviſion of victual.

The *Romans*, to increaſe their Cities, made the Towns that well deſerved of them (which they after called *Municipia*) to be partakers of their franchiſes and priviledges.

The firſt deviſes of Rome *to allure ſtrangers, was a* Sanctuary.

The firſt means the *Romans* uſed to allure people to make their habitations rather in *Rome* than elſewhere, was the opening the Sanctuary, & giving liberty and freedom to all that would come unto them. In reſpect whereof, there flocked thither, with their goods, numbers of people that were either racked with exactions, thruſt out of their habitations, or unſafe, or unſure for their lives in their own Countries for Religion ſake.

The very ſame reaſon in a manner hath increaſed ſo much the citie of *Geneva*: foraſmuch as it hath offered entertainment to all comers out of *France* and *Italy*, that have either forſaken, or been exiled their Countries for Religions ſake.

Triumphs. Likewiſe, triumphs, goodly buildings, battels on the water ſights of ſword-players, hunting of wild beaſts,

beasts, publick shows and sights, plays solemnized with great pomp and preparation, and many other such things do draw the curious people to a City inspeakably, which leaves behind them much treasure, and for such cause will rather settle themselves to inhabit there, than in other places. This was also the devise of *Rome* in her infancy to enlarge her self.

The Causes that concern the Magnificencie of a City.

TO confirm a City in her greatnesse, *Iustice*, *Peace*, and *Plenty* are the undoubted means: for *Iustice* assureth every man his own: *Peace* causeth all Arts and negotiation whatsoever to flourish: and *Plenty* of food and victuall, that sustaineth the life of Man with ease and much contentment. To conclude, all those things that cause the Greatnesse of a City, are also fit to conserve the same.

Sir

Sir Walter Raleigh's Seat of GOVERNMENT.

That the Seat of Government *is upheld by the two great pillars thereof,* viz. *Civil* Justice, *and Martial* Policie, *which are framed out of* Husbandry, Merchandise, *and* Gentry *of this Kingdome.*

THey say, that the goodliest CEDARS which grow on the high mountains of *Libanus*, thrust their roots between the clifts of hard Rocks, the better to bear themselves against the strong storms that blow there. As Nature hath instructed those Kings of Trees, so hath Reason taught the Kings of Men, to root themselves in the hardie Hearts of their faithfull Subjects. And as those Kings

kings of Trees have large Tops, so have the Kings of Men large Crowns; whereof as the first would soon be broken from their bodies, were they not underborn by many branches; so would the other easily tytter, were they not fastened on their heads, with the strong chains of Civil *Iustice* and Martial *Discipline*.

1. For the administration of the first, even God himself hath given direction, *Iudges and Officers shalt thou make, which shall judge the People with righteous Iudgements*..

2. The second is grounded on the first Laws of the world and nature, that Force is to be repelled by Force. Yea *Moses* in the 20. of *Exodus*, and elsewhere, hath delivered us many Laws and Policies of War. But as we have heard of the neglect and abuse in both, so have we heard of the decline and ruine of many Kingdoms and States long before our daies: for that Policie hath never yet prevailed (though it hath served for a short season) where the counterfeit hath been sold for the natural, and the outward shew and formality for the substance. Of the Emperour *Charles* the Fourth, the

the writers of that age witneſſe, that he uſed but the name of *Iuſtice* and good order, being more learned in the Law than in doing right, and that he had by farre, more knowledge than conſcience. Certainly the unjuſt Magiſtrate that fancieth to himſelf a ſolid and untranſparable bodie of Gold, every ordinarie wit can vitrifie, and make tranſparent pieces, and diſcern their corruptions; howſoever, becauſe not daring, they cover their knowledge, but in the mean while it is alſo true, That conſtrained diſſimulation, either in the proud heart, or in the oppreſſed, either in publick eſtates, or in private perſons, where the fear of God is not prevalent, doth in all the leiſure of her lurking, but ſharpen her teeth, the voluntary being no leſſe baſe, than the forced malitious. Thus it fared between the Barons of *England* and their Kings, between the Lords of *Switzerland* and their people, between the *Sicilians* and the *French*, between the *Dolphin* and *Iohn* of *Burgoign*, between *Charles* the Ninth and the *French* Proteſtants, and between *Henry* the third, his ſucceſſour, and the Lords of *Guiſe*, hereof in place of more particulars,

lars, the whole world may ſerve for examples.

It is a difficult piece of Geographie to delineate and lay out the bounds of Authoritie; but it is eaſie enough to conceive the beſt uſe of it, & by which it hath maintained it ſelf in laſting happineſſe, it hath ever acquired more honour by perſwading, than by beating; for as the bonds of Reaſon and Love are immortal, ſo do all other chains or cords, both ruſtie and rot Noble parts of their own Royal & Politick bodies.

Huſband-men.

But we will forbear for a while to ſtretch this firſt ſtring of Civil *Iuſtice*; for in reſpect of the firſt ſort of Men, *to wit*, of thoſe that live by their own labour, they have never been diſpleaſed where they have been ſuffered to enjoy the fruit of their own travels. *Meum & Tuum*, Mine & Thine is all wherein they ſeek their certainty & protection. True it is, that they are the fruit-trees of the Land, which God in *Deuteronomie* commanded to be ſpared, they gather honey, and hardly enjoy the wax, and break the ground with great labour, giving the beſt of their grain to the eaſefull & idle.

For

Merchants. For the second sort, which are the Merchants, as the first feed the Kingdome, so do these enrich it, yea their trades, especially those which are forcible, are not the least part of our Martial *Policie*, as hereafter proved; and to do them right, they have in all ages and times assisted the Kings of this Land, not only with great sums of money, but with great Fleets of Ships in all their enterprises beyond the seas. The second have seldome or never offended their Princes, to enjoy their trades at home upon tolerable conditions, hath ever contented them for the injuries received from other Nations; give them but the Commission of Reprisal, they will either Right themselves, or sit down with their own losse without complaint.

Gentry. 3. The third sort, which are the Gentry of *England*, these being neither seated in the loweſt grounds, and thereby subject to the biting of every beast, nor in the highest Mountains, and thereby in danger to be torn with tempests; but the Valleys between both, have their parts in the inferiour Iustice, and being spread over all, are the Garrisons of good order throughout the Realm.

FINIS.

SIR
WALTER RALEIGH'S
OBSERVATIONS,

TOUCHING

Trade and Commerce with the HOLLANDER, and other Nations, as it was presented to

King JAMES.

Wherein is proved, that our Sea and Land Commodities serve to inrich and strengthen other Countries against our own.

With other Passages of high Concernment.

LONDON,
Printed for *William Sheers*, at the sign of the *Bible* in *Covent-Garden*, 1661.

May it pleaſe your moſt Excellent

MAJESTIE.

According to my duty, I am imboldned to put your Majeſty in mind, that about fourteen or fifteen yeares paſt, I preſented you a Book of ſuch extraordinary importance, for honour and profit of your Majeſty and poſterity, and doubting that it hath been laid aſide and not conſidered of, I am encouraged (under your Majeſties pardon) to preſent unto you one more, conſiſting of five propoſitions: neither are they grounded upon vain or idle grounds but upon the fruition of thoſe wonderfull bleſſings, wherewith God hath endued your Majeſties Sea and Land; by which means, you may not onely enrich and fill your Coffers, but alſo encreaſe ſuch might and ſtrength (as ſhall appear, if it may ſtand with your Majeſties good liking to put the ſame in execution in the true and right form:) ſo

that there is no doubt but it will make you in ſhort time a Prince of ſuch power, ſo great, as ſhall make all the Princes your neighbours, as well glad of your friendſhip, as fearfull to offend you. That this is ſo, I humbly deſire that your Majeſtie will vouchſafe to peruſe this advertiſement with that care and judgement which God hath given you.

Moſt humbly praying your Majeſty, that whereas I preſented theſe five Propoſitions together, as in their own natures, jointly depending one of another, and ſo linked together, as the diſtraction of any one will be an apparent maim and diſabling to the reſt. That your Majeſty would be pleaſed that they may not be ſeparated, but all handled together jointly and ſeverally by Commiſsioners, with as much ſpeed and ſecrecy as can be, and made fit to be reported to your Majeſty, whereby I may be the better able to perform to your Highneſſe that which I have promiſed and will perform upon my life, if I be not prevented by ſome that may ſeek to hinder the honour and profit of your Majeſtie for their own private ends.

The

The true ground, course and form herein mentioned, shall appear how other Countreys make themselves powerfull and rich in all kindes, by Merchandize, Manufactory, and fulnesse of Trade, having no Commodities in their own Countrey growing to doe it withall.

And herein likewise shall appear how easie it is to draw the wealth and strength of other Countries to your Kingdome, and what royall, rich, and plentifull means God hath given this Land to doe it (which cannot be denied) for support of traffick and continuall employment of your People, for repleni∫hing of your Maje∫ties Coffers.

And if I were not fully assured to improve your native Commodities, with other traffick, three millions of pounds more yearly then now they are, and to bring not onely to your Maje∫ties Coffers within the space of two or three yeares, near two millions of pounds, but to encrease your Revenues many thousands yearly, and to plea∫e and greatly profit your people, I would not have undertaken so great a work: All which will grow by advancement of all kind of Merchandizing to the uttermost, thereby to bring Manufactory into the Kingdome, and to set on work all

ſorts of people in the Realm, as other Nations do, which raiſe their greatneſſe by the abundance of your native commodities: Whilſt we are parling and diſputing whether it be good for us or not.

May

May it please your most excellent

MAJESTIE.

I Have diligently in my Travels observed how the Countreys herein mentioned do grow potent with abundance of all things to serve themselves and other Nations, where nothing groweth, and that their never dried fountains of wealth, by which they raise their estate to such an admirable height, as that they are at this day even a wonder to the world, proceedeth from your Majesties Seas and Lands.

I thus moved, began to dive into the depth of their policies and circumventing practises, whereby they drain and still covet to exhaust the wealth and coin of this Kingdome, and so with our own commodities to weaken us, and finally beat us quite out of trading in other Countries; I found that they more fully obtained these their purposes by their

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convenient priviledges, and settled constitutions, then *England* with all the Laws, and superabundance of honebred commodities which God hath vouchsafed your Sea and Land: And these, and other mentioned in this book, are the urgent causes that provoked me in my love and bounden duty to your Majesty and my Countrey, to addresse my former Books to your Princely hands and consideration.

By which Priviledges they draw multitudes of Merchants to Trade with them, and many other Nations to inhabit amongst them, which makes them populous, and there they make Storehouses of all foreign Commodities, wherewith upon every occasion of scarcity and dearth, they are able to furnish foreign Countries with plenty of those Commodities, which before in time of plenty they ingrossed, and brought home from the same places, which doth greatly augment power and treasure to their State, besides the common good in setting their poor and people on work.

To which priviledges they adde smalnesse of custome, and liberty of Trade, which maketh them flourish, and their

Coun-

Countrey ſo plentifull of all kind of Coyn and Commodities, where little or nothing groweth, and their Merchants ſo flouriſh, that when a loſſe cometh they ſcarce feel it.

To bring this to paſſe, they have many advantages of us, the one is, by their faſhioned Ships called *Boyers*, *Hoybarks*, *Hoyes*, and others, that are made to hold great bulke of Merchandize, and to ſail with a few men for profit; For example, though an *Engliſh* Ship of two hundred Tuns, and a *Holland* Ship, or any other of the petty States of the ſame burthen be at *Danske*, or any other place beyond the Seas, or in *England*, they doe ſerve the Merchant better cheap by one hundred pounds in his fraight, then we can, by reaſon he hath but nine or ten Mariners, and we near thirty; thus he ſaveth twenty mens meat and wages in a voyage, and ſo in all other their Ships, according to their burden, by which means they are fraighted whereſoever they come, to great profit, whilſt our Ships lie ſtill and decay, or go to *Newcaſtle* for Coales.

Of this their ſmallneſſe of cuſtome inwards and outwards, we have daily

experi-

experience: for if two *Engliſh* Ships, or two of any other Nation be at *Bordeaux*, both laden with Wine of three hundred Tuns a piece, the one bound for *Holland*, or any other petty States, the other for *England*, the Merchant ſhall pay about nine hundred pound cuſtome here, and other duties, when the other in *Holland*, or any other petty States, ſhall be cleared for leſſe then fiftie pound, and ſo in all other wares and Merchandizes accordingly, which drawes all Nations to traffick with them; and although it ſeems but ſmall duties which they receive, yet the multitudes of all kind of Commodities and Coyn that is brought in by themſelves and others, and carried out by themſelves and others, is ſo great, that they receive more cuſtome and duties to the State, by the greatneſſe of their commerce in one year, then *England* doth in two yeares; for the one hundredth part of Commodities are not ſpent in *Holland*, but vented into other Countreys, which maketh all the Countrey Merchants to buy and ſell, and encreaſe Ships and Mariners to tranſport them.

My travells and meaning is not to diminiſh

diminiſh (neither hath been) your Majeſties Revenues, but exceedingly to encreaſe them, as ſhall appear, and yet pleaſe the people, as in other parts they do.

Notwithſtanding, their Exciſes bring them in great Revenues, yet whoſoever will adventure to *Burdeaux* but for ſix Tuns of Wine, ſhall be free of Exciſe in his own houſe all the year long; and this is done of purpoſe to animate and encreaſe Merchants in their Countrey.

And if it happen that a Trade be ſtopped by any forreign Nation, which they heretofore uſually had, or hear of any good Trading which they never had, they will hinder others, and ſeek either by favour, money, or force, to open the gap of Traffick for advancement of Trade amongſt themſelves, and employment of their people.

And when there is a new courſe or Trade erected, they give free cuſtome inwards and outwards, for the better maintenance of Navigation, and encouragement of the people to that buſineſſe.

Thus they and others glean the wealth and ſtrength from us to themſelves,

ſelves, and theſe reaſons following procure them this advantage of us.

1. The Merchant Staplers which make all things in abundance, by reaſon of their Store-houſes continually repleniſhed with all kind of Commodities.

2. The liberty of free Traffick for ſtrangers to buy and ſell in *Holland*, and other Countreys and States, as if they were free-born, maketh great intercourſe.

3. The ſmall duties levied upon Merchants, draws all Nations to trade with them.

4. Their faſhioned Ships continually fraighted before ours by reaſon of their few Mariners, and great bulk, ſerving the Merchant cheap.

5. Their forwardneſſe to further all manner of trading.

6. Their wonderful imployment of their Buſſes for fiſhing, and the great returns they make.

7. Their giving free Cuſtome inwards and outwards, for any new erected Trade, by means whereof they have gotten already almoſt the ſole Trade into their hands.

All Nations may buy and ſell freely in

in *France*, and there is free cuſtome outwards twice or thrice in a year, at which time our Merchants themſelves do make their great ſales of Engliſh Commodities, and do buy and lade their great bulk of *French* Commodities to ſerve for the whole year; and in *Rochel* in *France*, and in *Britain*, free cuſtome all the year long, except ſome ſmall Toll, which makes great Traffick, and maketh them flouriſh.

In *Denmark* to encourage and inrich the Merchants, and to increaſe Ships and Mariners, free cuſtome all the year long for their own Merchants, except one Moneth between *Bartholomew tide* and *Michaelmaſſe*.

The *Haunce* Towns have advantage of us, as *Holland*, and other petty States have, and in moſt things imitate them, which makes them exceeding rich and plentiful of all kind of Commodities and Coyn, and ſo ſtrong in ſhips and Mariners, that ſome of their Townes have near one thouſand ſail of Ships.

The Merchandizes of *France*, *Portugal*, *Spain*, *Italy*, *Turkey*, *Eaſt* and *Weſt Indies*, are tranſported moſt by the *Hollanders* and other petty States into the *Eaſt* and *North-Eaſt* Kingdomes of *Pomer-*

merland, *Spruceland*, *Poland*, *Denmark*, *Sweedland*, *Leifland* and *Germany*, and the Merchandizes brought from the laſt mentioned Kingdomes, being wonderfull many, are likewiſe by the *Hollanders* and other petty States moſt tranſported into the *Southern* and *Weſtern* Dominions, and yet the ſituation of *England* lyeth far better for a Storehouſe to ſerve the *Southern-Eaſt* and *North-Eaſt* Regions, than theirs doth, and hath far better means to doe it, if we will bend our courſe for it.

No ſooner a dearth of Fiſh, Wine, or Corn here, and other Merchandize, but forthwith the *Embdeners*, *Hamburgers*, and *Hollanders* out of their Storehouſes lade fifty, or one hundred ſhips, or more, diſperſing themſelves round about this Kingdome, and carry away great ſtore of coyn and wealth for little commodity in thoſe times of dearth, by which means they ſuck our Commonwealth of their riches, cut down our Merchants, and decay our Navigation, not with their natural commodities which grow in their own Countries, but the Merchandizes of other Countries and Kingdomes.

Therefore it is far more eaſier to

ſerve

ſerve ourſelves, hold up our Merchants, and encreaſe our Ships and Mariners, and ſtrengthen the Kingdome, and not onely keep our money in our own Realm, which other Nations ſtill rob us of, but bring in theirs who carry ours away, and make the bank of Coyn and Store-houſe to ſerve other Nations as well and far better cheap than they.

Amſterdam is never without ſeven hundred thouſand Quarters of Corn, beſides the plenty they daily vent, and none of this groweth in their own Countrey: a Dearth in *England*, *France*, *Spain*, *Italy*, *Portugall*, and other places, is truly obſerved to enrich *Holland* ſeven yeares after, and likewiſe the petty States.

For example, the laſt Dearth ſix yeares paſt, the *Hamburgers*, *Embdeners*, and *Hollanders* out of their Store-houſes furniſhed this Kingdome, and from *Southampton*, *Exeter*, and *Briſtow*, in a year and a halfe they carried away near two hundred thouſand pounds from theſe parts onely; then what great quantity of Coyns was tranſported round about your Kingdome from every Port Town, and from your City

of

of *London*, and other Cities cannot be esteemed so little as two millions, to the great decay of your Kingdome, and impoverishing your people, discredit to the Company of Merchants, and dishonour to the Land, that any Nation that have no Corn in their own Countrey growing, should serve this famous Kingdome, which God hath so inabled within it self.

They have a continuall Trade into this Kingdome with five or six hundred Ships yearly, with Merchandizes of other Countreys and Kingdomes, and store them up in store-houses here untill the prices rise to their mindes, and we trade not with fifty Ships into their Countrey in a year, and the said number are about this Realm every Eastern winde for the most part to lade Coales and other Merchandize.

Unlesse there be a scarcity, or dearth, or high prices, all Merchants doe forbear that place where great impositions are laid upon the Merchandize, and those places slenderly shipped, ill served, and at dear rates, and oftentimes in scarcity, and want employment for the people; and those petty *States* finding truly by experience, that small duties

duties impoſed upon Merchandize draw all Traffick unto them, and free liberty for ſtrangers to buy and ſell doth make continuall Mart; therefore what Exciſes or impoſitions are laid upon the common people, yet they ſtill eaſe, uphold and maintain the Merchants by all poſſible means, of purpoſe to draw the wealth and ſtrength of Chriſtendome to themſelves: whereby it appeareth though the duties be but ſmall, yet the cuſtomes for going out and coming in do ſo abound, that they increaſe their Revenues greatly, and make profit, plenty and employment of all ſorts by Sea and Land to ſerve themſelves and other Nations, as is admirable to behold: And likewiſe the great commerce which groweth by the ſame means, enableth the common people to bear their burthen laid upon them, and yet they grow rich by reaſon of the great commerce and Trade, occaſioned by their convenient priviledges, and commodious conſtitutions.

There was an intercourſe of Traffick in *Genoa*, and there was the flower of commerce, as appeareth by their antient Records, and their ſumptuous buildings. For all Nations traded with Mer-

Merchandize to them, and there was the Store-house of all *Italy* and other places; but after they had set a great custome of xvi. *per cent*. all Nations left trading with them, which made them give themselves wholly to usury, and at this day we have not three ships goe there in a year: but to the contrary, the Duke of *Florence* builded *Ligorn*, and set small custome upon Merchandize, and gave them great and pleasing priviledges, which hath made a rich and strong City with a flourishing State.

Furthermore touching some particulars needfull to be considered, of the mighty huge fishing that ever could be heard of in the world, is upon the coasts of *England*, *Scotland*, and *Ireland*; but the great Fishery is in the *Low-Countries*, and other petty States, wherewith they serve themselves and all Christendome, as shall appear.

In four Towns in the *East* Kingdomes within the *Sound*; *Quinsbrough*, *Elbing*, *Statten*, and *Dantzick*, there are carried and vented in a year, between thirty or fourty thousand Last of Herrings sold but at fifteen or sixteen pounds the Last, is about 620000. *l*, and we none.

Be-

Beſides, *Denmark*, *Norway*, *Sweathen*, *Leifland*, *Rie*, *Nevill*, the *Narve*, and other Port Townes within the *Sound*, there is carried and vented above 10000. Laſts of *Herrings* ſold at fifteen or ſixteen pounds the Laſt, is 170000. pounds; more yearly in ſuch requeſt are our *Herrings* there, that they are often times ſold for 20. 24. 30. and 36. pound the Laſt, and we ſend not one barrell into all thoſe Eaſt Countreys.

The *Hollanders* ſent into *Ruſsia* near fifteen hundred Laſt of *Herrings*, ſold about thirty ſhillings the barrell, amounteth to 27000. pound, and we but about twenty or thirty Laſts.

To *Stoade*, *Hambrough*, *Breame*, and *Embden* upon the River of *Elve*, *Weaſer*, and *Embs*, are carried and vented of *Fiſh* and *Herrings* about 6000. Laſts, ſold about fifteen or ſixteen pound the Laſt, is 100000 l. and we none.

Cleaveland, *Gulickland*, up the River of *Rhine* to *Cullen*, *Frankford*, or the *Maine*, and ſo over all *Germany*, is carried and vented *Fiſh* and *Herrings* near 22000. Laſts, ſold at twenty pound the Laſt, is 44000 l. and we none.

Up

Up the River of *Maze*, *Leigh*, *Maſtrith*, *Vendlow*, *Sutphin*, *Deventer*, *Campen*, *Swoole*, and all over *Lukeland* is carried and vented 7000 Laſts of *Herrings*, ſold at twenty pound the Laſt, is 140000 pound, and we none.

To *Gilderland*, *Artois*, *Henault*, *Brabant*, *Flanders*, up the River of *Antwerp*, all over the Arch-Dukes Countreys, are carried and vented between eight or nine thouſand Laſts ſold at eighteen pound the Laſt is 171000 l. and we noue.

The *Hollanders* and others carried of all ſorts of *Herrings* to *Roane* onely in one year, beſides all other parts of *France*, 50000 Laſts of *Herrings* ſold at twenty pound the Laſt, is 100000 l. and we not one hundred Laſt thither: they are ſold oftentimes there for twenty, and four and twenty, and thirty pound the Laſt.

Between *Chriſtmaſſe* and *Lent*, the duties for *Fiſh* and *Herrings* came to 15000 Crowns at *Roane* onely that year, the late Queen deceaſed; Sir *Thomas Parrie* was Agent there then, and S. *Savors* his man knowes it to be true, who handled the buſineſſe for pulling down the Impoſitions then, what

what great ſummes of money came to all in the Port Towns to inrich the *French* Kings Coffers, and to all the Kings and States throughout Chriſtendome to inrich their Coffers; beſides the great quantity vented to the Straights, and the multitude ſpent in the *Low-Countries*, where there is likewiſe ſold for many a hundred thouſand pound more yearly, is neceſſary to be remembred; and the ſtream to be turned to the good of this Kingdome, to whoſe Sea coaſts God onely hath ſent and given theſe great bleſſings and multitude of riches for us to take, howſoever it hath been neglected to the hurt of this Kingdome, that any Nation ſhould carry away out of this Kingdome yearly great maſſes of money for Fiſh taken in our Seas, and ſold again by them to us, which muſt needs be a great diſhonour to our Nation, and hinderance to this Realm.

From any Port Town of any Kingdome within Chriſtendome, the Bridgemaſter or the Wharfmaſter for twenty ſhillings a year will deliver a true Note of the number of Laſts of Herrings brought to their Wharfes, and their prices commonly they are ſold at, but the num-

number brought to *Danske*, *Cullen*, *Roterdam*, and *Enchuſen* is ſo great, as it will coſt three, four, or five pound for a true Note.

The abundance of Corn groweth in the *Eaſt* Kingdomes, but the great Store-houſes for grain to ſerve Chriſtendome and the Heathen Countries in time of dearth, is in the *Low-Countries*, wherewith upon every occaſion of ſcarcity and dearth they do inrich themſelves ſeven years after, imploy their people, and get great fraights for their Ships in other Countries, and we not one in that courſe.

The mighty Vineyards and ſtore of Salt is in *France* and *Spain*; but the great Vintage and Staple of Salt is in the *Low-Countries*, and they ſend near one thouſand ſail of ſhips with Salt and Wine only into the *Eaſt* Kingdome yearly, beſides other places, and we not one in that courſe.

The exceeding Groves of Wood are in the *Eaſt* Kingdomes, but the huge piles of *Wainſcot*, *Clapboard*, *Firdeal*, *Maſts*, and Timber is in the *Low-countries*, where none grow, wherewith they ſerve themſelves, and other parts, and this Kingdome with thoſe Commodities;

ties; they have five or six hundred great long ſhips continually uſing that Trade, and we none in that courſe.

The *Wool*, *Cloth*, *Lead*, *Tin*, and divers other Commodities are in *England*, but by means of our *Wool* and *Cloth* going out ruff, undreſt, and undied, there is an exceeding *Manufactory* and *Drapery* in the *Low-Countreys*, wherewith they ſerve themſelves, and other Nations, and advance greatly the imployment of their people at home, and Traffick abroad, and put down ours in forraign parts, where our Merchants trade unto, with our own Commodities.

We ſend into the *Eaſt* Kingdomes yeerly but one hundred ſhips, ad our Trade chiefly dependeth upon three Towns, *Elbing*, *Kingsborough*, and *Danske*, for making our Sails, and buying their Commodities ſent into this Realme at dear rates, which this Kingdome bears the burthen of.

The *Low-Countreys* ſend into the *Eaſt* Kingdomes yeerly about three thouſand ſhips, trading into every City and Port Town, taking the advantage, and venting their Commodities to exceeding profit, and buying and lading their

ſhips with plenty of thoſe Commodities, which they have from every of thoſe Towns 20 *per cent.* better cheap then we, by reaſon of the difference of the Coyn, and their *fiſh* yields ready money, which greatly advanceth their Traffick, and decayeth ours.

They ſend into *France*, *Spain*, *Portugal*, *Italy*, from the *Eaſt* Kingdomes that paſſeth through the *Sound*, and through your narrow *Seas*, yearly of the *Eaſt* Countrey Commodities about two thouſand ſhips, and we none in that courſe.

They Trade into all Cities, and *Port* Towns in *France*, and we chiefly to five or ſix.

They traffick into every City and *Port* Town round about this Land, with five or ſix hundred ſhips yearly, and we chiefly but to three Towns in their Countrey, and but with forty ſhips.

Notwithſtanding the *Low-Countreys* have as many ſhips and veſſels as eleven Kingdomes of Chriſtendome have, let *England* be one, and build every yeer neer one thouſand ſhips, and not a timber tree growing in their own Countrie, and that alſo all their home bred Commodities

modities that grow in their Land in a yeere, (leſſe then one hundred good ſhips are able to carry them away at one time,) yet they handle the matter ſo for ſetting them all on work, that their Traffick with the Haunce Towns exceeds in ſhipping all Chriſtendome.

We have all things of our own in ſuperabundance to increaſe Traffick, and Timber to build ſhips, and Commodities of our own to lade about one thouſand ſhips and veſſells at one time, (beſides the great fiſhing) and as faſt as they have made their voyages might re-lade againe, and ſo yeare after year all the yeare long to continue, yet our *Ships* and Mariners decline, and Traffick and Merchants daily decay.

The maine bulke and Maſs of *Herrings* from whence they raiſe ſo many millions yearly that inrich other Kingdomes, *Kings* and *States* Coffers, and likewiſe their own people, proceedeth from your Seas and Lands, and the return of the Commodities and Coyn they bring home in exchange of fiſh and other Commodities are ſo huge, as would require a large diſcourſe apart; all the amends they make us is, they beat us out of Trade in all parts with

with our own Commodities.

For inſtance, we had a great Trade in *Ruſsia* ſeventy years, and about fourteen years paſt we ſent ſtore of goodly ſhips to trade in thoſe parts, and three years paſt we ſet out but four, and this laſt year two or three; but to the contrary the *Hollanders* about 20 years ſince traded thither with two ſhips onely, yet now they are increaſed to about thirty or fourty, and one of their ſhips is as great as two of ours, and at the ſame time (in their troubles there) that we decreaſed, they increaſed, and the chiefeſt Commodities they carry with them thither, is *Engliſh* Cloath, Herrings taken in our Seas, *Engliſh* Lead and Pewter made of our Tin, beſides other Commodities; all which we may do better then they. And although it be a cheap Countrey, and the Trade very gainfull, yet we have almoſt brought it to nought, by diſorderly trading, joynt-ſtock, and the Merchants banding themſelves one againſt another.

And ſo likewiſe we uſed to have 8. or 9. great ſhips to go continually a fiſhing to *Wardhouſe*, and this year but one, and ſo *per rato* they out-go us in all kind of fiſhing and merchandizing in all Countries,

tries, by reason they spare no cost, nor deny no priviledges that may incourage advancement of trade and manufactorie.

Now if it please, and with your Majesties good liking stand,

TO take notice of these things, which I have conceived to be fit for your Majesties consideration, which in all humblenesse (as duty bindeth me) I do tender unto your Majesty, for the unfeigned zeal I bear to the advancement of your honour and profit, and the general good of your subjects; it being apparent that no three Kingdomes in Christendome can compare with your Majesty for support of Traffick, and continually imployment of your people within themselves, having so many great means both by Sea and Land to inrich your Coffers, multiply your Navie, inlarge your Traffick, make your Kingdomes powerful, and your people rich; yet through idlenesse they are poor, wanting imployment, many of your Land and Coast Towns much ruinated, and your Kingdome in need

of Coyn, your Shipping, Traffick, and Mariners decayed, whileſt your Majeſties Neighbour Princes, without theſe means, abound in wealth, inlarge their Towns, increaſe their Shipping, Traffick, and Mariners, and find out ſuch imployment for their people, that they are all advantageous to their Commonwealth, only by ordaining commodious conſtitutions in Merchandizing, and fulneſſe of Trade in Manufactory.

God hath bleſt your Majeſty with incomparable benefits:

AS with Copper, Lead, Iron, Tin, Allum, Copperas, Saffron, Fells, and divers other native Commodities, to the number of about one hundred, and other Manufactories vendible to the number of about one thouſand, (as ſhall appear) beſides Corn, whereof great quantity of Beer is made, and moſt tranſported by ſtrangers, as alſo Wool, whereof much is ſhipped forth unwrought into Cloath or Stuffs, and Cloath tranſported undreſt and undied, which doth imploy and maintain near fifty thouſand people in foreign parts,

your

your Majeſties people wanting the imployment in *England*, many of them being inforced to live in great want, and ſeek it beyond the Seas.

Coals which do imploy hundreds of Strangers ſhips yearly to tranſport them out of this Kingdome, whileſt we doe not imploy twenty ſhips in that courſe.

Iron Ordnance, which is a jewell of great value, far more then it is accounted, by reaſon that no other Countrey could ever attain unto it, although they have aſſayed with great charge.

Your Majeſtie hath timber of your own for building of ſhips, and commodities plenty to lade them, which commodities other Nations want, yet your Majeſties people decline in Shipping, Traffick, and Mariners.

Theſe Inconveniencies happen by three cauſes eſpecially.

1. *The unprofitable courſe of merchandizing.*
2. *The want of courſe of full Manufactory of our home bred commodi-*

3. *The undervaluing of our Coynes, contrary to the rules of other Nations.*

For Inſtance.

THe Merchant Adventurers by over-trading upon credit, or with money taken up upon exchange, whereby they loſe uſually ten or twelve, and ſometimes fifteen or ſixteen *per cent.* are inforced to make ſale of their cloathes at under-rates, to keep their credit, whereby cloathes being the Jewel of the Land, is undervalued, and the Merchant in ſhort time eaten out.

The Merchants of *Ipſwich*, whoſe Trade for *Elbing* is chiefly for fine cloaths, and ſome few ſorting cloaths all died and dreſt within our Land, do for the moſt part, buy there fine cloaths upon Time, and by reaſon they goe ſo much upon credit, they are inforced (not being able to ſtand upon their Markets) to ſell, giving 15. or 18. Moneths day of payment for their cloaths, and having ſold them, they then preſently ſell their bills ſo taken for cloath, allowing after the rate of fourteen or fifteen

fifteen, and sometimes twenty *per cent* which money they imploy forthwith in wares at excessive prices, and lose as much more that way, by that time their wares be sold at home: Thus by over-running themselves upon credit, they disable themselves and others, inhancing the prices of foreign commodities, and pulling down the rates of our own.

The West-Country Merchants that trade with cloaths into *France* or *Spain*, do usually imploy their servants, (young men of small experience) who by cunning combining of the *French* & *Spanish* Merchants, are so entrapped, that when all customes and charges be accompted, their Masters shall hardly receive their principal moneys. As for returns out of *France*, their silver and gold is so highly rated, that our Merchants cannot bring it home, but to great losse; therefore the *French* Merchants set higher rates upon their commodities, which we must either buy dear, or let our monies lie dead there a long time, untill we may conveniently imploy the same.

The Northern Merchants of *York*, *Hull* and *Newcastle*, trade onely in white Kersies and coloured, dozzens, and

every Merchant, be his Adventure never ſo ſmall, doth for the moſt part, ſend over an unexperienced youth, unfit for merchandizing, which bringeth to the ſtranger great advantage, but to his Maſter and common-weal great hindrance; for they before their goods be landed, goe to the ſtranger, and buy ſuch quantities of Iron, Flax, Corn, and other Commodities, as they are bound to lade their ſhips withall, which ſhips they ingage themſelves to relade within three weeks, or a moneth, and doe give the price the Merchant ſtranger asketh, becauſe he gives them credit, and lets them ſhip away their Iron, Flax, and other commodities, before they have ſold their Kerſies, and other commodities, by which means extraordinary dear commodities are returned into this Realm, and the ſervant alſo inforced to ſell his cloaths underfoot, and oftentimes to loſſe, to keep his credit, and to make payment for the goods before ſhipped home, having ſome twenty daies, or a moneths reſpite to ſell the cloaths, and to give the Merchant ſatisfaction for his Iron, Flax, and other wares; by which extremities our home bred commodities are abuſed.

Touching Manufactory.

THere have been about fourſcore thouſand undreſt & undied cloaths yearly tranſported.

It is therefore evident, that the Kingdome hath been yearly deprived of about 400000 *l.* within this five and fifty years, which is near twenty millions that would have been gained by the labour of poor workmen in that time, with the Merchants gains for bringing in dying ſtuffs, and return of cloaths dreſt and died, with other benefits to the Realm, beſides exceeding inlarging of Traffick, and increaſe of ſhips and Mariners.

There would have been gained in that time about three millions by increaſe of cuſtome upon commodities returned for cloaths dreſt and died, and for dying ſtuffs, which would have more plentifully been brought in and uſed for the ſame.

There hath been alſo tranſported in that time yearly by Bayſe, *Northern* and *Devonſhire* Kerſies white, about

50000. cloaths, counting three Kerſies to a cloath, whereby hath been loſt about five millions by thoſe ſorts of cloaths in that time, which would have come to poor workmen for their labour, with the cuſtomes for dying Stuffs, and the peoples profit for bringing them in, with returnes of other commodities and ſraights for ſhipping.

Baiſe are tranſported white into *Amſterdam*, and being there dreſt and dyed, are ſhipped into *Spain*, *Portugal*, and other Kingdomes, where they are ſold in the name of *Flemiſh* Baiſe, ſetting their own Town Seale upon them, ſo that we loſe the very name of our home-bred commodities, and other Countries get the reputation and profit thereof: Lamentable it is, that this Land ſhould be deprived of ſo many abovementioned Millions, and that our Native commodities of Cloath, ordained of God for the naturall ſubjects, being ſo royal and rich in it ſelf, ſhould be driven to ſo ſmall advantage of reputation and profit to your Majeſty and people, and ſo much improved and intercepted by ſtrangers, conſidering that God hath enabled, and given your Majeſty power

to

to advance dreſſing and dying, and tranſporting of all your Cloaths, within a year or two; I ſpeak it knowingly, to ſhew how it may be done laudably, lawfully, and approved to be honourable, feaſable, and profitable.

All the Companies of your Land tranſport their cloaths dreſt and dyed, to the good of your Kingdome, except the Merchant Adventurers, whereby the *Eaſtland* and *Turkey* Merchants, with other Companies, do increaſe your Majeſties cuſtomes by bringing in, and ſpending dying Stuffs, and ſetting your people on work, by dreſſing before they tranſport them; and they might increaſe far more cuſtome to your Majeſty, and make much more profit to themſelves, and this Realm, and ſet many thouſands of poor people more on work for dreſſing and dying, and likewiſe imploy more Ships and Mariners, for bringing in dying Stuffs, were it not for the Merchant Adventurers, who tranſport their cloaths white, rough, undreſt and undyed, into the *Low Countreys*, where they ſell them to the ſtrangers, who afterwards dreſs, dye & ſtretch them to ſuch unreaſonable lengths, contrary to our Law, that they pre-

vent

vent and fore-ſtall our Markets, and croſſe the juſt prohibitions of our State and Realm, by their Agents and Factors lying in divers places with our own cloaths, to the great decay of this Kingdome in generall, and diſcredit of our cloaths in particular.

If the accompt were truly known, it would be found that they make not clear profit, onely by cloath tranſported rough, undreſt, and undied, ſixty thouſand pounds a year: But it is moſt apparent your Majeſty in your cuſtomes, your Merchants in their ſales and prices, your ſubjects in their labours, for lack of not dreſſing and dying, your ſhips and Mariners in not bringing in of dying ſtuffs, and ſpending of Allum, is hindred yearly near a million of pounds, ſo that trade is driven to the great hindrance of your Majeſty and people, by permitting your native commodities to paſſe rough, undreſt, and undied, by the Merchant Adventurer.

Touch

Touching Fishing.

THe great Sea buſineſſe of Fiſhing doth imploy near twenty thouſand ſhips, and veſſels, and four hundred thouſand people are imployed yearly upon your Coaſt of *England*, *Scotland*, and *Ireland*, with ſixty ſhips of Warre, which may prove dangerous.

The *Hollanders* onely have about three thouſand ſhips to fiſh withall, and fifty thouſand people are imployed yearly by them upon your Majeſties coaſts of *England*, *Scotland*, and *Ireland*.

Theſe three thouſand fiſhing ſhips and veſſels of the *Hollanders*, do imploy near nine thouſand other ſhips and veſſels, and one hundred & fifty thouſand perſons more by Sea & Land to make proviſion to dreſſe and tranſport the Fiſh they take, and return commodities, whereby they are inabled, and do build yearly one thouſand ſhips and veſſels, having not one timber tree growing in their own Countrey, nor home-bred commodities to lade one hundred ſhips, and yet they have twenty thouſand ſhips and veſſels, and all imployed.

King *Henry* the ſeventh, deſirous to make his Kingdomes powerful and rich, by encreaſe of Ships and Mariners, and employment of his people, ſent unto his Sea-coaſt Townes, moving them to ſet up the great and rich fiſhing, with promiſe to give them needfull priviledges, and to furniſh them with loanes of money, if need were, to encourage them, yet his people were ſlack. Now ſince I have traced this buſineſſe, and made mine endeavours known unto your Majeſty, your Noblemen, able Merchants, and others, (who having ſet down under their hands for more aſſurance) promiſed to diſburſe large ſummes of money for the building up of this great and rich large Sea-City, which will encreaſe more ſtrength to your Land, give more comfort, and doe more good to all your Cities and Townes, than all the Companies of your Kingdome, having fit and needfull priviledges, for the upholding and ſtrengthning of ſo weighty and needfull a buſineſſe.

For example, twenty Buſſes built and put into a Sea coaſt Town where there is not one Ship before, there muſt be to carry, recarry, tranſport, and make

make proviſion for one Buſſe three Ships; likewiſe every Ship ſetting on work thirty ſeverall trades and occupations, and four hundred thouſand perſons by Sea and Land, inſomuch as three hundred perſons are not able to make one Fleet of Nets in four moneths for one Buſſe which is no ſmall employment.

Thus by twenty Buſſes are ſet on work, near eight thouſand perſons by Sea and Land, and an encreaſe of above one thouſand Mariners, and a Fleet of eighty ſail of Ships to belong to one Town, where none were before to take the wealth out of the *Sea* to enrich and ſtrengthen the Land, onely by raiſing of twenty Buſſes.

Then what good one thouſand, or two thouſand will doe, I leave to your Majeſties conſideration.

It is worthy to be noted, how neceſſary Fiſhermen are to the Commonwealth, and how needfull to be advanced and cheriſhed, *viz.*

1. For taking Gods bleſſing out of the *Sea* to enrich the Realm, which otherwiſe we loſe.

2. For ſetting the people on work.

3. For

3. For making plenty and cheapneſſe in the Realm.

4. For encreaſing of Shipping, to make the Land powerfull.

5. For a continual Nurſery for breeding and encreaſing our Mariners.

6. For making employment of all ſorts of people, as blind, lame, and others by Sea and Land from ten or twelve yeares and upwards.

7. For enriching your Majeſties Coffers, for Merchandiſes returned from other Countries for *Fiſh* and *Herrings*.

8. For the encreaſe and enabling of Merchants, which now droop and daily decay.

Touching the Coyn.

FOr the moſt part, all Monarchies and free States, both *Heathen* and *Chriſtian*, as *Turky*, *Barbary*, *France*, *Poland*, and others, do hold for a rule of never-failing profit, to keep their Coyn at higher rates within their own Territories, than it is in other Kingdomes

The Cauſes.

1. To preſerve the Coyn within their own Territories.

2 To bring unto themſelves the Coyn of Forreign Princes.

3. To enforce Merchant ſtrangers to take their commodities at high rates, which this Kingdome bears the burthen of.

For inſtance.

THe King of *Barbary* perceiving the Trade of Chriſtian Merchants to encréaſe in his Kingdome, and that there returns out of his Kingdoms were moſt in Gold, whereby it was much enhanced, raiſed his Ducket (being then currant for three ounces) to four, five, and ſix ounces; nevertheleſſe it was no more worth in *England*, being ſo raiſed, then when it went for three ounces.

This Ducket currant for three ounces in *Barbary*, was then worth in *England* ſeven ſhillings and ſix pence, and no more worth, being raiſed to ſix ounces, ſince which (time adding to it a ſmall piece of Gold) he hath raiſed it to eight

eight, and laſtly to ten ounces, yet at this day it is worth but ten ſhillings, and one penny, notwithſtanding your Majeſties late raiſing of your gold.

Having thus raiſed his gold, he then deviſed to have plenty of ſilver brought into his Kingdome, raiſed the royall of eight, being but two ounces to three & three pence half penny, which cauſed great plenty of ſilver to be brought in, and to continue in his Kingdome.

France.

THe *Engliſh Iacobus* goeth for three and twenty ſhillings in Merchandizing.

The *French* Crown for ſeven ſhillings and ſix pence.

Alſo the King hath raiſed his ſilver four Sowce in the Crown.

North-Holland.

THe double *Iacobus* goeth for three and twenty ſhillings ſterling.

The

The *Engliſh* ſhilling is there eleven ſtivers, which is two ſhillings over in the pound.

Poland.

THe King of *Poland* raiſed his *Hungary* Ducket from 56 to 77 ½ *Polinſh* groſhes, and the Rix Dollor from 36. to 47 and ½ groſhes, the Rix Dollor worth in *Poland* 47. and ½ groſhes, is by account valued at 6 s. 4 d. Sterling; and here in *England* is worth but 4 s. 7 d. The *Hungary* Ducket 77 is worth by account in *Poland* 10 s, 4 d. and in *England* is worth but 7 s. 10 d. The Iacobus of *England* here currant for 22 s. in *Poland* 24 s. at the rate of 7 s. 10 d. for the *Hungary* Ducket.

Now to turn the ſtream and riches raiſed by your Majeſties native commodities into the natural channel, from whence it hath been a long time diverted;

May

May it please your Majesty to consider these points following.

1. WHether it be not fit that a State-Merchant be setled within your Dominions, which may both dispose more profitably of the riches thereof, and encounter policies of Merchant strangers, who now go beyond us in all kind of profitable Merchandizing.

2. Whether it be not necessary that your native commodities should receive their full Manufactory by your Subjects within your Dominions.

3. Whether it be not fit the Coales should yield your Majesty and Subjects a better value, by permitting them to passe out of the Land, and that they be in your Subjects shipping only transported.

4. Whether it be not fit your Maiesty presently raise your Coyn to as high rates, as it is in the parts beyond the Seas.

5. Whether it be not necessary that the great Sea-businesse of Fishing be forthwith set forward

If

If it pleaſe your Majeſty to approve of theſe conſiderations, and accordingly to put them in a right courſe of execution, I aſſure my ſelf (by Gods help) in ſhort time your Majeſties Cuſtomes, and the continuall comings into your Coffers, will be exceedingly encreaſed, your Ships and Mariners trebled, your Land and waſte Townes (which are now run out of Gates) better repleniſhed, and your people employed, to the great enriching and honour of your Kingdome, with the applauſe, and to the comfort of all your Loyal Subjects.

May it pleaſe your Majeſty.

I Have the rather undergone the paines to look into their policies, becauſe I have heard them profeſſe they hoped to get the whole Trade and Shipping of Chriſtendome into their own hands, as well for tranſportation, as otherwiſe for the command and maſter of the Seas, to which end I find that they do daily encreaſe their Traffick, augmenting their Shipping, multiplying their Mariners, ſtrength, and wealth in all kindes, whereat I have grieved the more, when I conſidered how God hath endued this King-

Kingdome above any three Kingdomes in Christendome with divers varieties of home-bred commodities, which others have not, and cannot want, and indued us with sundry other means to continue and maintain trade of Merchandizing and Fishing beyond them all, whereby we might prevent the deceivers, ingrosse the commodities of the ingrossers, inrich our selves, and increase our Navigation, Shipping, and Mariners, so as it would make all Nations to vail the Bonnet to *England*, if we would not be still wanting to our selves in imployment of our people.

Which people being divided into three parts, two parts of them are meer spenders and consumers of a Common-wealth, therefore I aim at these points following.

To allure and encourage the people for their private gain, to be all workers and erecters of a Common-wealth.

To inrich and fill your Majesties Coffers by a continual coming in, and make your people wealthy, by means of their great and profitable trading and imployment.

To vent our home-bred commodities to far more reputation, and much more profit

profit to the King, the Merchant, and the Kingdome.

To return the Merchandizes of other Countries at far cheaper rates then now they are, to the great good of the Realm in general.

To make the Land powerfull by increasing of Ships and Mariners.

To make your peoples takings in general to be much more every day, than now they are, which by Gods help, will grow continually more and more by the great concourse and commerce that will come by setled constitutions and convenient priviledges, as in other parts they doe by this their great freedome of Trade.

All this, and much more is done in other Countreyes, where nothing groweth, so that of nothing they make great things.

Then how much more mighty things might we make, where so great abundance, and variety of home-bred commodities, and rich materialls growes, for your people to work upon, and other plentifull means to do that withall, which other Nations neither have, nor cannot want, but of necessity must be furnished from hence?

And now whereas our merchandizing is wild, utterly confused, and out of frame, as at large appeareth, a State-Merchant will roundly and effectually bring all the premises to passe, fill your Havens with ships, those ships with Mariners, your Kingdome full of Merchants, their houses full of out-landish commodities, and your Coffers full of coyn, as in other parts they do, and your people shall have just cause to hold in happy memory, that your Majesty was the beginner of so profitable, praise-worthy, and renowned a work, being the true Philosophers stone to make your Majesty a rich and potent King, and your Subjects happy people, onely by settling of a State-Merchant, whereby your people may have fulnesse of Trade and Manufactory, and yet hold both honourable and profitable Government without breakings of Companies,

And for that in the settling of so weighty a businesse, many things of great consequence must necessarily fall into consideration, I humbly pray that your Majesty may be pleased (for the bringing of this great service to light) to give me leave to nominate the Commissioners, and your Majesty to give them

them power to call before them ſuch men as they ſhall think fit to conferre with upon oath, or otherwiſe as occaſion ſhall offer; that the ſaid Commiſſioners with all ſpeed, for the better advancement of this honourable and profitable work, may prepare, and report the ſame unto your Majeſty.

Your Majeſties moſt loyall and true hearted Subject.

THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT.

That the Seat of Government is upheld by the two great pillars thereof, viz. Civil Iuſtice, and Martial Policy, which are framed out of Husbandry, Merchandize, and Gentry of this Kingdome.

THey ſay, that the goodlieſt Cedars which grow on the high Mountains of *Libanus*, thruſt their roots between the clifts of hard Rocks, the better to bear themſelves againſt the ſtrong ſtorms that blow there. As Nature hath inſtructed Thoſe

thoſe Kings of Trees, ſo hath Reaſon taught the Kings of Men to root themſelves in the hardy hearts of their faithfull Subjects. And as thoſe Kings of Trees have large Tops, ſo have the Kings of men large Crowns, whereof as the firſt would be ſoon broken from their bodies, were they not under-borne by many branches, ſo would the other eaſily totter, were they not faſtened on their heads, with the ſtrong chaines of Civil Juſtice, and Martial Diſcipline.

1. For the adminiſtration of the firſt, even God himſelf hath given direction, *Iudges and Officers ſhalt thou make, which ſhall judge the people with righteous judgement.*

2. The ſecond is grounded on the firſt Lawes of the World and Nature, that force is to be repelled by force, Yea *Moſes* in the 20. of *Exodus*, and elſewhere, hath delivered us many Lawes and Policies of Warre. But as we have heard of the neglect and abuſe in both, ſo have we heard of the decline and ruine of many Kingdomes and States long before our dayes; for that Policy hath never yet prevailed (though it hath ſerved for a ſhort

ſeaſon) where the counterfeit hath been ſold for the naturall, and the outward ſhew and formality for the ſubſtance. Of the Emperour *Charles* the Fourth, the Writers of that Age witneſſe, that he uſed but the name of Iuſtice and good order, being more learned in the Law, then in doing right, and that he had by farre, more knowledge then conſcience. Certainly the unjuſt Magiſtrate that fancieth to himſelf a ſolid and untranſparable body of Gold, every ordinary wit can vitrifie, and make tranſparent, pierce and diſcern their corruptions; howſoever, becauſe not daring, they cover their knowledge, but in the mean while it is alſo true, that conſtrained diſſimulation, either in the proud heart, or in the oppreſſed, either in publick eſtates, or in private perſons, where the fear of God is not prevalent, doth in all the leiſure of her lurking, but ſharpen her teeth, the voluntary being no leſſe baſe, then the forced malicious. Thus it fared between the Barons of *England*, and their Kings, between the Lords of *Switzerland*, and their people, between the *Sicilians*, and the *French*, between the

Dol-

Dolphin and *John* of *Burgoign*, between *Charles* the ninth, and the *French* Protestants, and between *Henry* the third, his Successour, and the Lords of *Guise*; and hereof in place of more particulars, the whole world would serve for examples.

It is a difficult piece of Geography, to delineate, and lay out the bounds of Authority; but it is easie enough to conceive the best use of it, and by which it hath maintained it self in lasting happinesse, it hath ever acquired more honour by perswading, then by beating; for as the bonds of Reason and Love are immortall, so do all other chains or cords, both rusty and rot noble parts of their own royall and politick bodies.

But we will forbear for a while to stretch this first string of Civil Iustice; for in respect of the first sort of men, to wit, of those that live by their own labour, they have never been displeased where they have been suffered to enjoy the fruit of their own travells, *Meum & Tuum*, Mine and Thine is all wherein they seek the certaintie and protection. True it is, that they are the Fruit Trees of the Land,

which God in *Deuteronomie* commanded to be ſpared, they gather honey, and hardly injoy the wax, and break the ground with great labour, giving the beſt of their grain to the eaſefull and idle.

For the ſecond ſort, which are the Merchants, as the firſt feed the Kingdome, ſo do theſe inrich it, yea their Trades, eſpecially thoſe which are forcible, are not the leaſt part of our Martial policy, as is hereafter proved; and to doe them right, they have in all ages and times aſſiſted the Kings of this Land, not only with great ſums of money, but with great Fleets of Ships in all their interpriſes beyond the Seas. The ſecond have ſeldome or never offended their Princes, to enjoy their trades at home upon tolerable conditions, hath ever contented them for the injuries received from other Nations, give them but the Commiſſion of Repriſal; they will either right themſelves, or ſit down with their own loſſe without complaint.

3. The third ſort, which are the Gentry of *England*, theſe being neither ſeated in the loweſt grounds, and thereby ſubject to the biting of every beaſt, nor in the higheſt mountains, and

there-

thereby in danger to be torn with tempeſt; but the valleys between both, have their parts in the inferiour Iuſtice, and being ſpread over all, are the Garriſons of good order throughout the Realm.

OBSERVATIONS
CONCERNING
The Causes of the Magnificency and Opulency of
CITIES.

THat the only way to civilize and reform the savage and barbarous lives, and corrupt Manners of such people, is,

1. To be dealt withall by gentle and loving conversation among them, to attain to the knowledge of their Language, and of the multitude of their special discommodities, and inconveniencies in their manner of living.

2. The next is to get an admired reputation amongst them, upon a solid and true foundation of Piety, Justice, and Wisdome, conjoyned with fortitude and power.

3. The

3. The third is, discreetly to possesse them with a knowledge of the condition of their own estate. Thus *Orpheus* and *Amphion* were said to draw after them the beasts of the field, &c.

And this must be first wrought by a visible representation of the certainty, truth, and sincerity of these, together with the felicity of a reformed estate.

All which is but to give foundation, bottom, and firm footing unto action, and to prepare them to receive wholesome and good advice, for the future profit and felicity of themselves, and their posterity.

For the more commodious effecting of this Reformation in a rude and barbarous people, they are to be perswaded to withdraw and unite themselves into severall Colonies; that so an interchangeable communication and commerce of all things may more commodiously be had, and that they may so live together in civility, for the better succour and welfare of one another: And thereby they may more easily be instructed in the Christian Faith, and governed under the Magistrates & Ministers of the King, or other

ſuperiour power, under whom this Reformation is ſought; which courſe the Stoick tells, that *Theſeus* took, after he had taken upon him the Government of the Athenians, whereby he united all the people into one City, that before lived diſperſedly in many villages. The like is put in practiſe at this day by the *Portugals*, and Ieſuites, that they may with leſſe difficulty and hindrance reform the rough behaviour and ſavage life of the people of *Brazeel*, who dwell ſcattered and diſperſed in Caves and Cottages made of boughs and leaves of the Palm-trees.

Alexander the Great, built more then ſeventy Cities; *Seleucus* built three Cities, called *Appanice*, to the honour of his wife; and five called *Laodicea*, in memory of his mother; and five called *Seleucia*, to the honour of himſelf.

Safety for Defence of the People and their goods, in and near the Town.

IN the ſituation of Cities, there is to be required a place of ſafety, by ſome natural ſtrength, commodiouſneſſe for Na-

Navigation and Conduct, for the attaining of plenty of all good things, for the sustenance and comfort of mans life, and to draw trade and intercourse of other Nations, as if the same be situate in such sort, as many people have need to repair thither for some naturall commodity, or other of the Countrey, which by traffick and transportation of commodities, whereof they have more plenty then will supply their own necessity, or for receiving of things, whereof they have scarcity. And much better will it be, if the place afford some notable commodity of it self, from whence other Nations may more readily, and at better rate attain the same. Likewise, and withall, be so fertile, pleasant, and healthfull of it self, that it may afford plenty of good things, for the delight and comfort of the inhabitants.

In former times, great Nations, Kings, and Potentates have indured sharp conflicts, and held it high policy, by all means to increase their Cities with multitudes of inhabitants. And to this end the *Romans* ever furnished themselves with strength and power, to make their neighbour peo-

ple,

ple, of neceſſity, willing to draw themſelves to *Rome* to dwell, and overthrow their Towns and Villages of meaſtrength, down to the ground.

So did they for this cauſe utterly deſtroy many Cities, bringing alwayes the vanquiſhed Captives to *Rome*, for the augmentation of that City.

Romulus, after a mighty fight with the *Sabines*, condeſcended to peace, upon condition that *Tatius* their King ſhould come with all their people to dwell at *Rome*: *Tatius* did accept, and made choice of the Capitol, and the Mount *Quirinalis* for his ſeat and Palace.

The ſame courſe held *Tamberlain* the Great, whereby he inlarged the great *Sarmatauda*, ſtill bringing unto it the richeſt and wealthieſt Citizens he had ſubdued.

And the *Ottomans*, to make the City *Conſtantinople* rich and great, brought to it many thouſand Families, eſpecially Artificers out of the ſubdued Cities, as *Mahomet* the Great from *Trabizond*, *Selim* the Firſt from *Cairo*, and *Soliman* from *Tauris*.

Authority and neceſſity, without the conſideration of the conveniencies and com-

commodiousneſſe of ſituation above-mentioned, are of ſmall moment in the foundation of a City, thereby onely it would be unlikely, either to grow or continue in magnificency or opulency; for if profit, height, and delight, go not companions therewith, no authority or neceſſity can retain much people or wealth.

But if the place whereupon a City is to be founded, be commodious for the aforeſaid conveniencies, which help greatly for the felicity of this life, then no doubt, the ſame is likely to draw much abundance of people and riches unto the ſame, whereby it may, by the help of Arts and Induſtry, in time become magnificent and glorious.

Sir

SIR *WALTER RALEIGH'S* LETTERS.

Sr. Walter Raleigh's *Letter to Mr. Secretary* Winwood, *before his Iourney to* Guiana.

Honourable SIR,

I Was lately perſwaded by two Gentlemen, my ancient Friends, to acquaint your Honour with ſome offers of mine, made heretofore for a Journey to *Guiana*, who were of opinion, That it would be better underſtood now, than when it was firſt propounded, which advice having ſurmounted my diſpair, I have preſumed to ſend unto your Honour the Copies of thoſe Letters which I then wrote, both to his Majeſtie, and to the Treaſurer *Cecill*, wherein as well the reaſons

ſons that firſt moved me are remembred, as the objections by him made, are briefly anſwered.

What I know of the riches of that place, not by hear-ſay, but what mine eyes have ſeen, I have ſaid it often, but it was then to no end: Becauſe thoſe that had the greateſt truſt, were reſolved not to believe it, not becauſe they doubted the Truth, but becauſe they doubted my Diſpoſition towards themſelves; where (if God had bleſſed me in the enterpriſe) I had recovered his Majeſties favour and good opinion. Other cauſe than this, or other ſuſpicion they never had any. Our late worthy Princes of *Wales* was extream curious in ſearching out the Nature of my offences, The Queens Majeſtie hath informed her ſelf from the beginning. The King of *Denmark* at both times of his being here was throughly ſatisfied of my innocencie, they would otherwiſe never have moved his Majeſtie on my behalf.

The Wife, the Brother, and the Son of a King, do not uſe to ſue for men ſuſpect; but Sir, ſince they all have done it out of their charitie, and

and but with references to me alone. Your Honour (whose respect hath onely relation to his Majesties service) strengthened by the example of those Princes, may with the more hardnesse do the like, being Princes to whom his Majesties good estate is no lesse dear; and all men that shall oppugne it no lesse hatefull, then to the King himself.

It is true Sir, That his Majestie hath sometimes answered, That his Councel knew me better than he did; meaning some two or three of them, And it was indeed my infelicitie; for had his Majestie known me, I had never been here where I now am: or had I known his Majestie, they had never been so long there where they now are. His Majestie not knowing of me hath been my ruine, and his Majestie misknowing of them, hath been the ruine of a goodly part of his estate: but they are all of them now, some living and some dying, come to his Majesties knowledge. But Sir, how ltitle soever his Majestie knew me, and how much soever he believed them, yet have I been bound to his Majestie both for my Life, and all that remains, of which,

but

but for his Majeſty, nor Life, nor ought elſe had remained. In this reſpect Sir, I am bound to yield up the ſame life, and all I have for his Majeſties ſervice: To die for the King, and not by the King, is all the ambition I have in the world.

Walter Raleigh.

Sir Walter Raleigh's *Letter to his* Wife, *from* Guiana.

Sweet Heart,

I Can yet write unto you but with a weak hand, for I have ſuffered the moſt violent Calenture for fifteen dayes, that ever man did, and lived: but God that gave me a ſtrong heart in all my adverſities, hath alſo now ſtrengthened it in the hell fire of heat.

We have had two moſt grievous ſickneſſes in our ſhip, of which fourty two have died, and there are yet many ſick, but having recovered the land of *Guiana*, this 12. of *November*, I hope we ſhall recover them. We are yet two hun-

hundred men, and the reſt of our Fleet are reaſonable ſtrong, ſtrong enough I hope to perform what we have undertaken, if the diligent care at *London*, to make our ſtrength known to the Spaniſh King by his Ambaſſadour, have not taught the Spaniſh King to fortifie all the enterances againſt us, howſoever we muſt make the adventure, and if we periſh, it ſhall be no honour for *England*, nor gain for his Majeſtie to loſe among many other, an hundred as valiant Gentlemen as *England* hath in it.

Of Captain *Baylies* baſe coming from us at the *Canaries*, ſee a Letter of *Kemiſhes* to Mr. *Scony*, and of the unnatural weather, ſtorms, and rains, and winds. He hath in the ſame letter, given a touch of the way that hath ever been ſailed in fourteen dayes, now hardly performed in fourty dayes. God I truſt, will give us comfort in that which is to come.

In paſſage to the *Canaries*, I ſtayed at *Gomerah*, where I took water in peace, becauſe the Countrey durſt not denie it me. I received there of an Engliſh race, a Preſent of Oranges, Lemmons, Quinces, & Pome-granates without

out which I could not have lived; those I preserved in fresh sands, and I have of them yet to my great refreshing. Your son had never so good health, having no distemper in all the heat under the Line. All my servants have escaped but *Crab* and my Cook, yet all have had the sickneſſe. *Crofts* and *March*, and the rest are all well. Remember my service to my Lord *Carew*, and Mr. Secretarie *Winwood*.

I write not to them, for I can write of nought but miseries: yet of men of sort, we have lost our Serjeant Major, Captain *Pigot*, and his Lieutenant, Captain *Edward Hastings*, who would have died at home, for both his Liver, Spleen, and Brains were rotten. My Sons Lieutenant *Payton* and my Cosin Mr. *Hews*, Mr. *Mordant*, Mr. *Gardiner*, Mr. *Hayward*, Captain *Ienning* the Merchant, *Kemish* of *London*, and the Master Chyrurgeon, Mr. *Refiner*, Mr. *Moor* the Governour of the *Barmoudas*, our Provost Marshall *William Steed*, Lieutenant *Vescie*, but to mine inestimable grief, *Hammon* and *Talbot*. By the next I trust you shall hear better of us, in Gods hands

hands we were, and in him we truſt.

This bearer, Captain *Alley*, for his infirmitie of his head I have ſent back, an honeſt valiant man, he can deliver you all that is paſt. Commend me to my worthy friends at *Lothbury*, Sir *Iohn Leigh* and *Mr. Bower*, whoſe Nephew *Knevit* is well, and to my coſin *Blundell*, and my moſt devoted and humble ſervice to her Majeſtie.

To tell you that I might be here King of the *Indian*, were a vanitie, but my name hath ſtill lived among them; here they feed me with freſh meat, and all that the Countrey yields, all offer to obey me. Commend me to poor *Carew* my Son.

From Galliana *in* Guiana, the 14. of *November*.

Sir Walter Raleigh's *Letter to Sir* Ralph Winwood.

SIR,

AS I have not hitherto given you any Account of our proceedings and paſſages towards the *Indies*, ſo have I no other ſubject to write of, then of the

the greateſt misfortunes that ever befell any man: for whereas, for the firſt, All thoſe that Navigate between *Cape de Verd* and *America* do paſſe between fifteen or twentie dayes at moſt, we found the wind ſo contrary, and which are alſo contrary to nature, ſo many ſtorms and rains, as we ſpent ſix weeks in the paſſage, by reaſon whereof, and that in ſo great heat we wanted water: for at the Iſle *Prano* of *Cape de Verd*, we loſt our Anchours and Cables, and our water Casks, being driven from the Iſland with a *Huricano*, and were like all to have periſhed. Great ſickneſſe fell amongſt us, and carried away great numbers of our ableſt men both for Sea and Land. The ſeaventeenth of *November*, we had ſight of *Guiana*, and ſoon after came to Anchour in five degrees at the River *Galliano*, here we ſtaid til the fourth of *December*, landed our ſick men, ſet up the Barges and Shallops, which were brought out of *England* in quarters, waſhed our Ships, and took in freſh water, being fed and cheriſhed by the *Indians* of my old acquaintance, with a great deal of love and reſpect, my ſelf being in the hands of death theſe ſix weeks, and was not a-

ble

able otherwiſe to move than as I was carried in a Chair, gave order to five ſmall ſhips, to ſail into *Orinoque*, having Captain *Kemis* for their Conductor towards the Mines, and in thoſe five Ships five Companies of fiftie under the command of Captain *Parker*, and Captain *North*, brethren to the Lord *Mounteagle* and the Lord *North*, valiant Gentlemen, and of infinite patience for the labour, hunger, and heat which they have endured, my Son had the third Company, Captain *Thornix* of *Kent* the fourth Company, Captain *Chidley*, by his Lieutenant, the fifth: but as my Serjeant Major Captain *Piggot* of the *Low Countreys* died in the former miſerable paſſage, ſo my Lieutenant Sir *Warhams* S. *Leiter* lay ſick without hope of life, and the charge conferred on my Nephew *George Raleigh*, who had alſo ſerved long with infinite commendations; but by reaſon of my abſence, and of Sir *Warhams*, was not ſo well obeyed as the Enterprize required. As they paſſed up the River, the *Spaniard* began the War, and ſhot at us both with their Ordnance and Muskets, whereupon the Companies were for-

forced to charge them, and soon after beat them out of the Town. In the assault, my son (more desirous of honour then safety) was slain, with whom (to say truth) all the respects of this world have taken end in me. And although these five Captains had as weak Companies as ever followed valiant Leaders, yet were there amongst them some twenty or thirty valiant adventurous Gentlemen, and of singular courage, as of my sons Company, Mr. *Knivet*, Mr. *Hammon*, Mr. *Langworth*, Mr. *John Pleasington*; his Officers, Sir *John Hamden*; Mr. *Simon Leak* Corporal of the Field, Mr. *Hammon* the elder Brother, Mr. *Nicholas* of *Buckingham*, Mr. *Roberts* of *Kent*, Mr. *Perin*, Mr. *Tresham*, Mr. *Mullinax*, Mr. *Winter* and his Brother, Mr. *Wray*, Mr. *Miles Herbert*, Mr. *Bradshaw*, Captain *Hall*, and others.

Sir, I have set down the names of these Gentlemen, to the end, that if his Majestie shall have cause to use their service, it may please you to take notice of them for very sufficient Gentlemen. The other five ships staid at *Trinidado*, having no other Port capable for them near *Guiana*. The

second ship was commanded by my Vice Admiral Captain *John Pennington*, of whom (to do him right) he is one of the sufficienteſt Gentlemen for the Sea that *England* hath. The third by Sir *Warham S. Leiger*, an exceeding valiant and worthy Gentleman. The fourth by Sir *John Fern*. The fifth by Captain *Chidley* of *Devon*. With theſe five ſhips I daily attended their Armado of *Spain*, which had they ſet upon us, our force divided, the one half in *Orinoque*, an hundred and fifty miles from us, we had not onely been torn in pieces, but all thoſe in the River had alſo periſhed, being of no force at all for the Sea-fight; for we had reſolved to have been burnt by their ſides, had the Armado arrived: but belike, they ſtaid for us at *Margaret*, by which they knew we muſt paſſe towards the *Indies*: for it pleaſed his Majeſty to value us at ſo little, as to command me upon my Allegiance, to ſet down under my hand the Countrey, and the River by which I was to enter it; to ſet down the number of my men, and burthen of my ſhips, and what Ordnance every ſhip carried, which being known to the *Spaniſh* Ambaſſadour, and by him

to

to the King of *Spain*, a diſpatch was made, and letters ſent from *Madrid*, before my departure out of the *Thames*; for his firſt letter ſent by a Barque of Adviſe, was dated the 19. of *March* 1617. at *Madrid*, which letter I have here incloſed ſent to your Honour, the reſt I reſerve, not knowing whether they may be intercepted or not. The ſecond by the King, dated the ſecond of *May*, ſent alſo by a Colonel of *Diego de Polonioque*, Governour of *Guiana*, *Elderedo*, and *Trinidado*. The third by the Biſhop of *Porericho*, and delivered to *Polonioque* the 15. of *Iuly*, at *Trinidado*. And the fourth was ſent from the Farmer and Secretary of his Cuſtomes in the *Indies*. At the ſame time, by that of the Kings hand, ſent by the Biſhop, there was alſo a Commiſſion for the ſpeedie levying of three hundred ſouldiers, and ten pieces of Ordnance to be ſent from *Portricho*, for the defence of *Guiana*, an hundred and fifty from *Nuevo Remo de Grando*, under the command of Captain *Anthony Muſica*, and the other hundred and fifty from *Portricho*, to be conducted by Capt. *Fran. Laudio*.

Now Sir, if all that have traded to

the *Indies* since his Majesties time knew that the *Spaniards* have flayed alive all the poor men which they have taken, being but Merchant men, what death and cruell torment shall we expect if they conquer us? Certainly they have hitherto failed grosly, being set out thence as we were, both for number, time, and place.

Lastly, to make an Apology for not working the Mine, (although I know his Majestie expects) whom I am to satisfie so much, as my self, having lost my son, and my estate in the Enterprise, yet it is true, that the *Spaniards* took more care to defend the passage leading unto it, then they did the Town, which by the Kings instructions they might easily do, the Countreys being *Aspera & Nemorosa*.

But it is true, that when Captain *Kemish* found the River low, and that he could not approach the Banks in most places near the Myne by a mile, and where he found a descent, a volley of Muskets came from the woods upon the Boat, and slew two Rowers, and hurt six others, and shot a valiant Gentleman of Captain *Thornix*, of which wound he languisheth to this

this day. He, to wit, *Kemiſh*, following his own advice, thought that it was in vain to diſcover the Myne; for he gave me this for an excuſe at his return, that the Companies of *Engliſh* in the Town of S. *Thome* were not able to defend it, againſt the daily and nightly aſſaults of the *Spaniards*, that the paſſages to the Mynes, were thick and unpaſſable woods, and that the Myne being diſcovered, they had no men to work it, did not diſcover it at all: for it is true, the *Spaniards* having two gold Mynes near the Town, the one poſſeſſed by *Pedro Rodrigo de Paran*, the ſecond by *Harmian Frotinio*, the third of ſilver, by Captain *Franciſco*, for the want of Negroes to work them; for as the *Indians* cannot be conſtrained by a Law of *Charls* the Fifth, ſo the *Spaniards* will not, nor can endure the labour of thoſe Mynes, whatſoever the Bragadochio, the *Spaniſh* Ambaſſadour ſaith. I ſhall prove under the Proprietors hand, by the Cuſtome-Book, and the Kings Quinto, of which I recovered an Ingot or two: I ſhall alſo make it appear to any Prince or State that will undertake it, how eaſily thoſe Mynes, and five or ſix more

of them may be poſſeſſed, and the moſt of them in thoſe parts, which never have as yet been attempted by any, nor by any paſſage to them, nor ever diſcovered by the Engliſh, French, or Dutch. But at *Kemiſh* his return from *Orineque*, when I rejected his counſel and his courſe, and told him that he had undone me, and wounded my credit with the King paſt recovery, he ſlew himſelf: for I told him, that ſeeing my ſon was ſlain, I cared not if I had loſt an hundred more in opening of the Myne, ſo my credit had been ſaved: for I proteſt before God, had not Capt. *Whitney* (to whom I gave more countenance than to all the Captains of my Fleet) run from me at the *Granadoes*, and carried another ſhip with him of Captain *Welleſton's*. I would have left my body at S. *Thomes* by my ſons, or have brought with me out of that or other Mynes, ſo much Gold-oar, as ſhould have ſatisfied the King. I propounded no vain thing; what ſhall become of me I know not, I am unpardoned in *England*, and my poor eſtate conſumed, and whether any Prince will give me bread or no I know not. I deſire your Honour to hold me in your good opinion, to remember my ſervice to my

Lord

Lord of *Arundel* and *Pembrook*, to take some pity on my poor Wife, to whom I dare not write for renewing her sorrow for her Son; and beseech you to give a Copie of this to my Lord *Carew*: for to a broken mind, a sick body, and weak eyes, it is a torment to write many Letters. I have found many things of importance for discovering the state and weaknesse of the *Indies*, which, if I live, I shall hereafter impart unto your Honour, to whom I shall remain a faithfull servant.

Walter Raleigh.

Sr. Walter Raleigh's *Letter sent to his Wife, Copied out of his own hand-writing.*

I Was loath to write, because I know not how to comfort you, and God knows, I never knew what sorrow meant till now. All that I can say to you is, that you must obey the will and providence of God, and remember, that the Queens Majestie bare the losse of Prince *Henry* with a magnanimous

heart, and the Lady *Harrington* of her ſon. Comfort your heart (deareſt *Beſs*) I ſhall ſorrow for us both, I ſhall ſorrow the leſſe, becauſe I have not long to ſorrow, becauſe not long to live. I referre you to Mr. Secretary *Winwoods* Letter, who will give you a copie of it, if you ſend for it, therein you ſhall know what hath paſſed; I have written that Letter, for my brains are broken, and it is a torment for me to write, and eſpecially of miſery. I have deſired Mr. Secretary to give my Lord *Carew* a copy of his Letter. I have cleanſed my ſhip of ſick men, and ſent them home: I hope God will ſend us ſomewhat before we return. You ſhall hear from me if I live, from the New-found land, where I mean to make clean my ſhips and revictual; for I have Tobacco enough to pay for it. The Lord bleſſe and comfort you, that you may bear patiently the death of your valiant ſon.

This 22. *of* March, *From the Iſle of* Chriſtophers, *yours* Walter Raleigh.

Poſt-ſcript.

I Proteſt before the Majeſtie of God, That as Sir *Francis Drake*, and

and Sir *Iohn Hawkins* died heart-broken when they failed of their enterprise, I could willingly doe the like, did I not contend against sorrow for your sake, in hope to provide somewhat for you, and to comfort and relieve you. If I live to return, resolve your self that it is the care for you that hath strengthened my heart. It is true that *Kemish* might have gone directly to the Myne, and meant it, but after my sons death, he made them believe he knew not the way, and excused himself upon want of water in the River, and counterfeiting many impediments, left it unfound. When he came back, I told him he had undone me, and that my credit was lost for ever; he answered, That when my Son was lost, and that he left me so weak, that he resolved not to find me alive, he had no reason to enrich a company of Rascals, who after my Sons death made no account of him. He further told me that the *English* sent up into *Guiana*, could hardly defend the *Spanish* Town of S, *Thome* which they had taken, and therefore for them to passe through thick words it was impossible, and more impossible to have victuall brought

them into the Mountains. And it is true that the Governour *Diego Polenego*, and other four Captains being slain, whereof *Wat* slew one, *Plesington*, *Wat's* servant, and *Iohn* of *Moroccoes*, one of his men, slew other two. I saw five of them slain in the entrance of the Town, the rest vvent off in a whole bodie, and took more care to defend the passages to their Mynes (of which they had three vvithin a League of the Town, besides a Myne that was about five miles off) than they did of the Town it self. Yet *Kemish* at the first vvas resolved to go to the Myne; but vvhen he came to the bank-side to Land, and had tvvo of his men slain outright from the bank, and six other hurt, and Captain *Thornix* shot in the head, of vvhich vvound, and the accident thereof, he hath pined avvay these tvvelve vveeks.

Novv vvhen *Kemish* came back and gave me the former Reasons which moved him not to open the Myne, the one the death of my Son, a second the vveakness of the English, and their impossibilities to vvork and to be victualled; a third that it vvere a folly to discover it for the Spaniards; and lastly my vveakness and being unpardoned;

and

and that I rejected all these his Arguments, and told him, that I must leave him to himself to resolve it to the King and State, he shut up himself into his Cabbin, and shot himself with a pocket Pistol which broke one of his ribs, and finding that he had not prevailed, he thrust a long Knife under his short ribs up to the handle and died. Thus much I have written to Mr. Secretary, to whose Letters I refer you to know the truth. I did after the sealing break open the Letter again, to let you know in brief the state of that business, which I pray you impart to my Lord of *Northumberland*, and *Silvanus Scorie*.

For the rest, there was never poor man so exposed to slaughter as I was; for being commanded upon mine Alleagiance to set down not onely the Countrey, but the very River by which I was to enter it, to name my Ships number, men, and my Artillerie. This now was sent by the Spanish Ambassadour to his Master the King of *Spain*, the King wrote his Letters to all parts of the *Indies*, especially to the Governour *Palamago* of *Guiana*, *Eldorado*, and *Trinidado*, of which the

first

first Letter bore date 19 of *March* 1617. at *Madrill*, when I had not yet left the *Thames*, which Letter I have ſent to Mr. Secretary. I have alſo other Letters of the Kings which I reſerve, and one of the Councils. The King alſo ſent a Commiſſion to levy three hundred Soldiers out of his Garriſons of *unie Regno de Granado è Portricho*, with ten pieces of braſſe Ordnance to entertain us; he alſo prepared an Army by Sea to ſet upon us. It were too long to tell you how we were preſerved, if I live I ſhall make it known; my brains are broken, and I cannot write much, I live yet, and I told you why. *Witney* for whom I ſold all my Plate at *Plymouth*, and to whom I gave more credit and countenance than to all the Captains of my Fleet, ran from me at the *Granadoes*, and *Woolenſton* with him, ſo as I have now but five Ships, and out of thoſe I have ſent ſome into my Fly-boat, a rabble of idle Raſcals, which I know will not ſpare to wound me, but I care not. I am ſure there is never a baſe ſlave in all the Fleet hath taken the pain and care that I have done, that have ſlept ſo little, and travelled ſo much, my friends

friends will not believe them, and for the reſt I care not; God in heaven bleſſe you and ſtrengthen your heart.

Yours

Walter Raleigh.

Sir Walter Raleigh's *Letter to Mr. Secretary* Winwood.

SIR,

SInce the death of *Kemiſt*, it is confeſſed by the Serjeant Major, and others of his inward friends, that he told them that he could have brought them unto the Myne within two hours March from the Rivers ſide; but becauſe my ſon was ſlain, my ſelf unpardoned, and not like to live, he had no reaſon to open the Myne either for the *Spaniard* or for the King; they anſwered, that the King (though I were not pardoned) had granted my heart under the Great Seal. He replyed that the grant to me was to no man, *non*

Ens

Ens in the Law, and therefore of no force; this diſcourſe they had, which I knew not of till after his death: but when I was reſolved to write unto your Honour, he prayed me to joyn with him in excuſing his not going to the Myne, I anſwered him I would not do it; but if my ſelf could ſatisfie the King and State, that he had reaſon not to open it, I ſhould be glad of it: but for my part, I muſt avow that he knew it, and that he might with loſſe have done it; other excuſes I would not frame: he told me that he would wait on me preſently, and give me better ſatisfaction: but I was no ſooner come from him into my Cabbin, but I heard a Piſtol goe over my head, and ſending to know who ſhot it, word was brought me that *Kemiſh* ſhot it out of his Cabbin window to cleanſe it; his boy going into his Cabbin, found him lying upon his bed with much bloud by him, and looking in his face ſaw him dead; the Piſtol being but little, did but crack his rib, but turning him over, found a long Knife in his body, all but the handle. Sir I have ſent into *England* with my couſin *Harbert* (a very valiant honeſt Gentleman) divers unworthy perſons,

good

good for nothing neither by sea nor land, and though it was at their own suit, yet I know they will wrong me in all that they can. I beseech your Honour, that the scorn of men may not be believed of me, who have taken more pains, and suffered more then the meanest Rascal in the ship; these being gone, I shall be able to keep the Sea untill the end of *August*, with some four reasonable good ships. Sir, wheresoever God shall permit me to arrive in any part of *Europe*, I will not fail to let your Honour know what we have done, till then, and ever I rest

Your Honours

Servant

Walter Raleigh.

Sir

Sir WALTER RALEIGH's Letter to King JAMES, At his return from *GUIANA.*

May it please your moſt excellent Majeſty.

IF in my Journey outward bound, I had my men murthered at the Iſlands, and yet ſpared to take revenge, if I did diſcharge ſome *Spaniſh* Barkes taken without ſpoil, if I forbear all parts of the *Spaniſh Indies*, wherein I might have taken twenty of their Downs on the ſea coaſts, and did onely follow the enterprize I undertook for *Guiana*, where without any directions from me, a *Spaniſh* Village was burnt, which was new ſet up within three miles of the Myne, By your Majeſties favour, I find no reaſon why the *Spaniſh* Ambaſſadour ſhould complain of me. If it were lawfull for the *Spaniards* to murther twenty ſix *Engliſh*

liſh men, tying them back to back, and then cutting their throats, when they had traded with them a whole moneth, and came to them on the land without ſo much as one ſword, and that it may not be lawfull to your Majeſties ſubjects, being charged firſt by them, to repell force by force, we may juſtly ſay, O miſerable *Engliſh!*

If *Parker* and *Metham* took *Campeach* and other places in the *Honduraes*, ſeated in the heart of the *Spaniſh Indies*, burnt Towns, and killed the *Spaniards*, and had nothing ſaid unto them at their return, and my ſelf forbore to look into the *Indies*; becauſe I would not offend, I may as juſtly ſay, O miſerable Sir *Walter Raleigh!*

If I have ſpent my poor eſtate, loſt my ſon, ſuffered by ſickneſſe and otherwiſe a world of miſeries; if I have reſiſted with manifeſt hazard of my life, the Robberies and Spoils, with which my Companions would have made me rich; if when I was poor, I would have made my ſelf rich, if when I have gotten my liberty, which all men and nature it ſelf do much prize, I voluntarily loſt it, if when I was ſure of my life, I rendered it again, if I might elſe-

where

where have ſold my Ship and goods, and put five or ſix thouſand pounds in my purſe, and yet brought her into *England*, I beſeech your Majeſty to believe, that all this I have done, becauſe it ſhould not be ſaid to your Majeſty, that your Majeſty had given libertie and truſt to a man whoſe end was but the recoverie of his liberty, and who had betrayed your Majeſties truſt.

My Mutiniers told me, that if I returned from *England* I ſhould be undone, but I believed in your Majeſties goodneſſe more than in all their arguments. Sure, I am the firſt that being free and able to enrich my ſelf; yet hath embraced poverty and perill. And as ſure I am, that my example ſhall make me the laſt: but your Majeſties wiſdome and goodneſſe I have made my judges, who have ever been, and ſhall ever be,

Your Majeſties

moſt humble Vaſſal

Walter Raleigh.

Sir

Sr. Walter Raleigh's *Letter to his Wife, after his Condemnation.*

YOu ſhall receive (my dear Wife) my Laſt words in theſe my laſt Lines; my love I ſend you, that you may keep when I am dead, and my counſell, that you may remember it when I am no more. I would not with my will preſent you ſorrows (dear *Beſs*) let them go to the grave with me, and be buried in the duſt. And ſeeing that it is not the will of God that I ſhall ſee you any more, bear my deſtruction patiently, and with an heart like your ſelf.

Firſt I ſend you all the thanks which my heart can conceive, or my words expreſſe, for your many travells and cares for me, which though they have not taken effect as you wiſhed, yet my debt to you is not the leſſe; but pay it I never ſhall in this world.

Secondly, I beſeech you, for the love you bare me living, that you do not hide your ſelf many days, but by your travells ſeek to help my miſerable Fortunes, and the Right of your poor Child,

Child, your mourning cannot avail me that am but duſt.

Thirdly, you ſhall underſtand, that my Lands were conveyed (*bona fide*) to my Child, the writings were drawn at Midſummer was twelve moneths, as divers can witneſſe, and I truſt my bloud will quench their malice who deſired my ſlaughter, that they will not ſeek alſo to kill you and yours with extream poverty. To what friend to direct you I know not, for all mine have left me in the true time of triall. Moſt ſorry am I, that being thus ſurpriſed by death, I can leave you no better Eſtate, God hath prevented all my determinations, that great God which worketh all in all, and if you can live free from want, care for no more, for the reſt is but a vanity: Love God, and begin betimes, in him ſhall you find true, everlaſting, and endleſſe comfort, when you have travelled and wearied your ſelf with all ſorts of worldly cogitations you ſhall ſit down by ſorrow in the end. Teach your ſon alſo to ſerve and fear God whileſt he is young, that the fear of God may grow up in him; then will God be an Husband to you,

and

and a Father to him, an Husband and a Father, that can never be taken from you.

Paylie oweth me a thouſand pounds, and *Aryan* ſix hundred; in *Iernefey* alſo I have much owing me. (Dear wife) I beſeech you, for my Souls ſake, pay all poor men. When I am dead, no doubt you ſhall be much ſought unto; for the world thinks I was very rich; have a care to the fair pretences of men, for no greater miſerie can befall you in this life, then to become a prey unto the world, and after to be deſpiſed. I ſpeak (God knows) not to diſſwade you from Marriage, for it will be beſt for you, both in reſpect of God and the world. As for me, I am no more yours, nor you mine, death hath cut us aſunder, and God hath divided me from the world, and you from me. Remember your poor Child for his Fathers ſake, who loved you in his happieſt eſtate. I ſued for my life, but (God knows) it was for you and yours that I deſired it: for know it, (my dear Wife) your Child is the Child of a true man, who in his own reſpect deſpiſeth Death and his miſhapen and ugly formes. I cannot write much,

much, (God knows) how hardly I steal this time when all sleep, and it is also time for me to separate my thoughts from the world. Beg my dead body, which living was denied you, and either lay it in *Sherburn* or in *Exeter* Church by my Father and Mother. I can say no more, Time and Death calleth me away. The everlasting God, powerfull, infinite, and inscrutable God Almighty, who is goodnesse it self, the true Light and Life, keep you and yours, and have mercy upon me, and forgive my Persecutors and false accusers, and send us to meet in his glorious Kingdome. My dear Wife farewell, Blesse my Boy, Pray for me, and let my true God hold you both in his Arms.

Yours that was, but

now not my own

Walter Raleigh.

Sir

Sr. Walter Raleigh's *Letter to Prince* Henry, *touching the model of a Ship.*

Moſt excellent Prince.

IF the Ship your Highneſſe Intends to build, be bigger than the *Victorie*, then her beams, which are laid overthwart from ſide to ſide will not ſerve again, and many other of her Timbers and other ſtuff, will not ſerve, whereas if ſhe be a ſize leſſe, the Timber of the old Ship will ſerve well to the building of a new.

If ſhe be bigger ſhe will be of leſſe uſe, go very deep to Water, and of mighty charge, our Channels decaying every year, leſſe nimble, leſſe mannyable, and ſeldome to be uſed *Grande Navio grande fatica* ſaith the *Spaniard*.

A Ship of ſix hundred Tuns, will carry as good Ordnance as a Ship of twelve hundred Tuns, and where the greater hath double her Ordnance, the leſſe will turn her broad ſide twice, before the great Ship can winde once,

once, and ſo no advantage in that overplus of Guns. The Leſſer will goe over clear where the greater ſhall ſtick and periſh; the leſſer will come and goe, leave or take, and is yare, whereas the greater is ſlow; unmaniable, and ever full of encumber.

In a well conditioned ſhip, theſe things are chiefly required.

1. That ſhe be ſtrong built.
2. Swift in ſail.
3. Stout-ſided.
4. That her Ports be ſo laid, as that ſhe may carrie out her Gunnes all weathers.
5. That ſhe hull and trie well.
6. That ſhe ſtay well, when boarding, or turning on a wind is required.

To make her ſtrong, conſiſteth in the care and truth of the work-man; to make her ſwift, is to give her a large Run, or way forward, and ſo afterward, done by art and juſt proportion, and that in laying out of her bowes before, and quarters behind; the ſhip-wright be ſure, that ſhe neither ſink nor hang into the water, but lye clear and above it, wherein Ship-wrights do often fail, and then is the ſpeed in ſailing utterly ſpoiled.

That

That ſhe be ſtout-ſided, the ſame is provided by a long bearing floar, and by ſharing off from above waters to the lower edge of the Ports, which done, then will ſhe carry out her Ordnance all weathers.

To make her to hull and to try well, which is called a good Sea Ship, there are two things principally to be regarded, the one that ſhe have a good draught of water, the other that ſhe be not overcharged: And this is ſeldome done in the Kings Ships, and therefore we are forced to lye, or trie in them with our main Courſe and mizen, which with a deep keel and ſtanding ſtreak; ſhe would perform.

The extream length of a Ship makes her unapt to ſtay, eſpecially if ſhe be floatie and want ſharpneſſe of way forward. And it is moſt true, that ſuch over-long Ships, are fitter for the narrow Seas in ſummer, than for the Ocean, or long voyages: and therefore an hundred foot by the Keel, and thirty five foot broad is a good proportion for a great Ship.

It is to be noted, that all Ships ſharp before, not having a long floar, will fall rough into the Sea from a billow, and

take in water over head and ears; and the ſame quality have all narrow quartered Ships to ſink after the tail. The high Charging of Ships, is that that brings many ill qualities, it makes them extream Lee-ward, makes them ſink deep into the Seas, makes them labour ſore in foul weather, and oft-times overſet. Safety is more to be reſpected than ſhewes, or niceneſſe for eaſe; in ſea-journeys both cannot well ſtand together, and therefore the moſt neceſſary is to be choſen.

Two Decks and an half is enough, and no building at all above that, but a low Maſters Cabbin. Our Maſters and Mariners will ſay, that the Ships will bear more well enough; and true it is, if none but ordinary Mariners ſerved in them. But men of better ſort, unuſed to ſuch a life, cannot ſo well endure the rowling and tumbling from ſide to ſide, where the ſeas are never ſo little grown, which comes by high Charging. Beſides thoſe high Cabbin-works aloft, are very dangerous in fight, to tear men with their ſplinters.

Above all other things, have care that the great Guns be four foot clear above water when all lading is in, or elſe

elſe theſe beſt pieces are idle at ſea: for if the Ports lie lower, and be open, it is dangerous; and by that default was a goodly Ship, and many gallant Gentlemen loſt, in the dayes of *Henry* the Eight, before the Iſle of *Wight*, in a Ship called by the name of *Mary-Roſe*.

Sr. *Walter Rateigh's*

PILGRIMAGE.

GIve me my Scallop ſhell of Quiet.
My Staff of Faith to walk upon ;
My Scrip of Joy immortall Diet ;
My Bottle of Salvation.
My Gown of Glory (Hopes true gage)
And thus I'le take my *Pilgrimage.*
Bloud muſt be my Bodies only Balmer,
No other Balm will there be given
Whil'ſt my Soul like a quiet Palmer,
Travelleth towards the Land of Heaven
Over the ſilver Mountains
Where ſprings the Nectar Fountains,
There will I kiſſe the Bowl of Bliſſe,
And drink mine everlaſting fill
Upon every Milken hill.
My Soul will be a drie before,
But after, it will thirſt no more.
I'le take them firſt, to quench my thirſt,
And taſte of Nectars ſuckets,
At thoſe clear Wells
Where ſweetneſſe dwells,
Drawn up by Saints in Cryſtal Buckets.
Then by that happy bleſtfull day,
More peacefull Pilgrims I ſhall ſee,
That have caſt off their rags of clay,
And walk apparelled freſh like me,
And when our Bottles and all we
Are fill'd with immortalitie.

Then

Then the bleſſed Parts wee'l travel;
Strow'd with Rubies thick as gravel,
Sealings of Diamonds, Saphire flowers,
High walls of Coral, & Pearly Bowers.
From thence to Heavens bribeleſs Hall,
Where no corrupted voices brawl,
No Conſcience molten into Gold,
No forg'd Accuſer bought or ſold,
No cauſe deferr'd, no vain ſpent journy,
For there *CHRIST* is the King's Attorny,
Who pleads for all without degrees,
And he hath Angels, but no Fees:
And when the twelve grand million Iury
Of our ſins, with direfull fury,
'Gainſt our Souls black Verdicts give,
Chriſt pleads his Death, & then we live.
Be thou my Speaker [taint'leſs Pleader,
Unblotted Lawyer, true Proceeder.]
Thou would'ſt Salvation even for Alms,
Not with a bribed Lawyers Palms.
And this is mine eternal Plea
To him that made Heaven, Earth & Sea,
That ſince my fleſh muſt die ſo ſoon,
And want a Head to dine next noon,
Juſt at the ſtroak when my veins ſtart and ſpread,
Set on my Soul an everlaſting Head.
Then am I ready, like a Palmer fit (writ.
To tread thoſe bleſt Paths which before I
Of *Death* & *Iudgement*, *Heaven* and *Hell*,
Who oft doth think, muſt needs die wel.

Sir Walter Raleigh's

VERSES,

Found in his *Bible* in the *Gate-houſe* at *Weſtminſter*.

EVen ſuch is Time, wch takes in truſt
Our Youth, our Ioys, & all we have,
And pays us nought but Age and Duſt,
When in the dark and ſilent Grave:
When we have wandred all our ways,
Shuts up the ſtory of our days:
And from which grave & earth & duſt,
The Lord ſhall raiſe me up I truſt.

Sir W. RALEIGH
On the Snuff *of a* Candle *the Night before he died.*

Cowards fear to Die, but courage ſtout,
Rather then liue in ſnuff, wil be put out.

Sir

Sir WALTER RALEIGH'S

SPEECH

Immediately before he was beheaded.

UPon *Simon* and *Judes* day, the Lieutenant of the *Tower* had a Warrant to bring his Priſoner to the Kings Bench in *Weſtminſter-Hall*, where the Attorney General demanded Execution, according to the Iudgement pronounced againſt him at *Wincheſter*, the Lord Chief Iuſtice cauſed the Indictment, Verdict, and Iudgement to be read, and after asked him, what he could ſay, Why he ſhould not die according to the Law; his anſwer was, That this fifteen years he had lived by the mere mercy of the King, and did now wonder how his Mercy was turned into Iuſtice, he not knowing any thing wherein he had provoked his Majeſties

ſties diſpleaſure, and did hope, that he was clear from that Iudgement by the Kings Commiſſion in making him General of the Voyage to *Guiana*, for (as he conceived) the words, *To his truſty and well beloved Subject*, &c. did in themſelves imply a Pardon. But Maſter Attorney told him, theſe words were not ſufficient for that purpoſe. Whereupon he deſired the opinion of the Court, to which the Lord Chief Iuſtice replyed, it was no Pardon in Law.

Then began Sir *Walter Raleigh* to make a long deſcription of the Events and Ends of his Voyage, but he was interrupted by the Chief Iuſtice, who told him, that it was not for any Offence committed there, but for his firſt fact that he was now called in queſtion, and thereupon told him, That ſeeing he muſt prepare to die, he would not adde affliction to affliction, nor aggravate his fault, knowing him to be a man full of miſery, but with the good *Samaritane* adminiſter Oyl and Wine for the comfort of his diſtreſſed Soul. You have been a General, and a great Commander, imitate therefore that noble Captain, who thruſting himſelf in-

into the middeſt of a Battel, cryed aloud, *Mors me exſpectat, & ego Mortem exſpectabo*, as you ſhould not contemn ſo to do, nor ſhould you fear death, the one ſheweth too much boldneſſe, the other no leſſe cowardize, ſo with ſome other few inſtructions the Court aroſe, and Sir *Walter* was committed into the hands of the Sheriff of *Middleſex*, who preſently conveyed him to the Gate-houſe in *Weſtminſter*.

Upon Thurſday morning this Courragious, although Committed Knight, was brought before the Parliament-Houſe, where there was a Scaffold erected for his Beheading: yet it was doubted over-night that he ſhould be hanged, but it fell out otherwiſe. He had no ſooner mounted the Scaffold, but with a chearfull Countenance, and undaunted Look, he ſaluted the Companie. His attire was a wrought night-cap, a Ruff-band, a hair-coloured Sattin Doublet, with a black wrought Waſte-coat under it, a pair of black cut Taffety Breeches, a pair of aſh-coloured Silk Stockings, and a wrought black Velvet Night gown; putting off his Hat, he directed his Speech to the Lords preſent, as followeth.

My honourable Lords, and the reſt of my good friends that come to ſee me die, Know, that I much rejoyce that it hath pleaſed God to bring me from darkneſſe to light, and in freeing me from the Tower, wherein I might have died in diſgrace, by letting me live to come to this place, where though I loſe my life, yet I ſhall clear ſome falſe accuſations, unjuſtly laid to my charge, and leave behind me a Teſtimony of a true heart, both to my King and Country.

Two things Sir *Walter Raleigh* is accuſed of.

Two things there are which have exceedingly preſſed and provoked his Majeſties indignation againſt me, viz. *A Confederacie, or Combination with* France, *and diſloyal and diſobedient words of my Prince. For the firſt, his Majeſtie had ſome cauſe, though grounded upon a weak foundation, to ſuſpect mine inclination to the* French *Faction, for not long before my departure from* England, *the* French *Agent took occaſion, paſſing by my houſe, to viſit me, had ſome conference, during the time of his abode, onely concerning my voyage, and nothing elſe, I take God to witneſſe.*

Another ſuſpition is had of me, becauſe I did labour to make an eſcape from Ply-

Plymouth to France, *I cannot deny, but that willingly, when I heard a rumour, That there was no hope of my Life upon my return to* London, *I would have escaped for the safe-guard of my Life, and not for any ill intent or conspiracie against the State.*

The like reason of suspition arose in that I perswaded Sir Lewis Steukly, *my Guardian, to flee with me from* London *to* France, *but my answer to this is, as to the other, That only for my safeguard, and nought else, was my intent, as I shall answer before the Almighty.*

It is alledged, That I feigned my self sick, and by art made my body full of blisters when I was at Salisbury. *True it is, I did so; the reason was, because I hoped thereby to defer my coming before the King and Council, and so by delaying, might have gained time to have got my Pardon. I have an Example out of Scripture for my warrant, that in case of necessity, and for the safeguard of his life,* David *feigned himself foolish and mad, yet it was not imputed to him for sin.*

Concerning the second Imputation laid to my charge, that I should spead scandalous and reproachfull words of my Prince, there is no witnesse against me but onely

one,

one, and he a Mimical French man, whom I entertained rather for his Ieſts then his Iudgement: this man to incroath himſelf into the favour of the Lords, and gaping after ſome great reward, hath falſely accuſed me of ſeditious ſpeeches againſt his Majeſtie; againſt whom, if I did either ſpeak or think a thought hurtfull or prejudicial, the Lord blot me out of the book of Life.

It is not a time to flatter or fear Princes, for I am a ſubject to none but Death, therefore have a charitable conceit of me. That I know to ſwear is an offence, to ſwear falſly at any time is a great ſin, but to ſwear falſe before the preſence of Almighty God, before whom I am forthwith to appear, were an offence unpardonable; therefore think me not now raſhly or untruly to confirm, or proteſt any thing.

As for other objections, in that I was brought perforce into England, that I carried ſixteen thouſand pounds in money out of England with me, more then I made known; that I ſhould receive Letters from the French King, and ſuch like, with many Proteſtations he utterly denied.

FINIS.

The PREROGATIVE Of PARLIAMENTS In ENGLAND.

Proved

In a Dialogue between a Councellour of State, and a Justice of Peace.

By Sir WALTER RALEIGH.

Dedicated to the KINGS most Excellent Majestie.

LONDON.
Printed for *William Sheares* at the Bible in bedford street in *Covent Garden* 1661.

To the

KING

Moſt gracious Soveraign.

THoſe that are ſuppreſt and helpleſſe are commonly ſilent, wiſhing that the common ill in all ſort might be with their particular misfortunes: which diſpoſition, as it is uncharitable in all men, ſo would it be in me more dogge-like then man-like, to bite the ſtone that ſtrooke me: (to wit) the borrowed authority of my Soveraigne miſinformed, ſeeing their arms and hands that flang it, are moſt of them already rotten. For I muſt confeſſe it ever, that they are debts,

and not discontentments, that your Majesty hath laid upon me; the debts & obligation of a friendlesse adversity, farre more payable dn all kinds, then those of the prosperous: All which, nor the least of them, though I cannot discharge, I may yet endeavour it. And notwithstanding my restrant hath retrenched all wayes, as well the wayes of labour and will, as of all other imployments, yet hath it left with me my cogitations, then which I have nothing else to offer on the Altar of my Love.

Of those (most gracious soveraigne) I have used some part in the following dispute, between a Counsellour of Estate, and a Iustice of Peace, the one disswading, the other perswading the calling of a Parliament. In all which, since the Norman Conquest (at the least so many, as Histories have gathered) I have in some things in the following

Dialogue

Dialogue presented your Majesty with the contents and successes.

Some things there are and those of the greatest, which because they ought to be resolved on, I thought fit to range them in the front of the rest, to the end your Majesty may be pleased to examine your own great and Princely heart of their acceptance, or refusall.

The first is, that supposition, that your Majesties Subjects give nothing but with adjunction of their own interest, interlacing in one and the same act your Majesties reliefe, their own liberties: not that your Majesties piety was ever suspected, but because the best Princes are ever the least jealous, your Majesties judging others by your self, who have abused your Majesties trust. The fear'd continuance of the like abuse may perswade the provision. But this

caution, how ever it seemeth at first sight, your Majestie shall perceive by many examples following but frivolous. The bonds of Subjects to their Kings should alwayes be wrought out of Iron, the bonds of Kings unto Subjects but with Cobwebs.

This it is (most renowned Soveraigne) that this traffick of assurances hath been often urged, of which, if the Conditions had been easie, our Kings have as easily kept them; if hard and prejudiciall, either to their honours or estates, the Creditours have been paid their debts with their own presumption.

For all binding of a King by Law upon the advantage of his necessity, makes the breach it self lawful in a King, His Charters and all other instruments being no other then the surviving witnesses of unconstrained will: Princeps

non

non ſubjicitur niſi ſua voluntate libera, mero motu & certa Scientia: *Neceſſary words in all the grants of a King witneſſing that the ſame grants were given freely and knowingly.*

The ſecond reſolution will reſt in your Majeſty, leaving the new impoſitions, all Monopolies, and other grievances of the people to the conſideration of the Houſe, Provided, that your Majeſties revenue be not abated, which if your Majeſty ſhall refuſe, it is thought that the diſputes will laſt long, and the iſſues will be doubtfull: And on the contrary if your Majeſty vouchſafe it, it may perchance be ſtiled a yielding, which ſeemeth by the ſound to brave the Regalty.

But (moſt excellent Prince) what other is it to th'eares of the Wiſe, but as the ſound of a trumpet, having blaſted forth a falſe Alarme, becomes but common

aire ? Shall the head yield to the feet ? certainly it ought, when they are grieved, for wiſdome will rather regard the commodity, then object the diſgrace, ſeeing if the feet lye in fetters, the head *cannot be freed, and where the feet feele but their own paines, the* head *doth not only ſuffer by participation, but withall by conſideration of the evill.*

Certainly the point of honour well weighed hath nothing in it to even the ballance, for by your Majeſties favour, your Majeſty doth not yield either to any perſon or to any power, but to diſpute only, in which the Propoſition and Minor prove nothing without a concluſion, which no other perſon or power can make, but a Majeſty : yea this in Henry *the third his time was called a wiſdome incomparable. For the King raiſed*

again,

again, recovered his authority: For, being in that extremity as he was driven with the Queen and his Children, Cum Abbatibus & Prioribus ſatis humilibus hoſpitia quærere & prandia: *For the reſt, may it pleaſe your Majeſty to conſider that there can nothing befall your Majeſty in matters of affaires more unfortunately, then the Commons of Parliament with ill ſucceſſe: A diſhonour ſo perſwaſive and adventurous as it will not onely find arguments; but it will take the leading of all enemies that ſhall offer themſelves againſt your Majeſties eſtate.*

Le Tabourin de la paurete ne faict poinct de breuct: *of which dangerous diſeaſe in Princes, the remedy doth chiefly conſiſt in the love of the people, which how it may be had & held, no man knowes better then your Majeſty; how to*

looſe it, all men know, and know that it is loſt by nothing more then by the defence of others in wrong doing. The only motives of miſchances that ever come to Kings of this Land ſince the Conqueſt.

It is only love (*moſt renowned Soveraign*) *muſt prepare the way for your Majeſties following deſires. It is* love *which obeyes, which ſuffers, which gives, which ſtickes at nothing; which Love, as well of your Majeſties people, as the love of God to your Majeſty, that it may alwayes hold, ſhall be the continuall prayers of your Majeſties moſt humble vaſſall,*

Walter Raleigh.

The PREROGATVE of PARLIAMENTS Proved in a dialogue between a COUNSELLOUR of STATE, and a JUSTICE of PEACE

COUNSELLOUR.

NOW Sir, what think you of M. S. *Iohns* tryall in Star Camber? I know that the bruit ranne that he was hardly dealt with-all, becauſe he was impriſoned in the Tower, ſeeing his diſſwaſion from granting a Benevolence to the King was warranted by the Law.

IUSTICE. Surely Sir it was made

made manifeſt at the hearing, that M. St. *Iohn* was rather in love with his own letter; he confeſſed he had ſeen your Lordſhips Letter, before hee wrote his to the Major of *Marleborough*, and in your Lordſhips letter, there was not a word whereto the Statutes by Mr. St. *Iohn* alleadged, had reference; for thoſe Statutes did condemn the gathering of mony from the ſubject, under title of a free gift; whereas a fift, a ſixt, a tenth, &c. was ſet down and required. But my good Lord, though divers Shires have given to his Majeſtie, ſome more, ſome leſſe, what is this to the Kings debt?

COUNS. Wee know it well enough, but we have many other projects.

IUST. Is is true my good Lord: but your Lordſhip will finde, that when by theſe you have drawn many petty ſummes from the ſubjects, and thoſe ſomtimes ſpent as faſt as they are gathered, his Majeſty being nothing enabled thereby, when you ſhall be forced to demand your *great aide*, the Countrey will excuſe it ſelf in regard of their former payments.

COUNS. What mean you by the *great aide*.

IUST.

IUST. I mean the aide of Parliament.

COUNS. By Parliament, I would fain know the man that durſt perſwade the King unto it, for if it ſhould ſucceed ill, in what caſe were he.

IUST. You ſay well for your ſelf my Lord, and perchance you that are lovers of your ſelves (under pardon) do follow the advice of the late Duke of *Alva*, who was ever oppoſite to all reſolutions in buſineſſe of importance; for if the things enterpriſed ſucceeded well, the advice never came in queſtion; if ill, (whereto great undertakings are commonly ſubject) he then made his advantage by remembring his Countrey Councell: But my good Lord, theſe reſerved Politicians are not the beſt ſervants, for he that is bound to adventure his life for his Maſter, is alſo bound to adventure his advice, *Keep not back Councell* (ſaith *Eccleſiaſticus*) *when it may do good.*

COUNS. But Sir, I ſpeak it not in other reſpect then I think it dangerous for the King to aſſemble the three eſtates, for thereby have our former Kings alwayes loſt ſomewhat of their *prerogatives*. And becauſe that you ſhall not think that I ſpeak it at randome,

dome, I will begin with elder times, wherein the first contention began betwixt the King of this land and their subjects in Parliament.

JUST. Your Lordship shall do me a singular favour.

COUNS. You know that the Kings of *England* had no formal Parliament till about the 18. year of *Hen.* the first. for in his 17 year for the marriage of his Daughter, the King raised a tax upon every hide of land by the advice of his privy Councell alone. But you may remember how the subjects soon after the establishment of this Parliament began to stand upon terms with the King, and drew from him by strong hand and the sword the *great Charter.*

IUST. Your Lordships sayes well, they drew from the King the *great Charter* by the sword, and hereof the Parliament cannot be accused, but the Lords.

COUNS. You say well, but it was after the establishment of the Parliament, and by colour of it, that they had so great daring, for before that time they could not endure to hear of Sr. *Edwards* lawes, but resisting the confirmation in all they could, although

by

by theſe lawes the Subjects of this Iland were no leſſe free then any of all *Europe*.

IUST. My good Lord, the reaſon is manifeſt; for while the *Normans* and others of the *French* that followed the Conquerour made ſpoyle of the *English*, they would not endure that any thing but the will of the Conquerour ſhould ſtand for Law: but after a diſcent or two when themſelves were become *English*, and found themſelves beaten with their own rods, they then began to favour the difference between ſubjection and ſlavery, and inſiſt upon the Law, *Meum & tuum*, and to be able to ſay unto themſelves, *hoc fac & vives*: yea that the conquering *English* in *Ireland* did the like, your Lordſhip knowes it better than I.

COUNS. I think you gueſſe aright: And to the end the ſubject may know that being a Faithfull ſervant to his Prince he might enjoy his own life, and paying to his Prince what belongs to a Soveraigne, the remainder was his own to diſpoſe. *Henry* the firſt to content his vaſſals gave them the *great Charter*, and the *Charter of Forreſts*.

IUST. What reaſon then had

K. Iohn to deny the cofirmation.

COUNS. He did not, but he on the contrary confirmed both the *Charters* with additions, and required the Pope whom he had then made his ſuperior to ſtrengthen him with a *golden Bull.*

IUST. But your honour knowes, that it was not long, that he repented himſelf.

COUNS. It is true, and he had reaſon ſo to do, for the Barons refuſed to follow him into France, as they ought to have done, and to ſay true, this *great Charter* upon which you inſiſt ſomuch, was not originally granted Regally and freely; for *Henry* the firſt did uſurpe the Kingdome, and therefore the better to aſſure himſelf againſt *Robert* his eldeſt Brother, he flattered the Nobility and people with thoſe *Charters.* Yea King *Iohn* that confirmed them, had the like reſpect: for *Arthur* Duke of *Britain* was the undoubted heir of the Crown, upon whom *Iohn* uſurped. And ſo to conclude, theſe Charters had their originall from Kings *de facto*, but not *de jure.*

IUST. But King *Iohn* confirmed the *Charter* after the death of his Nephew *Arthur*, when he was then *Rex de jure* alſo.

COUNS.

COUNS. It is true, for he durſt do no other, ſtanding accurſed, whereby few or none obeyed him, for his Nobility refuſed to follow him into *Scotland*, and he had ſo grieved the people by pulling down all the Parke pales before harveſt, to the end his Deere might ſpoil the corn; And by ſeizing the temporalities of ſo many Biſhopricks into his hands, and cheifly for practiſing the death of the Duke of *Britain* his Nephew, as alſo having loſt *Normandy* to the French, ſo as the hearts of all men were turned from him.

IUST. Nay by your favour my Lord, King *Iohn* reſtored K. *Edwards* Laws after his abſolution, and wrote his letters in the 15 of his reigne to all Sheriffs countermanding all former oppreſſions, yea this he did notwithſtanding the Lords refuſed to follow him into France.

COUNS. Pardon me, he did not reſtore King *Edwards* Lawes then, nor yet confirmed the Charters, but he promiſed upon his abſolution to doe both: but after his return out of *France*. in his 16. year de denyed it, becauſe without ſuch a promiſe he had not obtained reſtitution, his promiſe

miſe being conſtrained, and not voluntary.

JUST. But what think you, was hee not bound in honour to performe it?

COUNS. Certainly no, for it was determined, the caſe of King *Francis* the firſt of France, that all promiſes by him made, whilſt he was in the hands of *Charles* the fift his enemy, were void, by reaſon the Judge of honour, which tels us he durſt doe no other.

JUST. But King *Iohn* was not in priſon.

COUNS. Yet for all that, reſtraint is impriſonment, yea, fear it ſelf is impriſonment, and the King was ſubject to both: I know there is nothing more Kingly in a King than the performance of his word; but yet of a word freely and voluntarily given. Neither was the *Charter* of *Henry* the firſt ſo publiſhed, that all men might plead it for their advantage but a *Charter* was left (*in depoſito*) in the hands of the Archbiſhop of *Canterbury* for the time, and ſo to his ſucceſſours. *Stephen Langthon*, who was ever a Traytor to the King, produced this *Charter*, and ſhewed it to the Barons, there-

thereby encouraging them to make war againſt the King. Neither was it the old *Charter* ſimply the Barons ſought to have confirmed, but they preſented unto the King other articles and orders, tending to the alteration of the whole common-wealth, which when the King refuſed to ſigne, the Barons preſently put themſelves into the field, & in rebellious and outragious faſhion ſent the King word, except he confirmed them, they would not deſiſt from making war againſt him, till he had ſatisfied them therein. And in concluſion, the King being betrayed of all his Nobility, in effect was forced to grant the Charter of *Magna Charta*, and *Charta de Foreſtis*, at ſuch time as he was invironed with an Army in the Meadowes of *Staynes*, which *Charters* being procured by force, Pope *Innocent* afterward diſavowed, and threatned to curſe the Barons if they ſubmitted not themſelves as they ought to their Soveraigne Lord, which when the Lords refuſed to obey, the King entertained an army of ſtrangers for his own defence, wherewith having Maſtered and beaten the Barons, they called in *Lewis* of *France* (a moſt unnaturall reſolution) to be

their

their King; Neither was *Magna Charta* a Law in the 19. of *Henry* the 2d. but simply a *Charter* which he confirmed in the 21 of his reigne, and made it a Law in the 25. according to *Littletons* opinion. Thus much for the beginning of the *Great Charter*, which had first an obscure birth from usurpation, and was secondly, fostered and shewed to the world by rebellion.

IUST. I cannot deny but that all your Lordship hath said is true; but seeing the *Charters* were afterwards so many times confirmed by Parliament and made Lawes, and that there is nothing in them unequall or prejudicial to the King, doth not your Honour think it reason they should be observed?

COUNS. Yes, and observed they are in all that the state of a King can permit, for no man is destroyed but by the Lawes of the land, no man dissezed of his inheritance but by the Lawes of the land, imprisoned they are by the prerogative where the King hath cause to suspect their loyalty: for were it otherwise, the King should never come to the knowledge of any conspiracy or Treason againit his Person or state, and being imprisoned, yet

doth

doth not any man ſuffer death but by the Law of the land.

IUST. But may it pleaſe your Lordſhip, were not *Cornewallis*, *Sharpe*, and *Hoskins* impriſoned, being no ſuſpition of Treaſon there?

COUNS. They were; but it coſt them nothing.

IUST. And what got the King by it? for in the concluſion (beſides the murmure of the people) *Cornewallis*, *Sharpe* and *Hoskins* having greatly overſhot themſelves, and repented them, a fine of 5 or 6ool. was laid on his Majeſtie for their offences, for ſo much their diet coſt his Majeſty.

COUNS, I know who gave the advice, ſure I am that it was none of mine: But thus I ſay, if you conſult your memory, you ſhall find that thoſe Kings which did in their own times confirme the *Magna Charta*, did not only impriſon, but they cauſed of their Nobilitie and others to be ſlain without hearing or tryall.

IUST. My good Lord, if you will give me leave to ſpeak freely, I ſay, that they are not well adviſed that perſwade the King not to admit the *Magna Charta* with the former reſervations: For as the King can never loſe a

far-

a farthing by it as I ſhall prove anon: So except *England* were as Naples is, and kept by Garriſons of another Nation, it is impoſſible for a King of *England* to greaten and inrich himſelf by any way ſo aſſuredly, as by the love of his people: For by one rebellion the King hath more loſſe then by a hundred years obſervance of *Magna Charta*. For therein have our Kings been forced to compound with Rogues and Rebels, and to pardon them, yea the ſtate of the King, the Monarchie, the Nobility have been endangered by them.

COUNS. Well Sir, let that paſſe, why ſhould not our Kings raiſe money as the Kings of *France* do by their letters and Edicts onely? for ſince the the time of *Lewis* the 11. of whom it is ſaid, that he freed the French Kings of their wardſhip; the French Kings have ſeldome aſſembled the ſtates for any contribution.

JUST. I will tell you why: the ſtrength of *England* doth conſiſt of the people and Yeomantry, the Peſants of *France* have no courage nor armes: In *France* every Village and Burrough hath a caſtle, which the *French* call *Chaſteau Villain*, every good City hath

a

a good Cittadell, the King hath the Regiments of his guardes and his men at armes alwayes in pay; yea the Nobility of *France* in whom the ſtrength of *France* conſiſts, doe alwayes aſſiſt the King in thoſe leavies, becauſe themſelves being free, they made the ſame leavies upon their Tennants. But my Lord, if you marke it, *France* was never free in effect from civill wars, and lately it was endangered either to be conquered by the *Spaniard* or to be cantonized by the rebellious French themſelves, ſince that freedome of Wardſhip. But my good Lord, to leave this digreſſion, that wherein I would willingly ſatisfie your Lordſhip, is, that the Kings of *England* have never received loſſe by Parliament, or prejudice.

COUNS. No Sir, you ſhall find that the ſubjects in Parliament have decreed great things to the diſadvantage and diſhonour of our Kings in former times.

IUST. My good Lord, to avoide confuſion, I will make a ſhort repitition of them all, & then your Lordſhip may object where you ſee cauſe; And I doubt not but to give your Lordſhip ſatisfaction. In the ſix year of

Henry

Henry the 3d there was no diſpute, the houſe gave the King two ſhillings of every plough'd land within *England*, and in the end of the ſame year he had *eſcuage* payed him (to wit) for every Knights fee two marks in ſilver. In the fifth year of that King, the Lords demaunded the confirmation of the *Great Charter* which the Kings Councell for that time preſent excuſed, alleadging that thoſe priviledges, were extorted by force during the Kings Minority, and yet the King was pleaſed to ſend forth his writ to the Sheriffes of every Countrey, requiring them to certifie what thoſe liberties were, and how uſed, and in exchange of the Lords demaund, becauſſe they preſſed him ſo violently, the King required all the caſtles and places which the Lords held of his, and had held in time of his Father, with thoſe Mannors and Lordſhips which they had heretofore wreſted from the Crown, which at that time (the King being provided of forces) they durſt not deny. In the 14 year he had the 15 peny of all goods given him, upon condition to confirme the *Great Charter*: For by reaſon of the wars in *France*, and the loſſe of *Rochell*,

chell, he was then enforced to consent to the Lords in all they demanded. In the tenth of his reigne he fined the City of *London* at 50000. marks, becauſe they had received *Lewis* of *France*. In the 11. year in the Parliament at *Oxford*, he revoked the great Charter, being granted when he was under age, and governed by the Earle of *Pembroke* and the Biſhop of *Winchester*. In this 11. year the Earles of *Cornewall* and *Chester*, Marſhall, *Edward* Earle of *Pembroke*, *Gilbert* Earle of *Glouceſter*. *Warren*, *Hereford*, *Ferrars*, *and Warwick*, and others rebelled againſt the King, and conſtrained him to yeeld unto them in what they demanded for their particular intereſt, which rebellion being appeaſed, he ſayled into *France*, and in his 15 year he had a 15th of the temporality, and a diſme and a halfe of the ſpirituality, and withall eſcuage of every Knights fee.

COUNS. But what ſay you to the Parliament of *Weſtminſter* in the 16th. of the King, where notwithſtanding the wars of *France* and his great charge in repulſing the *Welſh* rebels, he was flatly denyed the Subſidy demanded.

IUST. I confeſſe, my Lord, that

the houſe excuſed themſelves by reaſon of their poverty, and the Lords taking of Armes; in the next year it was manifeſt that the houſe was practiſed againſt the King: And was it not ſo, my good Lord, think you in our two laſt Parliaments, for in the firſt even thoſe whom his Majeſty truſted moſt, betrayed him in the union, and in the ſecond there were other of the great ones ran counter. But your Lordſhip ſpake of dangers of Parliaments, in this, my Lord, there was a deny-all, but there was no danger at all: but to returne where I left, what got the Lords by practizing the houſe at that time? I ſay that thoſe that brake this Staffe upon the King, were overturned with the counterbuffe, for he reſumed all thoſe lands which he had given in his minority: he called all his exacting officers to accompt, he found them all faulty, he examined the corruption of other Magiſtrates, and from all theſe he drew ſufficient money to ſatisfie his preſent neceſſity; whereby he not only ſpared his people, but highly contented them with an act of ſo great Iuſtice: Yea *Hubert* Earle of *Kent* the cheif Iuſtice whom he had moſt truſted, and moſt advanced

ced, was found as falſe to the King as any one of the reſt. And for concluſion, in the end of that year at the aſſembly of the States at *Lambeth*, the King had the fortieth part of every mans goods given him freely toward his debts: for the people, who the ſame year had refuſed to give the King any thing, when they ſaw he had ſqueaſed thoſe ſpunges of the Common-wealth, they willingly yielded to give him ſatisfaction.

COUNS. But I pray you what became of this *Hubert*, whom the King had favoured above all men, betraying his Majeſty as he did.

IUST. There were many that perſwaded the King to put him to death, but he could not be drawn to conſent, but the King ſeized upon his eſtate which was great; yet in the end he left him a ſufficient portion, and gave him his life, becauſe he had done great ſervice in former times: For his Majeſty, though he tooke advantage of his vice; yet he forgot not to have conſiderarion of his virtue. And upon this occaſion it was that the King, betrayed by thoſe whom he moſt truſted, entertained ſtrangers, and gave them their offices and the charge of

his Caſtles and ſtrong places in *England*.

COUNS. But the drawing in of thoſe ſtrangers was the cauſe that *Marſhall* Earle of *Pembroke* moved war againſt the King.

JUST. It is true, my good Lord, but he was ſoon after ſlain in *Ireland*, and his whole maſculine race, ten years extinguiſhed, though there were five Sons of them, and *Marſhall*. being dead, who was the mover and ring-leader of that war, the King pardoned the reſt of the Lords that had aſſiſted *Marſhall*

COUNS. What reaſon had the King ſo to doe?

JUST. Becauſe he was perſwaded, that they loved his perſon, and only hated thoſe corrupt Counſellors, that then bear the greateſt ſway under him, as alſo becauſe they were the beſt men of war he had, whom if he deſtroyed, having war with the *French* he had wanted Commanders to have ſerved him.

COUNS. But what reaſon had the Lords to take armes?

JUST. Becauſe the King entertained the *Poictovins*, were not they the Kings vaſſals alſo? Should the

the *Spaniards* rebell, becauſe the *Spaniſh* King truſts to the *Neapolitans*, *Portagues*, *Millanoes*, and other Nations his vaſſals, ſeeing thoſe that are governed by the Vice-royes and deputies, are in pollicy to be well entertained & to be employed, who would otherwiſe deviſe how to free themſelves; whereas, being truſted and imployed by their Prince, they entertain themſelves with the hopes that other the Kings vaſſals do, if the King had called in the *Spaniards*, or other Nations, not his Subjects, the Nobilitie of *England* had reaſon of grief.

COUNS. But what people did ever ſerve the King of *England* more faithfully then the *Gaſcoignes* did, even to the laſt of the conqueſt of that Dutchie;

JUST. Your Lordſhip ſayes well, and I am of that opinion, that if it had pleaſed the Queen of *England* to have drawn ſome of the cheif of the *Iriſh* Nobilitie into *England* & by exchange to have made them good free-holders in *England* ſhe had ſaved above 2. millions of pounds, which were conſumed in times of thoſe Rebellions. For what held the great *Gaſcoigne* firm to the

Crown of *England* (of whom the Duke of *Eſpernon* married the Inheretrix) but his Earledome of *Kendall* in *England*, whereof the Duke of *Eſpernon* (in right of his Wife) beares the Title to this day? And to the ſame end I take it, hath *Iames* our Soveraign Lord given Lands to divers of the Nobilitie of *Scotland*. And if I were worthy to adviſe your Lordſhip, I ſhould think, that your Lordſhip ſhould do the King great ſervice, to put him in mind to prohibite all the *Scottish* Nation to alienate and ſell away their inheritance here; for they ſelling, they not only give cauſe to the *English* to complain, that the Treaſure of *England* is tranſported into *Scotland*, but his Majeſtie is thereby alſo fruſtrated of making both Nations one, and of aſſuring the ſervice and obedience of the *Scots* in future.

COUNS. You ſay well, for though thoſe of *Scotland* that are advanced & enriched by the Kings Majeſties will, no doubt ſerve him faithfully, yet how their heires and ſucceſſors, having no inheritance to loſe in *England*, may be ſeduced, is uncertain. But let us go on with our Parliament. And what ſay you to the denyall, in the

26th. year of his raigne, even when the King was invited to come into *France* by the Earle of *March*, who had married his Mother, and who promised to assist the King in the conquest of many places lost?

IUST. It is true my good Lord, that a subsidie was then denied, and the reasons are delivered in *English* Histories, and indeed the King not long before had spent much Treasure in aiding the Duke of *Britaine* to no purpose; for he drew over the King but to draw on good conditions for himself, as the Earle of *March* his father in law now did: As the *English* Barons did invite *Lewes* of *France* not long before, as in elder times all the Kings and States had done, and in late yeares the Leaguers of *France* entertained the *Spaniards*, and the *French* Protestants and Netherlands, Queen *Elizabeth*, not with any purpose to greaten those that aide them, but to purchase to themselves an advantageous peace. But what say the Histories to this denyall? They say, with a world of payments there mentioned, that the King had drawn the Nobility drie. And besides, that whereas not long before great summes of mo-

ney where given, & the ſame appointed to be kept in four Caſtles, and not to be expended but by the advice of the Peeres; it was believed, that the ſame Treaſure was yet unſpent.

COUNS Good Sir you have ſaid enough; judge you whether it were not a diſhonor to the King to be ſo tyed, as not to expend his Treaſure but by other mens advice, as it were by their licence.

IUST. Surely, my Lord, the King was well adviſed to take the money upon any occaſion, and they were fooles that propounded the reſtraint; for it doth not appear, that the King took any great heed to thoſe overſeers: *Kings are bound by their pietie and by no other obligation.* In Queen *Maries* time, when it was thought that ſhee was with Child, it was propounded in Parliament, that the rule of the Realme ſhould be given to King *Philip*, during the minoritie of the hoped Prince or Princeſſe; and the King offered his aſſurance in great ſummes of money, to relinquiſh the Government at ſuch time as the Prince or Princeſſe ſhould be of age: At which motion, when all elſe where ſilent in the Houſe.

Lord

Lord *Dacres* (who was none of the wiſeſt) asked who ſhall ſue the King's Bonds? which ended the diſpute, (for what other Bond is between a King and his vaſſals, then the Bond of the Kings Faith?) But, my good Lord, the King, notwithſtanding the denyall at that time, was with gifts from particular perſons, and otherwiſe, ſupplyed for proceeding of his journey for that time into *France*; he took with him 30 Caskes filled with *Silver* and Coyne, which was a great Treaſure in thoſe dayes. And laſtly, notwithſtanding the firſt deniall, in the Kings abſence he had Eſcuage granted him (to wit) 20 s. of every Knights Fee.

COUNS. What ſay you then to the 28th year of that King, in which when the King demanded reliefe, the States would not conſent, except the ſame former order had bin taken for the appointing of 4 overſeers for the treaſure: as alſo that the Lord chief Iuſtice and the L. Chancelor ſhould be choſen by the States, with ſome *Barons* of the Exchequer and other officers.

IUST. My good Lord, admit the King had yielded their demands,

then whatsoever had been ordained by those Magistrates to the dislike of the Common-wealth, the people had been without remedie, whereas while the King made them, they had their appeal and other remedies. But those demands vanished, and in the end the King had escuage given him, without any of their conditions. It is an excellent virtue in a King to have patience, and to give way to the furie of mens passions. The Whale when he is strucken by the fisherman, growes into that furie, that he cannot be resisted: but will overthrow all the ships and Barkes that come into his way; but when he hath tumbled a while, he is drawn to the shore with a twin'd thred.

COUNS. What say you then to the Parliament in the 29th. of that King.

JUST. I say, that the Commons being unable to pay, the King relieves himself upon the richer sort: and so it likewise happened in the 33. of that King, in which he was relieved cheifly by the Citie of *London*. But, my good Lord, in the Parliament in *London* in the 38th. year, he had given him the tenth of all the revenues of the Church

Church for 3 years, and three marks of every Knights Fee throughout the Kingdome, upon his promiſe and oath upon the obſerving of *Magna Charta*, but in the end of the ſame year, the King being then in *France*, he was denyed the aides which he required. What is this to the danger of a Parliament? eſpecially at this time they had reaſon to refuſe, they had given ſo great a ſumme in the begining of the ſame year. And again, becauſe it was known that the King had but pretended war with the King of *Caſtile*, with whom he had ſecretly contracted an alliance, and concluded a Marriage betwixt his Son *Edward* and the Lady *Elenor*. Theſe falſe fires do but fright Children, and it commonly falls out, that when the cauſe given is known to be falſe, the neceſſitie pretended is thought to be fained. Royall dealing hath evermore Royall ſucceſſe: and as the King was denyed in the eight and thirtieth year, ſo was he denyed in the nine and thirtieth year, becauſe the Nobilitie and the people ſaw it plainly, that the King was abuſed by the Pope, who as well in deſpite to *Manfred* baſtard Son to the Emperour *Frederick* the ſecond: as to

couzen the King and to waſte him, would needs beſtow on the King the Kingdome of *Sicily*; to recover which the King ſent all the Treaſure he could borrow or ſcrape to the Pope, and withall gave him letters of credence, for to take up what he could in *Italy*, the King binding himſelf for the payment. Now, my good Lord, the wiſdome of Princes is ſeen in nothing more then in their enterpriſes. So how unpleaſing it was to the State of *England* to conſume the Treaſure of the Land, and in the conqueſt of *Sicily* ſo far off, and otherwiſe, for that the *English* had loſt *Normandie* under their noſes, and ſo many goodly parts of *France*, of their own proper inheritances: the reaſon of the denyall is as well to be conſidered as the denyall.

COUNS. Was not the King alſo denyed a Subſidie in the fortie firſt of his reigne?

IUST. No, my Lord: for although the King required mony as before, for the impoſſible conqueſt of *Sicily*, yet the Houſe offered to give 52000 marks, which whether he refuſed or accepted, is uncertain: and whilſt the King dreamed of *Sicily*, the *Welsh* invaded

invaded and ſpoyled the borders of *England*; for in the Parliament of *London*, when the King urged the Houſe for the proſecuting the conqueſt of *Sicily*, the Lords utterly diſliking the attempt, urged the proſecuting of the Welſhmen: which Parliament being proroged did again aſſemble at Oxford, and was called the mad Parliament, which was no other then an aſſembly of rebels, for the royal aſſent of the King which gives life to all Lawes, form'd by the three eſtates, was not a royall aſſent, when both the King and the Prince were conſtrained to yield to the Lotds. A conſtrained conſent is the conſent of a Captive and not of a King and therefore there was nothing done there either legally or royally. For if it be not properly a Parliament where the ſubject is not free, certainly it can be none where the King is bound, for all Kingly rule was taken from the King, and twelve Peers appointed; and as ſome Writers have it 24. Peeres, to govern the Realme, and therefore the aſſembly made by *Iack Straw* and other rebels may aſwell be called a Parliament as that of Oxford. *Principis nomen habere, non eſt eſſe princeps,*

for

for there by was the K. driven not only to compound all quarrels with the French, but to have meanes to be revenged on the rebell Lords : but he quitted his right to *Normandy*, *Anjoun* and *Mayne*.

COUNS. But Sir, what needed this extremity, seeing the Lords required but the confirmation of the former Charter, which was not prejudiciall to the King to grant ?

JUST. Yes my good Lord, but they insulted upon the King, and would not suffer him to enter into his own Castles, they put down the Purveyor of the meat for the maintenance of his house : as if the King had been a bankrupt, and gave order that without ready money he should not take up a Chicken. And though there is nothing against the royalty of a King in these Charters (the Kings of England being Kings of freemen and not of slaves) yet it is so contrary to the nature of a King to be forced even to those things which may be to his advantage, as the King had some reason to seek the dispensation of his oath from the Pope, and to draw in strangers for his own defence : yea *jure salvo Coronæ nostræ* is intended inclusi-

cluſively in all oathes and promiſes exacted from a Soveraign,

Couns. But you cannot be ignorant how dangerous a thing it is to call in other Nations both for the ſpoil they make, as alſo, becauſe they have often held the poſſeſſion of the beſt places with which they have been truſted.

Just. It is true my good Lord, that there is nothing ſo dangerous for a King as to be conſtrained and held as a priſoner to his vaſſals, for by that, *Edward* the ſecond, and *Richard* the ſecond loſt their Kingdomes and their lives. And for calling in of ſtrangers, was not King *Edward* the ſixth driven to call in ſtrangers againſt the Rebels in Norfolke, Cornewall, Oxfordſhire and elſewhere? Have not the Kings of Scotland been oftentimes conſtrained to entertain ſtrangers againſt the Kings of England: And the King of England at this time had he not been diverſe times aſſiſted by the Kings of Scotland had, bin endangered to have been expelled for ever.

Couns. But yet you know thoſe Kings were depoſed by Parliament.

Just. Yea my good Lord being Priſoners, being out of poſſeſſion, and being

being in their hands that were Princes of the bloud and pretenders. It is an old Countrey Proverbe, (that *Might overcomes Right*) a weak title that weares a ſtrong ſword, commonly prevailes againſt a ſtrong title that weares but a weak one, otherwiſe *Philip* the ſecond had never been Duke of Portugall, nor Duke of Millayne, nor King of Naples & Sicily. But good Lord, *Errores non ſunt trahendi in exemplum.* I ſpeak of regall, peaceable, and lawfull Parliaments. The King at this time was but a King in name, for Gloceſter, Leiceſter and Chicheſter made choice of other Nine, to whom the rule of the Realme was committed, and the Prince was forced to purchaſe his liberty from the Earle of Leiceſter, by giving for his ranſome the Countey Pallatine of Cheſter. But my Lord let us judge of thoſe occaſions by their events, what became of this proud Earle? was he not ſoon after ſlain in Eveſham? was he not left naked in the field, and left a ſhamfull ſpectacle, his head being cut off from his ſhoulders, his privie parts from his body, and laid on each ſide of his noſe? And did not God extinguiſh his race after which in a lawfull Parliament

liament at Weſtminſter (confirmed in a following Parliament of Weſtminſter) were not all the Lords that followed Leyceſter diſinherited? And when that fool Gloceſter after the death of Leyceſter (whom he had formerly forſaken) made himſelf the head of a ſecond Rebellion, and called in ſtrangers, for which not long before he had cried out againſt the King, was not he in the end, after that he had ſeen the ſlaughter of ſo many of the Barons, the ſpoil of their Caſtles, and Lordſhips, conſtrained to ſubmit himſelf, as all the ſurvivers did, of which they that ſped beſt, payed their fines and ranſomes, the King reſerving his younger Son, the Earledomes of Leyceſter and Derby.

COUNS. Well Sir, we have diſputed this King to the grave, though it be true, that he out-lived all his enemies, and brought them to confuſion, yet thoſe examples did not terrifie their ſucceſſors, but the Earle Marſhall, and Hereford, threatned King *Edward* the firſt, with a new War.

JUST. They did ſo, but after the death of Hereford, the Earle Marſhall repented himſelf, and to gain the Kings favour, he made him heir

of

of all his Lands. But what is this to the Parliament? for there was never King of this land had more given him for the time of his raign, then *Edward* the Son of *Henry* the third had.

COUNS. How doth that appear?

JUST. In this sort my good Lord, in this Kings third year he had given him the fifteenth part of all goods. In his sixt year a twentyeth. In his twelfth year a twentyeth, in his fourteenth year he had escuage (to wit) forty shillings of every Knights Fee, in his eighteenth year he had the eleventh part of all moveable goods within the Kingdome, in his nineteenth year the tenth part of all Church livings in England, Scotland and Ireland for six years, by agreement from the Pope in his three and twentieth year he raised a taxe upon Wool and fels, and on a day caused all the religious houses to be searched, and all the treasure in them to be seized and brought to his coffers, excusing himself by laying the fault upon his Treasurer: he had also in the end of the same year, of all goods of all Burgesses, and of the Commons the 10th part, in the 25th year of the Parliament of St. *Edmundsbury*, he had an 18th part of the goods

goods of the Burgeſſes, and of the people in generall, the tenth part. He had alſo the ſame year by putting the Clergie out of his protection a fifth part of their goods, and in the ſame year he ſet a great taxe upon Wools, to wit from halfa marke to 40 s. upon every ſack, whereupon the Earle *Marſhall*, and the Earle of *Hereford* refuſing to attend the King to *Flanders*, pretended the grievances of the people. But in the end the King having pardoned them, and confirmed the great Charter, he had the ninth penny of all goods from the Lords & Commons of the Clergie, in the South he had the tenth penny, and in the North the fift penny. In the two and thirtyeth year he had a ſubſidy freely granted. In the three and thirtyeth year he confirmed the great Charter of his own Royall diſpoſition, and the ſtates to ſhew their thankfullneſſe, gave the King for one year, the fift part of all the revenues of the land, and of the Citizens the ſixt part of their goods. And in the ſame year the King uſed the inquiſition called *Traile Baſton*. By which all Juſtices and other Magiſtrates were grievouſly fined that had uſed extortion

tion or bribery, or had otherwiſe miſdemeaned themſelves to the great contentation of the people. This Commiſſion likewiſe did enquire of entrudors, barators, and all other the like virmine, whereby the King gathered a great maſſe of treaſure with a great deal of love. Now for the whole raigne of this King, who governed *England* 35 years, there was not any Parliament to his prejudice.

COUNS. But there was taking of armes by *Marshall* and *Hereford*.

JUST. That's true, but why was that? becauſe the King, notwithſtanding all that was given him by Parliament, did lay the greateſt taxes that ever King did without their conſent. But what loſt the King by thoſe Lords? one of them gave the King all his lands and the other dyed in diſgrace.

COUNS. But what ſay you to the Parliament in *Edward* the Seconds time his ſucceſſor: did not the houſe of Parliament baniſh *Peirce Gaveſton* whom the King favoured?

JUST. But what was this *Gaveſton* but an Eſquier of *Gaſcoigne*, formerly baniſht the Realme by King *Edward* the firſt, for corrupting the Prince *Edward*, now raigning. And the whole

King-

Kingdome fearing and deteſting his venemous diſpoſition, they beſought His Majeſtie to caſt him off, which the King performed by an Act of his own, and not by Act of Parliament, yea *Gaveſtones* own father in Law, the Earl of *Gloceſter*, was one of the chiefeſt of the Lords that procured it. And yet finding the Kings affection to follow him ſo ſtrongly, they all conſented to have him recalled. After which when his credit ſo encreaſed, that he deſpiſed and ſet at naught all the ancient Nobility, and not onley perſwaded the King to all manner of outrages and riots, but withall tranſported what he liſted of the Kings Treaſure, and Jewels: the Lords urged his baniſhment the ſecond time, but neither was the firſt nor ſecond baniſhment forced by Act of Parliament, but by the forceable Lords his Enemies. Laſtly he being recalled by the King, the Earl of *Lancaſter* cauſed his head to be ſtricken off, when thoſe of his party had taken him priſoner. By which preſumptuous act, the Earl and the reſt of his company committed Treaſon and murder: Treaſon by raiſing an Army without warrant, murder by taking away the life of the

Kings

Kings ſubjects. After which *Gaveſton* being dead, the *Spencers* got poſſeſſion of the Kings favour, though the younger of them was placed about the King, by the Lords themſelves.

COUNS. What ſay you then to the Parliament held at London about the Sixt year of that King.

JUST. I ſay that the King was not bound to perform the acts of this Parliament, becauſe the Lords being too ſtrong for the King, inforced his conſent, for theſe be the words of our own Hiſtory. *They wreſted too much beyond the bounds of reaſon.*

COUNS. What ſay you to the Parliaments of the White wands in the 13th of the King.

IUST. I ſay the Lords that were ſo moved, came with an Army, and by ſtrong hand ſurprized the King, they conſtrained, (ſaith the ſtory) the reſt of the Lords, and compelled many of the Biſhops to conſent unto them, yea it ſaith further, that the King durſt not but grant to all that they required, (to wit) for the baniſhment of the *Spencers*. Yea they were ſo inſolent that they refuſed to lodge the Queen comming through *Kent* in the Caſtle of *Leedes*, and ſent her to provide

provide her lodging where she could get it so late in the night, for which notwithstanding some that kept her out were soon after taken and hang'd; and therefore your Lordship cannot call this a Parliament for the reasons before alleadged. But my Lord what became of these Lawgivers to the King, even when they were greatest, a Knight of the North called *Andrew Herkeley*, assembled the forces of the Country, overthrew them and their Army, slew the Earle of *Hereford*, and other Barons, took their generall *Thomas* Earle of *Lancaster*, the Kings cozen-germane at that time possessed of five Earledomes, the Lords *Clifford*, *Talbot*, *Moubray*, *Maudint*, *Willington*, *Warren*, Lord *Darcy*, *Withers*, *Knevill*, *Leybourne*, *Bekes*, *Lovell*, *Fitzwilliams*, *Watervild*, and divers other Barons, Knights and Esquires, and soon after the Lord *Percy*, and the Lord *Warren* took the Lords *Baldsemere*, and the Lord *Audley*, the Lord *Teis*, *Gifford*, *Tuchet*, and many others that fled from the battaile, the Most of which past under the hands of the hangman, for constraining the King under colour and name of a Parliament. But this your good Lordship may judge, to whom

whom, thoſe tumultuous aſſemblies (which our Hiſtories, falſly call Parliaments have been dangerous, the King in the end ever prevailed, and the Lords loſt their lives, and eſtates. After which the *Spencers* in their baniſhment at *York*, in the 15th. of the King, were reſtored to there honors and eſtates, & therein the King had a ſubſidy given him the ſixt penny of goods throughout *England*, *Ireland*, and *Wales*.

COUNS. Yet you ſee the *Spencers* were ſoon after diſſolved.

IUST, It is true my Lord, but that is nothing to our ſubject of Parliament, they may thank their own inſolencie, for they branded and deſpiſed the Queen, whom they ought to have honored as the Kings wife; they were alſo exceeding greedy, and built themſelves upon other mens ruines; they were ambitious and exceeding malicious, whereupon that came, that when Chamberlain *Spencer* was hang'd in *Hereford*, a part of the 24th *Pſalm* was written over his head: *Quid gloriaris in malitia potens*?

COUNS, Well Sir, you have all this while excuſed your ſelf upon the ſtrength and rebellions of the Lords,

but

but what say you now to King *Edward* the third, in whose time (and during the time of this victorious King, no man durst take Armes or rebell) the three estates did him the greatest affront that ever King received or endured, therefore I conclude where I began, that these Parliaments are dangerous for a King.

JUST. To answer your Lordship in order, may it please you first to call to mind, what was given this great King by his subjects before the dispute betwixt him and the house happened, which was in his latter dayes, from his first year to his fift year there was nothing given the King by his Subjects. In his eight year at the Parliament at *London* a tenth and a fifteenth was granted. In his tenth year he ceased upon the *Italians* goods here in *England* to his own use, with all the goods of the *Monkes Cluniackes* and others, of the order of the *Cistertians*. In the eleaventh year, he had given him by the Parliament a notable relief, the one half of the Wools throughout *England*, and of the Clergy all their Woolls, after which, in the end of the year he had granted in his Parliament at *Westmin-*

ſter, fourty ſhillings upon every ſack of Wooll, and for every 30 woollfels forty ſhillings, for every laſt of leather, as much, and for all other merchandizes after the ſame rate. The King promiſing that this years gathering ended, he would thenceforth content himſelf with the old cuſtome, he had over and above this great aide the eight part of all goods of all Citiznes and Burgeſſes; and of other, as of forreigne Merchants, and ſuch as lived not of the gain of breeding of ſheep and cattell the fifteenth of their goods. Nay my Lord, this was not all, though more then ever was granted to any King, for the ſame Parliament beſtowed on the King the ninth ſheaf of all the corn within the Land, the ninth fleece, and the ninth lambe for two years next following; now what think your Lordſhip of this Parliament.

COUNS. I ſay they were honeſt men:

IUST. And I ſay, the people are as loving to their King now, as ever they were, if they be honeſtly and wiſely dealt withall, and ſo his Majeſty hath found them in his laſt two Parliaments, if his Majeſtie had not been

been betrayed by thoſe whom he moſt truſted.

COUNS. But I pray you Sir, who ſhall a King truſt, if he may not truſt thoſe whom he hath ſo greatly advanced?

IUST. I will tell your Lordſhip whom the King may truſt.

COUNS. Who are they?

IUST. His own reaſon, and his own excellent Iudgement which have not deceived him in any thing, wherein his Majeſty hath been pleaſed to exerciſe them, *Take Councell of thine heart* (ſaith the book of Wiſedome) *for there is none more faithfull unto thee then it.*

COUNS. It is true, but his Majeſty found that thoſe wanted no judgement whom he truſted, and how could his Majeſtie divine of their honeſties?

IUST. Will you pardon me if I ſpeak freely, for if I ſpeak out of *love*, which (as *Solomon* ſaith) *covereth all treſpaſſes*; The truth is, that his Majeſtie would never believe any man that ſpake againſt them, and they knew it well enough, which gave them boldneſſe to do what they did.

COUNS. What was that?

IUST, Even, my good Lord, to

ruine the Kings eſtate ſo far as the ſtate of ſo great a King may be ruin'd by men ambitious and greedy without proportion. It had been a brave increaſe of revenue, my Lord, to have rayſed 50000l. land of the Kings to 20000l. revenue, and to raiſe the revenue of wards to 20000l. more, 40000l. added to the reſt of his Majeſties eſtate, had ſo enabled his Majeſtie, as he could never have wanted. And my good Lord, it had been an honeſt ſervice to the King, to have added 7000 l. lands of the Lord *Cobhams*, his Woods & goods being worth 30000 l. more

COUNS. I know not the reaſon why it was done.

JUST. Neither doth your Lordſhip, perchance know the reaſon why the 10000 l. offer'd by *Swinnerton* for a fine of the *French* wines, was by the then Lord Treaſurer conferr'd on *Devonſhire* and his *Miſtris*.

COUNS. What mov'd the Treaſurer to reject and croſſe that raiſing of the Kings lands?

JUST. The reaſon, my good Lord, is manifeſt, for had the land been raiſed, then had the King known when he had given or exchanged land, what

what he had given or exchanged.

COUNS. What hurt had been to the Treasurer whose Office is truely to inform the King of the value of all that he giveth?

JUST. So he did, when it did not concerne himself nor his particular, for he could never admit any one peece of a good Mannor to passe in my Lord *Aubignes* book of 1cool. land, till he himself had bought, and then all the remaining flowers of the Crowne were culled out. Now, had the Treasurer suffer'd the Kings lands to have been raised, how could his Lordship have made choice of the old rents, as well in that book of my Lord *Aubigne*, as in exchange of *Theobalds*, for which he took *Hatfeild* in it, which the greatest subject, or favorite Queen *Elizabeth* had never durst have named unto her by way of gift or exchange. Nay my Lord, so many other goodly Mannors have passed from his Majestie, as the very heart of the Kingdome mourneth to remember it, and the eyes of the Kingdome shedde tears continually at the beholding it: yea the soul of the Kingdome is heavy unto death with the consideration thereof, that so

magnanimous a Prince ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be ſo abuſed.

COUNS. But Sir you know that *Cobhams* lands were entayled upon his Cozens.

IUST. Yea my Lord, but during the lives and races of *George Brooke* his childeren, it had been the Kings, that is to ſay, for ever in effect, but to wreſt the King, and to draw the inheritance upon himſelf, he perſwaded his Majeſtie to relinquiſh his intereſt for a pretty ſumme of mony; and that there might be no counter working, he ſent *Brook* 6000 l. to make friends, whereof Lord *Hume* had 2000 l. back again, *Buckhurſt* and *Barwick* had the other 4000 l. and the Treaſurer and his heirs the maſſe of land for ever.

COUNS. What then I pray you came to the King by this confiſcation.

IUST. My Lord, the Kings Majeſtie by all thoſe goodly poſſeſſions, Woods and goods looſeth 500 l. by the year which he giveth in penſion to *Cobham*, to maintain him in priſon.

COUNS. Certainly, even in conſcience they ſhould have reſerved ſo much of the land in the Crown, as to

have

have given *Cobham* meat and apparell, and not made themselves so great gainers, and the King 500 l. (*per annum*) looser by the bargain, but it's past: *Consilium non est eorum quæ fieri nequeunt.*

Iust. Take the rest of the Sentence, my Lord: *Sed consilium versatur in iis quæ sunt in nostra potestate.* It is yet, my good Lord, *in potestate Regis*, to right himself. But this is not all my Lord; And I fear me, knowing your Lordships love to the King, it would put you in a feaver to hear all, I will therefore go on with my Parliaments.

Couns. I pray do so, and amongst the rest; I pray you what say you to the Parliament holden at *London* in the fifteenth year of King *Edward* the third;

Iust. I say there was nothing concluded therein to the prejudice of the King. It is true, that a little before the sitting of the house, the King displaced his Chancellour and his Treasurer, and most of all his Iudges and Officers of the Exchequer, and committed many of them to prison, because they did not supply him with money, being beyond the Seas, for

the reſt, the States aſſembled, beſought the King that the Lawes of the two Charters might be obſerved, and that the great Officers of the Crowne might be choſen by Parliament.

COUNS. But what ſucceſſe had theſe petitions.

IUST. The Charters were obſerved, as before, and ſo they will be ever, and the other petition was not rejected, the King being pleas'd, notwithſtanding, that the great Officers, ſhould take an oath in Parliament to do Juſtice. Now for the Parliament of *Weſtminſter* in the 17th year of the King, the King had three markes and a half for every ſack of Wooll, tranſported; and in his 18th. he had a 10th of the Clergie, and a 15th of the Laity for one year. His Majeſtie forbare after this to charge his Subjects with any more payments, untill the 29th of his reigne, when there was given the King by Parliament 50 for every ſack of Wooll tranſported for ſix years, by which grant, the King received a thouſand markes a day, a greater matter then a thouſand pounds in theſe dayes, and a 1000l. a day amounts to 365000 l. a year, which was one of the greateſt

preſents

presents that ever was given to a King of this land. For besides the cheapnesse of all things in that age, the Kings souldiers had but 3d. a day wages, a man at armes 6d. a Knight but 2s. In the Parliament at *Westminster*, in the 33th year he had 26s. 8d. for every sack of Woole transported, and in the 42th year 3 dismes and 3 fifteenes. In his 45th year he had 500ool. of the Laity, and because the Spirituality disputed it, and did not pay so much the King chang'd his Chancellour, Treasurer, & Privy Seal being Bishops and placed Lay men in their roome,

COUNS. It seems that in those dayes the Kings were no longer in love with their great Chancellors, then when they deserved well of them.

JUST. No my Lord, they were not, and that was the reason they were well served, and it was the custome then, and in many ages after, to change the Treasurer & the Chancellour every 3 years, and withall to hear all mens complaints against them.

COUNS. But by this often change, the saying is verified, that there is no inheritance in the favour of Kings. *He that keepeth the figge tree* (Saith *Solomon*) *shall eate the fruit thereof*;

for reaſon it is that the ſervant live by the Maſter.

IUST. My Lord, you ſay well in both, but had the ſubject an inheritance in the Princes favour, where the Prince hath no inheritance in the Subjects fidelity, then were Kings in more unhappy eſtate then common perſons: for the reſt, *Solomon* meaneth not, that he that *keepeth the figge tree* ſhould ſurfet, though he meant he ſhould eat, he meant not he ſhould break the branches in gathering the figs, or eat the ripe, and leave the rotten for the owner of the tree; for what ſaith he in the following chapter, he ſaith that *he that maketh haſt to be rich cannot be innocent.* And before that, he ſaith, *that the end of an inheritance haſtily gotten, cannot be bleſſed.* Your Lordſhip hath heard of few or none great with Kings, that have not uſed their power to oppreſſe, that have not grown inſolent and hatefull to the people; yea, inſolent towards thoſe Princes that advanced them.

COUNS. Yet you ſee that Princes can change their fancies.

IUST. Yea my Lord, when favorites change their faith, when they forget that how familiar ſoever Kings make

make themſelves with their Vaſſals, yet they are Kings: *He that provoketh a King to anger* (ſaith *Solomon*) *ſinneth againſt his own ſoul.* And he further ſaith, that *pride goeth before diſtruction, and a high mind before a fall.* I ſay therefore, that in diſcharging thoſe Lucifers, how dear ſoever they have been, Kings make the world know that they have more of Iudgement then of paſſion, yea they thereby offer a ſatisfactory ſacrifice to all their people, too great benefits of ſubjects to their King, where the minde is blown up with their own deſervings, and to great benefits of Kings conferr'd upon their Subjects, where the minde is not qualified with a great deal of modeſty are equally dangerous. Of this later and inſolenter, had King *Richard* the ſecond delivered up to Iuſtice but three or four, he had ſtill held the love of the people, and thereby his life and eſtate.

COUNS. Well, I pray you go on with your Parliaments.

IUST. The life of this great King *Edward* drawes to an end, ſo do the Parliaments of this time, where in 50 years raigne, he never received any affront, for in his 49th year he had a diſme

diſme and a fifteen granted him freely.

COUNS. But Sir it is an old ſaying, that all is well that ends well, Iudge you whether that in his 15th. year in Parliament at *Weſtminſter* he receiued not an affront, when the houſe urged the King to remove and diſcharge from his preſence the Duke of *Lancaſter*, the Lord *Latimer* his Chamberlaine, Sir *Richard Sturry*, and others whom the King fauoured and truſted. Nay, they preſſed the King to thruſt a certain Lady out of Court, which at that time bare the greateſt ſway therein.

IUST. I will with patience anſwer your Lordſhip to the full, and firſt your Lordſhip may remember by that which I euen now ſaid, that neuer King had ſo many gifts as this King had from his ſubiects, and it hath neuer grieued the ſubiects of *England* to giue to their King, but when they knew there was a deuouring Lady, that had her ſhare in all things that paſſed, and the Duke of *Lancaſter* was as ſcraping as ſhee, that the Chancellour did eat up the people as faſt as either of them both. It greiued the ſubiects to feed theſe Cormorants,

But

But my Lord there are two things by which the Kings of *England* have been preſt, (to wit) by their ſubjects, and by their own neceſſities. The Lords in former times were farre ſtronger, more warlike, better followed, living in their Countries, then now they are. Your Lordſhip may remember in your reading, that there were many Earls could bring into the field a thouſand Barbed horſes, many a Baron 5. or 600. Barbed horſes, whereas now very few of them can furniſh twenty fit to ſerve the King. But to ſay the truth my Lord, the Juſtices of peace in *England*, have oppoſ'd the injuſticers of war in *England*, the Kings writ runs over all, and the great Seal of *England*, with that of the next Conſtables will ſerve the turn to affront the greateſt Lords in *England*, that ſhall move againſt the King. The force therefore by which our Kings in former times were troubled is vaniſht away. But the neceſſities remain. The people therefore in theſe later ages, are no leſſe to be pleaſed then the Peeres; for as the later are become leſſe, ſo by reaſon of the trayning through *England*, the Commons have all the weapons in their hand.

COUNS-

COUNS. And was it not ſo ever?

IUST. No my good Lord; for the Noblemen had in their Armories, to furniſh ſome of them a thouſand, ſome two thouſand, ſome three thouſand men, whereas now there are not many that can arme fifty.

COUNS. Can you blame them? But I will only anſwer for my ſelf, between you and me be it ſpoken; I hold it not ſafe to maintain ſo great an Armory or Stable, it might cauſe me, or any other Nobleman to be ſuſpected, as the preparing of ſome Innovation.

IUST. Why ſo my Lord, rather to be commended as preparing againſt all danger of Innovation.

COUNS. It ſhould be ſo, but call your obſervation to accompt, and you ſhall find it as I ſay, for (indeed) ſuch a jealouſie hath been held ever ſince the time of the Civil wars, over the Military greatneſs of our Nobles, as made them have little will to bend their ſtudies that wayes: wherefore let every man provide according as he is rated in the Muſter Book, you underſtand me.

IUST. Very well my Lord, as what might be replyed in the perceiving

ving ſo much; I have ever (to deal plainly and freely with your Lordſhip) more fear'd at home popular violence, then all the forreine that can be made, for it can never be in the power of any forraigne Prince without a Papiſticall party, rather to diſorder or endanger his Majeſties Eſtate.

COUNS. By this it ſeems, it is no leſſe dangerous for a King to leave the power in the people, then in the Nobility.

JUST. My good Lord, the wiſdome of our own age, is the fooliſhneſſe of another, the time preſent ought not to be preferr'd to the policy that was, but the policy that was to the time preſent; ſo that the power of the Nobility being now withered, and the power of the people in the flower, the care to content them would not be neglected, the way to win them often practized, or at leaſt to defend them from oppreſſion. The motive of all dangers that ever this Monarchy hath undergone, ſhould be carefully heeded, for this Maxime hath no poſterne, *Poteſtas humana radicatur in voluntatibus hominum.* And now my Lord, for King *Edward*, it is true, though he were not ſubject to force

force, yet was he subject to necessity, which because it was violent, he gave way unto it, *Potestas* (saith *Pithagoras*) *juxta necessitatem habitat*. And it is true, that at the request of the house he discharged and put from him those before named, which done, he had the greatest gift (but one) that ever he received in all his dayes (to wit) from every person, man and woman, above the age of fourteen years 4d. of old mony; which made many Millions of Groats, worth 6l. of our mony. This he had in generall, besides he had of every benificed Priest, 12d And of the Nobility and Gentry, I know not how much, for it is not set down. Now my good Lord, what lost the King by satisfying the desires of the Parliament house, for assoon as he had the money in purse, he recalled the Lords and restored them, and who durst call the King to accompt, when the Assembly were dissolved. *where the word of a King is, there is power* (saith *Ecclesiasticus*) *who shall say unto him, what doest thou!* saith the same Author, for every purpose there is a time and judgement, the King gave way to the time, and his judgement perswaded him to yeeld to necessity, *Consularius*

nemo

nemo melior eſt quam tempus.

COUNS. But yet you ſee the King was forc'd to yeeld to their demands.

JUST. Doth your Lordſhip remember the ſaying of *Monſier de Lange* that he that hath profit of the war, hath alſo the houour of the war, whether it be by battaile or retreate, the King you ſee hath the profit of the Parliament, and therefore the honour alſo, what other end had the King then to ſupply his wants. A wiſe man hath evermore reſpect unto his ends: and the King alſo knew that it was the love that the people bare him, that they urged the removing of thoſe Lords, there was no man among them that ſought himſelf in that deſire, but they all ſought the King, as by the ſucceſſe it appeared. My good Lord, hath it not been ordinary in *England* and in *France* to yeeld to the demands of rebels, did not King *Richard* the ſecond grant pardon to the outragious rogues and murtherers that followed *Iack Straw*, and *Wat Tyler*, after they had murthered his Chancellor, his Treaſurer, Chief Juſtice, and others? brake open his Exchequer, and committed

al

all manner of outrages and villanies, and why did he do it, but to avoid a greater danger: I say the Kings have then yielded to those that hated them and their estates, (to wit) to pernicious rebels. And yet without dishonour, shall it be called dishonour for the King to yeild to honest desires of his subjects? No my Lord, those that tell the King those tales, fear their own dishonour, and not the Kings; for the honour of the King is supreame, and being guarded by Iustice and piety, it cannot receive neither wound nor stain.

COUNS. But Sir, what cause have any about our King to fear a Parliament?

JUST. The same cause that the Earle of *Suffolke* had in *Richard* the seconds time, and the Treasurer *Fartham*. with others, for these great Officers being generally hated for abusing both the King and the Subject, at the request of the States were discharged, and others put in their roomes.

COUN And was not this dishonour to the King?

JUST. Certainly no, for King *Richard* knew that his Grandfather had done the like, and though the King

King was in his heart utterly againſt it, yet had he the profit of this exchange; for *Suffolke* was fined at 20000 markes, and 1000 l. lands.

COUNS. Well Sir, we will ſpeak of thoſe that fear the Parliament ſome other time, But I pray you go on with that, that happened in the troubleſome raigne of *Richard* the ſecond who ſucceeded, the Grandfather being dead.

IUST. That King, my good Lord, was one of the moſt unfortunate Princes that ever *England* had, he was cruell, extreame prodigall, and wholly carried away with his two Minions, *Suffolk*, and the Duke of *Ireland*, by whoſe ill advice and others, he was in danger to have loſt his eſtate; which in the end (being led by men of the like temper) he miſerably loſt. But for his ſubſidies he had given him in his firſt year being under age two tenths, and two fifteenes: In which Parliament, *Alice Pierce*, who was removed in King *Edwards* time, with *Lancaſter*, *Latimer*, and *Sturry*, were confiſcate and baniſhed, in his ſecond year at the Parliament at *Gloceſter*, the King had a marke upon every ſack of Wooll, and 6d. the pound upon

wards.

wards. In his third year at the Parliament at *Wincheſter*, the Commons were ſpared, and a ſubſidy given by the better ſort, the Dukes gave 20 marks, and Earls 6 markes, Biſhoppes and Abbots with myters ſix marks, every marke 3s. 4d. and every Knight, Juſtice, Eſquire, Shrieve, Perſon, Vicar, & Chaplaine, paid proportionably according to their eſtates.

COUNS. This me thinks was no great matter.

JUST. It is true my Lord, but a little money went far in thoſe dayes: I my ſelf once moved it in Parliament in the time of Queen *Elizabeth*, who deſired much to ſpare the Common people, & I did it by her Commandement; but when we caſt up the ſubſidy Books, we found the ſumme but ſmall, when the 30l. men were left out. In the beginning of his fourth year, a tenth with a fifteen were granted upon condition, that for one whole year no ſubſedies ſhould be demanded; but this promiſe was as ſuddenly forgotten as made, for in the end of that year, the great ſubſidy of Poll mony was granted in the Parliament at *Northamyton*.

COUNS. Yea but there followed the

the terrible Rebellion of *Baker*, *Straw* and others, *Leiſter*, *Wrais*, and others.

JUST. That was not the fault of the Parliament my Lord, it is manifeſt that the ſubſidy given was not the cauſe; for it is plain that the bondmen of *England* begun it, becauſe they were grievouſly preſt by their Lord in their tenure of Villenage, as alſo for the hatred they bare to the Lawyers and Atturneyes: for the ſtory of thoſe times ſay, that they deſtroyed the houſes and Mannors of men of Law, & ſuch Lawyers as they caught, ſlew them, and beheaded the Lord chief Juſtice, which commotion being once begun, the head mony was by other rebels pretended: A fire is often kindled with a little ſtraw, which oftentimes takes hold of greater timber, & conſumes the whole building: And that this Rebellion was begun by the diſcontented ſlaves (whereof there have been many in Elder times the like) is manifeſt by the *Charter* of *Manumiſſion*, which the King granted *in hæc verba*, *Rich. Dei gratiâ &c. Sciatis quod de gratiâ noſtrâ ſpirituali manumiſſimus*, &c. to which ſeeing the King was conſtrained by force of armes, he revoked the letters Pattents, and

and made them voide, the ſame revocation being ſtrengthned by the Parliament enſuing, in which the King had given him a ſubſidy upon Woolls, called a *Maletot*: In the ſame fourth year was the Lord Treaſurer diſcharged of his Office, and *Hales* Lord of St. *Iohns* choſen in his place: in his fift year was the Treaſurer again changed, and the ſtaffe given to *Segrave*, and the Lord Chancellour was alſo changed, and the ſtaffe given to the Lord *Scroope*: Which Lord *Scroope* was again in the beginning of his ſixt year turned off, and the King after that he had for a while kept the Seal in his own hand, gave it to the Biſhop of *London*, from whom it was ſoon after taken and beſtowed on the Earle of *Suffolke*, who they ſay had abuſed the King, and converted the Kings Treaſure to his own uſe. To this the King condiſcended. And though (ſaith *Walſingham*) he deſerved to looſe his life and goods, yet he had the favour to go at liberty upon good ſureties, and becauſe the King was but young & that the reliefe granted was committed to the truſt of the Earle of *Arundell* for the furniſhing of the Kings Navy againſt the *French*.

COUNS.

COUNS. Yet you see it was a dishonour to the King to have his beloved Chancellour removed.

JUST. Truly no, for the King had both his fine 1000l. lands and a subsidy to boot. And though for the present it pleased the King to fancy a man all the world hated (the Kings passion overcomming his judgement) yet it cannot be called a dishonour, for the King is to believe the generall counsell of the Kingdome, and to prefer it before his affection, especially when *Suffolke* was proved to be false even to the King; for were it otherwise, love and affection might be called a frenzie and a madnesse, for it is the nature of humane passions, that the love bred by fidelity, doth change it self into hatred, when the fidelity is first changed into falshood.

COUNS. But you see there were thirteen Lords chosen in the Parliament, to have the oversight of the government under the King.

JUST. No my Lord, it was to have the oversight of those Officers, which (saith the story) had imbezeled, lewdly wasted, and prodigally spent the Kings Treasure, for to the Commission to those Lords, or to any six of

of them, joyn'd with the Kings Counſell, was one of the moſt royall and moſt profitable that ever he did, if he had been conſtant to himſelf. But my good Lord, man is the cauſe of his own miſery, for I will repeat the ſubſtance of the Commiſſion granted by the King, and confirmed by Parliament, which, whether it had bin profiatble for the King to have proſecuted, your Lordſhip may judge. The preamble hath theſe words: *Whereas our Sovereigne Lord the King perceiveth by the grievous complaints of the Lords and Commous of this Realm, that the rents, profits, and revenues of this Realme, by the ſingular and inſufficient Councell and evill government, aſwell of ſome his late great Officers and others, &c. are ſo much withdrawen, waſted, given, granted, alienated, deſtroyed, and evill diſpended, that he is ſo much impoveriſhed and void of treaſure and goods, and the ſubſtance of the Crown ſo much diminiſhed and deſtroyed, that his eſtate may not honorably be ſuſtained as appertaineth. The King of his free will at the requeſt of the Lords and Commons, hath ordained* William *Archbiſhop of* Canterbury *and others with his Chancellour, Treaſurer, keeper of his privy ſeal, to*

ſurvey

ſurvey and examine as well the eſtate and government of his houſe, &c. as of all the rents, and profits, and revenues that to him appertaineth, and to be due, or ought to appertain and be due, &c. And all manner of gifts, grants, alienations and confirmations made by him of lands, tenements, rents, &c. bargained and ſold to the prejudice of him and his Crown, &c. And of his jewels & goods which were his Grandfathers at the time of his death, &c. and where they be become.

This is in effect the ſubſtance of the commiſſion, which your Lordſhip may reade at large in the book of Statutes, this commiſſion being enacted in the tenth year of the Kings raigne. Now if ſuch a commiſſion were in theſe dayes granted to the faithfull men that have an intereſt in the ſales, gifts nor purchaſes, nor in the keeping of the jewels at the Queens death, nor in the obtaining grants of the Kings beſt lands, I cannot ſay what may be recovered, and juſtly recovered; and what ſay your Lordſhip, was not this a noble act for the King, if it had been followed to effect?

COUNS. I cannot tell whether it were or no, for it gave power to the

Commiſſioners to examine all the grants.

Just. Why my Lord, doth the King grant any thing, that ſhames at the examination? are not the Kings grants on record?

Couns. But by your leave, it is ſome diſhonour to a King, to have his judgement called in queſtion.

Just. That is true my Lord, but in this, or whenſoever the like ſhall be granted in the future, the Kings judgement is not examined, but their knavery that abuſed the King. Nay by your favour, the contrary is true, that when a King will ſuffer himſelf to be eaten up by a company of petty fellowes, by himſelf raiſed, therein both his judgement and courage is diſputed. And if your Lordſhip will diſdaine it at your own ſervants hands, much more ought the great heart of a King to diſdain it. And ſurely my Lord, it is a greater treaſon (though it undercreep the law) to tear from the Crown the ornaments thereof: And it is an infallible maxime, that he that loves not his Majeſties eſtate, loves not his perſon.

Couns. How came it then, that the act was not executed?

Just.

IUST. Becauſe theſe, againſt whom it was granted, perſwaded the King to the contrary: as the Duke of *Ireland*, *Suffolk*, the cheif Iuſtice *Treſilian*, and others; yea, that which was lawfully done by the King, and the great Councell of the Kingdome, was (by the maſtery which *Ireland*, *Suffolk*, and *Treſilian* had over the Kings affections) broken and diſavowed. Thoſe that deviſed to relieve the King, not by any private invention, but by generall Councell, were by a private and partiall aſſembly adjudged traitors, and the moſt honeſt Iudges of the land, enforced to ſubſcribe to that judgement. In ſo much that the Iudge *Belknap* plainly told the Duke of *Ireland*, and the Earl of *Suffolk*, when he was conſtrained to ſet his hand, plainly told theſe Lords, that he wanted but a rope, that he might therewith receive a reward for his ſubſcription. And in this Councell of *Nottingham* was hatched the ruine of thoſe which governed the King, of the Iudges by them conſtrained, of the Lords that loved the King, and ſought a reformation, and of the King himſelf; for though the King found by all the Shrieves of

the ſhires, that the people would not fight againſt the Lords, whom they thought to be moſt faithfull unto the King, when the Citizens of *London* made the ſame anſwer, being at that time able to arme 50000. men, and told the Major that they would never fight againſt the Kings friends, and defenders of the Realme, when the Lord *Ralph Baſſet*, who was near the King, told the King boldly that he would not adventure to have his head broken for the Duke of *Irelands* pleaſure, when the Lord of London told the Earle of *Suffolk* in the Kings preſence, that he was not worthy to live, &c. yet would the King in the defence of the deſtroyers of his eſtate, lay ambuſhes to entrap the Lords, when they came upon his faith, yea when all was pacified, and that the King by his Proclamation had clear'd the Lords, and promiſed to produce *Ireland*, *Suffolk*, and the Archbiſhop of *Yorke*, *Triſilian*, and *Pramber*, to anſwer at the next Parliament, theſe men confeſt, that they durſt not appear; and when *Suffolk* fled to *Callice*, and the Duke of *Ireland* to *Cheſter*, the King cauſed an army to be leavied in *Lancashire*, for the ſafe conduct of the

the Duke of *Ireland* to his presence, when as the Duke being encountered by the Lords, ranne like a coward from his company, and fled into *Holland*. After this was holden a Parliament, which was called that wrought wonders. In the Eleventh year of this King, wherein the forenamed Lords, the Duke of *Ireland* and the rest, were condemned and confiscate, the Chief Iustice hanged with many others, the rest of the Iudges condemned, and banisht and a 10. and a 15. given to the King.

COUNS. But good Sir: the King was first besieged in the Tower of *London*, and the Lords came to the Parliament, and no man durst contradict them.

IUST. Certainly in raising an army, they committed treason, and though it appear, that they loved the King (for they did him no harm, having him in their power) yet our law doth construe all leavying of war without the Kings commission, and all force raised to be intended for the death and destruction of the King, not attending the sequell. And it is so judged upon good reason, for every unlawfull and ill action is supposed

to be accompanied with an ill intent. And beſides thoſe Lords uſed too great cruelty, in procuring the ſentence of death againſt divers of the Kings ſervants, who were bound to follow and obey their Maſter and Soveraigne Lord, in that he commanded.

COUNS. It is true, and they were alſo greatly to blame to cauſe then ſo many ſeconds to be put to death, ſeeing the principalls, *Ireland*, *Suffolk*, and *York* had eſcaped them. And what reaſon had they to ſeek to enform the State by ſtrong hand, wa snot the Kings eſtate as dear to himſelf as to them? He that maketh a King know his errour mannerly and privately, and gives him the beſt advice, he is diſcharged before God and his own conſcience. The Lords might have retired themſelves, when they ſaw they could not prevail, and have left the King to his own wayes, who had more to loſe then they had.

JUST. My Lord, the taking of Armes cannot be excuſed in reſpect of the law, but this might be ſaid for the Lords, that the King being under yeares, and being wholly governed by their

their enemies, and the enemies of the kingdome, and becauſe by thoſe evil mens perſwaſions, it was adviſed, how the Lords ſhould have been murthered at a feaſt in *London*, they were excuſable during the kings minority to ſtand upon their guard againſt their particular enemies. But we will paſſe over & go on with our parliaments that followed, whereof that of Cambridge in the Kings 12th year was the next, therein the King had given him a 10th and a 15th after which being 20. yeares of age rechanged (ſaith *H. Knighton*) his Treaſurer, his Chancellour, the Iuſtices of either bench, the Clerk of the privy ſeal and others, and took the government into his own hands. He alſo took the Admirals place from the Earle of Arundell, and in his room he placed the Earle of Huntingdon in the year following, which was the 13th year of the K. In the Parliament at Weſtminſter there was given to the King upon every ſack of Wooll 14 s. and 6d in the pound upon other Merchandiſe.

COUNS. But by your leave, the King was reſtrained this parliament, that he might not diſpoſe of, but a third part of the money gathered.

Iust. No my Lord, by your favour. But true it is that part of this mony was by the Kings consent assigned towards the wars, but yet left in the Lord Treasurers hands, and my Lord it would be a great ease, and a great saving to his Majesty, our Lord and Master, if it pleased him to make his assignations upon some part of his revenewes, by which he might have 1000l. upon every 100000l. and save himself a great deale of clamour. For seeing of necessity the Navy must be maintained, and that these poor men as well Carpenters as ship-keepers must be paid, it were better for his Majesty to give an assignation to the Treasurer of his Navy for the receiving of so much as is called ordinary, then to discontent those poor men, who being made desperate beggars, may perchance be corrupted by them that lye in wait to destroy the Kings estate. And if his Majesty did the like in all other payments, especially where the necessity of such as are to receive, cannot possible give dayes, his Majesty might then in a little rowle behold his receipts and expences, he might quiet his heart when all necessaries were provided for, and

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then dispose the rest at his pleasure. And my good Lord, how excellently and easily might this have been done, if the 400001. had been raised as aforesaid upon the Kings lands, and wards I say that his Majesties House, his Navy, his guardes, his pensioners, his munition, his Ambassadors, and all else of ordinary charge might have been defrayed, and a great summe left for his Majesties casuall expences and rewards, I will not say they were not in love with the Kings estate, but I say they were unfortunately borne for the King that crost it.

COUNS. Well Sir, I would it had been otherwise, But for the assignments, there are among us that will not willingly indure it. Charity begins with it self, shall we hinder our selves of 500001. *per annum* to save the King 20? No Sir, what will become of our New years gifts, our presents and gratuities? We can now say to those that have warrants for money, that there is not a penny in the Exchequer, but the King gives it away unto the Scots faster then it comes in.

IUST. My Lord you say well, at least you say the trueth, that such are

ſome of our anſwers, and hence comes that generall murmure to all men that have mony to receive, I ſay that there is not a penny given to that nation; be it for ſervice or otherwiſe but is ſpread over all the kingdome: yea they gather notes, and take copies of all the privy ſeals and warrants that his Majeſty hath given for the money for the Scots, that they may ſhew them in Parliament. But of his Majeſties gifts to the Engliſh, there is no bruit though they may be tenne times as much as the Scots. And yet my good Lord, howſoever they be thus anſwered that to them that ſue for money out of the Exchequer, it is due to them for 10. or 12. or 20. in the hundred, abated according to their qualities that ſue, they are alwaies furniſhed. For concluſion, if it would pleaſe God to put into the Kings heart to make their aſſignations, it would ſave him many a pound, and gain him many a prayer, and a great deal of love, for it grieveth every honeſt mans heart to ſee the abundance which even the petty officers of the Exchequer, and others gather both from the King and ſubject, and to ſee a world of poore men

runne after the King for their ordinary wages.

COUNS. Well, well, did you never hear this old tale, that when there was a great contention about the weather, the Seamen complaining of contrary windes, when those of the high Countryes desired rain, and those of the valleys sunshining dayes, *Iupiter* sent them word by *Mercury*, then, when they had all done, the weather should be as it had been. And it shall ever fall out so with them that complain, the course of payments shall be as they have been. what care we what petty fellowes say? or what care we for your papers? have we not the Kings eares, who dares contest with us? though we cannot be revenged on such as you are for telling the truth, yet upon some other pretence, wee'le clap you up, and you shall sue to us ere you get out. Nay wee'le make you confesse that you were deceived in your projects, and eat your own words: learn this of me Sir, that as a little good fortune is better then a great deal of virtue: so the least authority hath advantage over the greatest wit, was he not the wisest man that said *the battel*

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was not the ſtrongeſt, nor yet bread for the wiſe, nor riches to men of underſtanding. nor favour to men of knowledg: but what time and chance came to them all.

IUST. It is well for your Lordſhip that it is ſo. But Qu. *Elizabeth* would ſet the reaſon of a mean man, before the authority of the greateſt Councellor ſhe had, and by her patience therein ſhe raiſed upon the uſuall and ordinary cuſtomes of London without any new impoſition above 50000l. a year, for though the Treaſurer *Burleigh*, and the Earle of Leiceſter and Secretary *Walshingham*, all three penſioners to Cuſtomer *Smith*, did ſet themſelves againſt a poor waiter of the Cuſtome-houſe called *Carwarden*, and commanded the groomes of the privy Chamber not to give him acceſſe; yet the Queen ſent for him, and gave him countenance againſt them all. It would not ſerve the turn, my Lord, with her; when your Lordſhips would tell her, that the diſgracing her great officers by hearing the complaints of buſie heads, was a diſhonour to her ſelf, but ſhe had alwayes this anſwer, *That if any men complain injuſtly againſt a Magiſtrate, it were reaſon he ſhould be ſeverely punished, if juſt-*

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ly, shee was Queen of the small, as well as of the great, and would hear their complaints. For my good Lord, a Prince that suffereth himself to be besieged, forsaketh one of the greatest regalities belonging to a Monarchie, to wit the last appeal, or as the French call it, *le dernier resort.*

COUNS. Well Sir, this from the matter I pray you go on.

IUST. Then my Lord, in the Kings 15. year he had a tenth and a fifteen graunted in Parliament of London. And that same year there was a great Councell called at Stamford, to which diverse men were sent for, of diverse counties besides the Nobilitie, of which the King took advice whether he should continue the war, or make a finall end with the French.

COUNS. What needed the King to take the advice of any but of his own Councell in matter of peace or warre.

IUST. Yea my Lord, for it is said in the Proverbs, *where is many counsellers, there is health.* And if the King had made the watre by a generall consent, the Kingdome in generall were bound to maintain the warre, and

and they could not then ſay when the King required aid, that he undertook a needleſſe warre.

COUNS, You ſay well, but I pray you go on.

JUST. After the ſubſidy in the 15. year, the King deſired to borrow 100000l. of the Londoners, which they refuſed to lend.

COUNS. And was not the King greatly troubled therewith.

IUST. Yea, but the King troubled the Londoners ſoon after, for the King took the advantage of a ryot made upon the Biſhop of Salisbury his men, ſent for the Major, and other the ableſt citizens, committed the Major to priſon in the Caſtle of windſor, and others to other caſtles, and made a Lord Warden of this citie, till in the end what with 100000l. ready money, and other rich preſents, inſtead of lending, 100000l. it coſt them 200000l. Between the fifteenth yeare and twentieth yeare, he had two aides given him in the Parliaments of Wincheſter and Weſtminſter: and this later was given to furniſh the Kings journey into Ireland, to eſtabliſh that eſtate which was greatly ſhaken ſince the death of

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the Kings Grandfather, who received thence yearly 30000l. and during the Kings ſtay in Ireland he had a 10 th and 5 th granted.

COUNS. And good reaſon, for the King had in his army 4000. horſe and 30000. foot.

JUST. That by your favour, was the Kings ſafety: for great armies do rather devour themſelves then deſtroy enemies. Such an army, (whereof the fourth part would have conquered all Ireland) was in reſpect of Ireland ſuch an army as *Xerxes* led into Greece. In this twentieth yeare, wherein he had a tenth of the Clergy, was the great conſpiracy of the Kings uncle the Duke of Gloceſter, and of Moubrey, Arundell, Nottingham, and Warwick, the Archbiſhop of Canterbury and the Abbot of Weſtminſter, and others, who in the one and twentieth yeare of the King were all redeemed by Parliament, and what thinks your Lordſhip, was not this aſſemblie of the 3. ſtates for the kings eſtate, wherein he ſo prevailed, that he not onely overthrew thoſe popular Lords, but beſides (the Engliſh Chronicle ſaith) the king ſo wrought and brought things about, that he obtained

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the power of both houſes to be granted to certain perſons, to 15. Noblemen and Gentlemen, or to ſeven of them.

COUNS. Sir, whether the King wrought well or ill I cannot judge, but our Chronicles ſay, that many things were done in this Parliament, to the diſpleaſure of no ſmall number of people, to wit, for that diverſe right-full heires were diſinherited of their lands and livings, with which wrong-full doings the people were much offended, ſo that the King with thoſe that were about him, and chief in Counſell, came into great infamy & ſlander.

JUST. My good Lord, if your Lordſhip will pardon mee, I am of opinion that thoſe Parliaments wherein the Kings of this land have ſatisfied the people, as they have been ever proſperous, ſo where the King hath reſtrained the houſe, the contrary hath happened, for the Kings atchievments in the Parliament, were the ready preparations to his ruine.

COV. You mean by the generall diſcontentment that followed, and becauſe the King did not proceed legally with Gloceſter and others. Why Sir,

Sir, this was not the first time that the Kings of England have done things without the Counsell of the land: yea, contrary to the law.

Just. It is true my Lord in some particulars, as even at this time the Duke of Gloceſter was made away at Callice by ſtrong hand, without any lawfull triall: for he was a man ſo beloved of the people and ſo allied, having the Dukes of Lancaſter, and York his bretheren, the Duke of Armarle, and the Duke of Hereford his Nephewes, the great Earles of Arundell and Warwicke, with diverſe others of his part in the conſpiracy, as the King durſt not trie him according to the law: for at the triall of Arundell and Warwicke, the King was forced to entertaine a pretty army about him. And though the Duke was greatly lamented, yet it cannot be denyed but that he was then a traytor to the King. And was it not ſo my Lord with the Duke of Guiſe: your Lordſhip doth remember the ſpurgald proverb, *that neceſsitie hath no law*: and my good Lord, it is the practice of doing wrong, and of generall wrong done, that brings danger, and not where Kings are preſt in this or

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that particular, for there is great difference between naturall cruelty and accidentall. And therefore it was *Machiavels* advice, that *all that a King did in that kind, he ſhall do at once, and by his mercie afterwards make the world know that his cruelty was not affected.* And my Lord take this for a generall rule, that the immortall policy of a ſtate cannot admit any law or priviledge whatſoever, but in ſome particular or other, the ſame is neceſſarily broken, yea in an *Ariſtocratie* or popular eſtate, which vaunts ſo much of equality and common right, more outrage hath been committed then in any Chriſtian Monarchy.

COUNS. But whence came this hatred between the Duke and the King his Nephew.

JUST. My Lord, the Dukes conſtraining the King, when he was young, ſtuck in the Kings hear, and now the Dukes proud ſpeech to the King when he had rendred *Breſt* formerly engaged to the Duke of Brittain, kindled again theſe coales that were not altogether extinguiſhed, for he uſed theſe words: *Your grate ought to put your body in great pain to winne a ſtrong hold or town by feats of armes, ere you take*

take upon you to sell or deliver any town gotten by the manhood & strong hand & policy of your noble progenitors. Whereat, saith the story, the King changed his countenance, &c. and to say truth, it was a proud and masterly speech of the Duke; besides that inclusively he taxed him of sloath and cowardise, as if he had never put himself to the adventure of winning such a place: undutifull words of a subject do often take deeper roote then the memory of ill deeds do: the Duke of Biron found it when the King had him at advantage. Yea the late Earle of Essex told Queen *Elizabeth* that her conditions was as crooked as her carkasse: but it cost him his head, which his insurrection had not cost him, but for that speech, *who will say unto a King* (saith *Iob*) *thou art wicked.* Certainly it is the same thing to say unto a Lady, thou art crooked (and perchance more) as to say unto a King that he is wicked, and to say that he is a coward, or to use any other words of disgrace, it is one and the same errour.

COUNS. But what say you for Arundell, a brave and valiant man, who had the

the Kings pardon of his contempt during his minority.

Iust. My good Lord, the Parliament which you say disputes the Kings prerogative, did quite contrary, and destroyed the Kings charter and pardon formerly given to Arundell. And my good Lord, do you remember, that at the Parliament that wrought wonders, when these Lords compounded that Parliament, as the King did this, they were so mercilesse towards all, that they thought their enemies, as the Earl of Arundell most insolently suffered the Qu. to kneel unto him three houres for the saving of one of her servants, and that scorne of his *manebat alto mente repostum*. And to say the truth, it is more barbarous & unpardonable then any act that ever he did to permit the wife of his Soveraign to kneel to him being the Kings vassel. For if he had saved the Lords servant freely at her first request, it is like enough that the Qu: would also have saved him, *Miseris succurrens paria obtinebis aliquando*: For your Lordship sees that the Earle of Warwicke who was as farre in the treason as any of the rest, was pardoned. It was also at this Parlia-

liament that the Duke of Hereford accuſed *Moubray* Duke of Norfolke, and that the Duke of Hereford Sonne to the Duke of Lancaſter, was baniſhed to the Kings confuſion, as your Lordſhip well knows.

COUNS. I know it well, and God knows that the King had then a ſilly and weak Councell about him, that perſwaded him to baniſh a Prince of the bloud, a moſt valiant man, and the beſt beloved of the people, in generall of any man living, eſpecially conſidering that the King gave every day more then other offence to his ſubjects. For beſides that he fined the inhabitants that aſſiſted the Lords in his Minority (of the 17. ſhires) which offence he had long before pardoned, his blank Charters, and letting the Realme to farme to mean perſons, by whom he was wholly adviſed, increaſed the peoples hatred toward the preſent government.

IUST. You ſay well my L. Princes of an ill deſtiny do alwayes follow the worſt counſell, or at leaſt imbrace the beſt after opportunity is loſt, *Qui conſilia non ex ſuo corde ſed alienis viribus colligunt, non animo ſed auribus cogitant.* And this was not the leaſt grief of the ſubject

ſubject in generall, that thoſe men had the greateſt part of the ſpoil of the commonwealth, which neither by virtue, valour or counſell could adde any thing unto it - *Nihil eſt ſordidius, nihil crudelius* (ſaith *Anto : Pius*) *quanſi Remp. ii arrodunt, qui nihil in eam ſuo labore conferunt.*

COUNS. Indeed the letting to farm the Realm was very grievous to the ſubject.

JUST. Will your Lorſhip pardon me if I tell you that the letting to farm of his Majeſties Cuſtomes (the greateſt revenue of the Realm) is not very pleaſing.

COUNS. And why I pray you, doth not the King thereby raiſe his profits every third year, & one farmer outbids another to the Kings advantage.

JUST. It is true my Lord, but it grieves the ſubject to pay cuſtome to the ſubject, for what mighty men are thoſe Farmers become, and if thoſe Farmers get many thouſands every year, as the world knows they do, why ſhould they not now (being men of infinite wealth) declare unto the King upon oath, what they have gained, and henceforth become the Kings collectours of his Cuſtome, did not

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Queen *Elizabeth* who was reputed both a wise and just Princesse, after she had brought *Customer Smith* from 14000l. a year to 42000l. a year, made him lay down a recompence for that which he had gotten? and if these Farmers do give no recompence, let them yet present the King with the truth of their receivings and profits. But my Lord for conclusion, after *Bullingbrook* arriving in *England* with a small troop: Notwithstanding the King at his Landing out of *Ireland*, had a sufficient and willing army: yet he wanting courage to defend his right gave leave to all his Souldiers to depart, and put himself into his hands that cast him into his grave.

COUNS. Yet you see he was depos'd by Parliament.

JUST. Aswell may your Lordship say he was knock't in the head by Parliament, for your Lordship knows that if King *Richard* had ever escaped out of their fingers that deposed him, the next Parliament would have made all the deposers traitours and Rebels, and that justly. In which Parliament, or rather unlawfull assembly, there appeared but one honest man, to wit, the B. of *Carlile*, who scorned

ſcorned his life, and eſtate, in reſpect of right and his allegiance, and defended the right of his Soveraigne Lord againſt the Kings elect and his partakers.

COUNS. Well I pray goe on with the Parliaments held in the time of his ſucceſſor *Henry* the fourth.

IUST. This King had in his third year a ſubſidy, and in his fift a tenth of the Clergy without a Parliament; In his ſixt year he had ſo great a ſubſidie, as the Houſe required there might be no record thereof left to poſterity, for the Houſe gave him 20s. of every Knights Fee, and of every 20l. land, 20d. and 12d. the pound of goods.

COUNS. Yea in the end of this year, the Parliament preſt the King to annex unto the Crown all temporall poſſeſſions belonging to Church men within the land, which at that time was the third foot of all *England*. But the Biſhops made friends, and in the end ſaved their eſtates.

IUST. By this you ſee, my Lord that *Cromwell* was not the firſt that thought on ſuch a buſineſs. And if King *Henry* the 8. had reſerved the Abbeyes, and other Church lands, which he had given

given at that time, the revennue of the Crown of *England* had exceeded the revenue of the Crown of *Spaine*, with both the *Indies*, whereas uſed as it was (a little enriched the Crown) ſerved but to make a number of pettifoggers, and others gentlemen.

COUNS. But what had the King inſtead of this great revenue.

IUST. He had a 15th of the Commons and tenth, and a half of the Clergy, and withall, all penſions graunted by King *Edward*, and King *Richard* were made void. It was alſo moved that all Crown lands formerly given (at leaſt given by King *Edw.* and King *Richard*) ſhould be taken back.

COUNS. What think you of that, Sir? would it not have been a diſhonour to the King? and would not his Succeſſors have done the like to thoſe that the King had advanced?

IUST. I cannot anſwer your Lordſhip, but by diſtinguiſhing, for where the Kings had given land for ſervices, and had not been over-reached in his gifts, there it had been a diſhonour to the King, to have made void the graunts of his predeceſſors, or his graunts, but all thoſe graunts of the

Kings, wherein they were deceived, the very cuſtome and policy of *England* makes them void at this day.

COUNS. How mean you that, for his Majeſtie hath given a great deal of Land among us ſince he came into *England*, and would it ſtand with the K. honour to take it from us again.

IUST. Yea my Lord, very well with the Kings honour, if your Lordſhip, or any Lord elſe, have under the name of 1001. land a year, gotten 5001. land, and ſo after that rate.

COUNS. I will never believe that his Majeſty will ever doe any ſuch thing.

IUST. And I believe as your Lordſhip doth, but we ſpake e're-while of thoſe that diſſwaded the King from calling a Parliament: And your Lordſhip asked me the reaſon, why any man ſhould diſſwade it, or fear it, to which, this place gives me an opportunity to make your Lordſhip anſwer, for though his Majeſty will of himſelf never queſtion thoſe grants, yet when the Commons ſhall make humble petition to the King in Parliament, that it will pleaſe his Majeſty to aſſiſt them in his relief, with that which ought to be his own, which, if it will pleaſe his Majeſty to yield unto,

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the house will most willingly furnish & supply the rest; with what grace can his Majesty deny that honest suit of theirs; the like having been done in many Kings times before? This proceeding my good Lord, may perchance prove all your phrases of the Kings honour, false *English*.

COUN But this cannot concern many, and for my self, I am sure it concerns me little.

JUST. It is true my Lord, & there are not many that disswade his Majesty from a Parliament.

CO. But they are great ones, a few of which will serve turn well enough.

IUST. But my Lord, be they never so great (as great as Gyants) yet if they disswade the King from his ready and assured way of his subsistence, they must devise how the K. may be elsewhere supplied, for they otherwise runne into a dangerous fortune.

COUNS. Hold you contented Sir, the King needs no great disswasion.

IUST. My Lord, learne of me, that there is none of you all, that can pierce the King. It is an essentiall property of a man truly wise, not to open all the boxes of his bosome, even to those that are near'st & dear'st unto

him, for when a man is discovered to the very bottome, he is after the lesse esteemed. I dare undertake, that when your Lordship hath served the King twice twelve years more, you will finde, that his Majesty hath reserved somewhat beyond all your capacities. His Majesty hath great reason to put off the Parliament, at his last refuge, and in the mean time, to make tryall of all your loves to serve him, for his Majesty hath had good experience, how well you can serve your selves: But when the King finds, that the building of your own fortunes and factions, hath been the diligent studies, and the service of his Majesty, but the exercises of your leasures: He may then perchance cast himself upon the generall love of his people: of which (I trust) he shall never be deceived, and leave as many of your Lordships as have pilfered from the Crown, to their examination.

COUNS. Well Sir, I take no great pleasure in this dispute, go on I pray.

IUST. In that Kings 15th year, he had also a subsidy, which is got by holding the house together from Easter,

ſter to Chriſtmas, and would not ſuffer them to depart. He had alſo a ſubſidy in his ninth year. In his eleventh year the commons did again preſſe the King to take all the temporalities of the Church men into his hands, which they proved ſufficient to maintain 150. Earles, 1500. Knights, and 6400. Eſquires, with a hundred hoſpitals, but not prevailing, they gave the King a ſubſidy.

As for the notorious Prince, *Henry* the fift, I find, that he had given him in his ſecond year 300000. markes, and after that two other ſubſidies, one in his fifth year, another in his ninth, without any diſputes.

In the time of his ſucceſſor *Henry* the ſixt, there were not many ſubſidies. In his third year he had a ſubſidy of a Tunnage and poundage. And here (ſaith *John Stow*) began thoſe payments, which we call cuſtomes; becauſe the payment was continued, whereas before that time it was granted but for a year, two or three, according to the Kings occaſions. He had alſo an ayde & gathering of money in his fourth year, and the like in his tenth year, and in his thirteenth year a 15 th. He had alſo a fifteenth for

the conveying of the Queen out of *France* into *England*. In the twenty eight year of that King was the act of Resumption of all honours, townes, castles, Seigneuries, villages, Manors, lands, tenements, rents, reversions, fees &c. But becaufe the wages of the Kings servants, were by the ſtrictneſs of the act alſo reſtrained, this act of Reſumption was expounded in the Parliament at *Reading* the 31th year of the Kings reigne.

COUNS. I perceive that thoſe acts of Reſumption were ordinary in former times; for King *Stephen* reſumed the lands, which in former times he had given to make friends during the Civill warrs. And *Henry* the ſecond reſumed all (without exception) which King *Stephen* had not reſumed; for although King *Stephen* tooke backa great deal, yet he ſuffered his truſtieſt ſervants to enjoy his gift.

IUST. Yes my Lord, and in after times alſo; for this was not the laſt, nor ſhall be the laſt, I hope. And judge you my Lord, whether the Parliaments doe not only ſerve the King, whatſoever is ſaid to the contrary; for as all King *Henry* the 6. gifts & graunts

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were made void by the Duke of *York* when he was in poſſeſſion of the Kingdome by Parliament. So in the time of *K. H.* when *K. Edw.* was beaten out again, the Parliament of *Weſtminſter* made all his acts voyd, made him and all his followers traytors, and gave the King many of their heads and lands. The Parliaments of *England* do alwaies ſerve the King in poſſeſſion. It ſerved *Rich.* the ſecond to condemne the popular Lords. It ſerved *Bullinbrooke* to depoſe *Rich.* When *Edw.* the 4. had the Scepter. It made them all beggars that had followed *H.* the 6. And it did the like for *H.* when *Edw.* was driven out. The Parliaments are, as the friendſhip of this world is, which alwayes followeth proſperity. For King *Edw.* the 4. after that he was poſſeſſed of the Crown, had, in his 13. year a ſubſidy freely given him: and in the year following he took a benevolence through *England*, which arbitrary taking from the people, ſerved that ambitious traytor the Duke of Bucks. After the Kings death was a plaucible argument to perſwade the multitude, that they ſhould not permit (ſaith Sir

Thomas Moore) his line to raigne any longer upon them.

COUNS. Well Sir, what say you to the Parliament of *Richard* the third in his time?

JUST. I find but one, and therein he made diverse good Laws. For King *Henry* the seventh in the beginning of his third year, he had by Parliament an ayde granted unto him, towards the relief of the Duke of *Brittain*, then assailed by the *French* King. And although the King did not enter into the warre, but by the advice of the three estates, who did willingly contribute: Yet those Northen men which loved *Richard* the third, raised rebellion under colour of the money impos'd, and murthered the Earle of *Northumberland* whom the King employed in that Collection. By which your Lordship sees, that it hath not been for taxes and impositions alone, that the ill disposed have taken Armes; but even for those payments which have been appointed by Parliament.

COUNS. And what became of these Rebels?

JUST. They were fairely hang'd, & the mony levied notwithstanding.

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In the Kings first year he gathered a marvailous great maise of mony, by a benevolence, taking pattern by this kind of levie from *Edw.* 4th. But the King caused it first to be moved in Parliament, where it was allowed, because the poorer sort were therein spared. Yet it is true, that the King used some art, for in his Letters he declared that he would measure every mans affections by his gifts. In the thirteenth year he had also a subsidy, whereupon the Cornish men took Armes, as the Northen men of the Bishoprick had done in the third year of the King.

COUNS. It is without Example, that ever the people have rebelled for any thing granted by Parliament, save in this Kings dayes.

JUST. Your Lordship must consider, that he was not over much beloved, for he took many advantages upon the people and the Nobility both.

COUNS. And I pray you what say they now of the new impositions lately laid by the Kings Majesty? do they say that they are justly or unjustly laid?

Just. To impose upon all things brought into the Kindome is very ancient: which imposing when it hath been continued a certain time, is then called Customes, because the subjects are accustomed to pay it, and yet the great taxe upon wine is still called Impost, because it was imposed after the ordinary rate of payment, had lasted many years. But we do now a dayes understand those things to be impositions, which are raised by the command of Princes, without the advice of the Common wealth, though (as I take it) much of that which is now called custome, was at the first imposed by Prerogative royall. Now whether it be time or consent that makes them just, I cannot define, were they just because new, and not justified yet by time, or unjust because they want a generall consent. Yet is this rule of *Aristotle* verified in respect of his Majestie: *Minus timent homines injustum pati à principe quem cultorem Dei putant.* Yea my Lord, they are also the more willingly borne, because all the world knowes they are no new Invention of the Kings. And if those that advised his Majesty to impose them,

them, had raiſed his lands (as it was offered them) to 20000l. more then it was, and his wards to aſmuch as aſo reſaid, they had done him farre more acceptable ſervice. But they had their own ends in refuſing the one, and accepting the other. If the land had been raiſed, they could not have ſelected the beſt of it for themſelves: If the impoſitions had not been laid, ſome of them could not have their ſilks: others pieces in farme, which indeed grieved the ſubject ten times more then that which his Majeſtie enjoyeth. But certainly they made a great advantage that were the adviſers; for if any tumult had followed, his Majeſties ready way had been to have delivered them over to the people.

COUNS. But think you that the King would have delivered them, if any troubles had followed?

JUST. I know not my Lord, it was *Machiavels* counſell to *Cæſar Borgia* to doe it, and King *H.* the 8. delivered up *Empſon* and *Dudley*: yea the ſame King, when the great Cardinall *Woolſey*, who governed the King

King and all his Eſtate, had (by requiring the ſixt part of every mans goods for the King) raiſed a rebellion, the King I ſay diſavowed him abſolutely; that had not the Dukes of *Norfolk* and *Suffolk* appeaſed the people, the Cardinall had ſung no more Maſſe; for theſe are the words of our Story: The King then came to *Weſtminſter* to the Cardinals Palace, and aſſembled there a great Councell, in which he poteſted, that *his minde was never to aske any thing of his commons which might ſound to the breach of his Lawes.* Wherefore he then willed them to know by whoſe meanes they were ſo ſtrictly given forth. Now my Lord, how the Cardinall would have ſhifted himſelf, by ſaying, *I had the opinion of the Iudges*, had not the rebellion been appeaſed, I greatly doubt.

COUNS. But good Sir, you blanch my queſtion, and anſwer me by examples. I aske you whether or no in any ſuch tumult, the people pretending againſt any one or two great Officers, the King ſhould deliver them, or defend them?

IUST. My good Lord, the people have not ſtayed for the Kings delivery, nei-

neither in *England*, nor in *France*; Your Lordſhip knows how the Chancellour, Treaſurer, and Chief Iuſtice, with many others at ſeverall times have been uſed by the Rebels: And the Marſhals, Conſtables, and Treaſurers in *France*, have been cut in pieces in *Charles* the ſixt his time. Now to your Lordſhips queſtion, I ſay that where any man ſhall give a King perilous advice, as may either cauſe a Rebellion, or draw the peoples love from the King, I ſay, that a King ſhall be adviſed to baniſh him: But if the King do abſolutely command his ſervant to do any thing diſpleaſing to the Common-wealth, and to his own perill, there is the King bound in honour to defend him. But my good Lord for concluſion, there is no man in *England* that will lay any invention either grievous or againſt law upon the Kings Majeſty: and therefore your Lordſhips muſt ſhare it amongſt you.

COUNS. For my part, I had no hand in it, (I think) *Ingram* was he that propounded it to the Treaſurer.

IUST. Alas, my good Lord, every poor waiter in the Cuſtome-houſe, or every promooter might have done it, there is no invention in theſe things.

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To lay impoſitions, and ſell the Kings lands, are poor and common devices. It is true that *Ingram* and his fellows are odious men, and therefore his Majeſty pleas'd the people greatly to put him from the Cofferſhip. It is better for a Prince to uſe ſuch a kind of men, then to countenance them; hangmen are neceſſary in a common wealth; yet in the Netherlands, none but a hangmans ſonne will marry a hangmans daughter. Now my Lord, the laſt gathering which *Henry* the ſeventh made, was in the twentieth year, wherein he had another benevolence both of the Clergy and Laity, a part of which taken of the poorer ſort, he ordained by his teſtament that it ſhould be reſtored. And for King *Henry* the eight, although he was left in a moſt plentifull eſtate, yet he wonderfully preſt his people with great payments; for in the beginning of his time it was infinite that he ſpent in Masking and Tilting, Banqueting, and other vanities, before he was entred into the moſt conſuming expence of the moſt fond and fruitleſſe warre that ever King undertook. In his fourth yeare he had one of the greateſt ſubſidies that ever

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was granted; for beſides two fifteens and two diſmes, he uſed *Davids* Law of Capitation or head money, and had of every Duke ten marks, of every Earl five pounds, of every Lord four pounds, of every Knight four marks and every man rated at 8l. in goods, 4. marks, and ſo after the rate: yea every man that was valued but at 40l paid 12d, and every man and woman above 15. years. 4d. He had alſo in his ſixt year divers ſubſidies granted him. In his fourteenth there was a tenth demanded of every mans goods, but it was moderated. In the Parliament following, the Clergie gave the King the half of their ſpirituall livings for one yeare, and of the Laity there was demanded 800000l, which could not be leavied in England, but it was a marvellous great gift that the King had given him at that time. In the Kings ſeventeenth yeare was the Rebellion before ſpoken of, wherein the King diſavowed the Cardinall: In his ſeventeenth yeare he had a tenth and fifteenth given by Parliament, which were before that time paid to the Pope. And before that alſo, the moneys that the King borrowed

in his fifteenth yeare were forgiven him by Parliament in his seventeenth yeare. In his 35. yeare a subsidy was granted of 4d. the pound of every man worth in goods from 20s. to 5l, from 5l. to 10l. and upwards of every pound 2s. And all strangers, denisens and others doubled this summe, strangers not being inhabitants above 16. years 4d. a head. All that had Lands Fees, and Annuities, from 20. to 5. and so double as they did for goods: And the Clergy gave 6d. the pound. In the thirty seventh yeare, a Benevolence was taken not voluntary, but rated by Commissioners, which because one of the Aldermen refused to pay, he was sent for a souldier into *Scotland*. He had also another great subsidy of six shillings the pound of the Clergy, and two shillings eight pence of the goods of the Laity, and four shillings the pound upon Lands.

In the second yeare of *Edward* the sixt, the Parliament gave the King an aid of twelve pence the pound of goods of his Naturall subjects, and two shillings the pound of strangers, and this to continue for three yeares, and by the statute of the second and third of *Edward* the sixt, it may appear the

the ſame Parliament did alſo give a ſecond aid, as followeth (to wit) of every Ewe kept in ſeverall paſtures, 3d: of every weather kept as aforeſaid 2d: of every ſheep kept in the Common, 1d, ob. The Houſe gave the King alſo 8d the pound of every woollen cloath made for the ſale throughout *England* for three years. In the third and fourth of the King, by reaſon of the troubleſome gathering of the pole money upon ſheep, and the tax upon cloath, this act of ſubſidy was repeal'd, and other relief given the King, and in the ſeventh yeare he had a ſubſidy and two fifteens.

In the firſt yeare of Queen *Mary*, tunnage and pondage were granted: In the ſecond yeare a ſubſidy was given to King *Philip*, and to the Queen, ſhe had alſo a third ſubſidy *in Annis* 4. & 5.

Eliz. Reg. Now my Lord, for the Parliaments of the late Queens time, in which there was nothing new, neither head money, nor ſheep money, nor eſcuage, nor any of theſe kinds of payments was required, but onely the ordinary ſubſidies, and thoſe as eaſily graunted as demanded, I ſhall not need to trouble your Lordſhip with a-

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ny of them, neither can I inform your Lordſhip of all the paſſages and acts which have paſſed, for they are not extant, nor printed.

COUS. No, it were but time loſt to ſpeak of the latter, and by thoſe that are already remembred, we may judge of the reſt, for thoſe of the greateſt importance are publick. But I pray you deal freely with me, what you think would be done for his Majeſty, If he ſhould call a Parliament at this time, or what would be required at his Majeſties hands?

JUST. The firſt thing that would be required, would be the ſame that was required by the Commons in the thirteenth yeare of *Hen.* the eight (to wit) that if any man of the commons houſe ſhould ſpeak more largely, then of duty he ought to do, all ſuch offences to be pardoned, and that to be of record.

COUNS. So might every Companion ſpeak of the King what they liſt.

IUST. No my Lord, the reverence which a Vaſſall oweth to his Soveraigne, is alwaies intended for every ſpeech, howſoever it muſt import the good of the King, and his eſtate, and ſo long it may be eaſily pardoned, otherwiſe

therwiſe not; for in Queen *Elizabeths* time, who gave freedome of ſpeech in all Parliaments, when *Wentworth* made thoſe motions, that were but ſuppoſed dangerous to the Queens eſtate, he was impriſoned in the Tower, notwithſtanding the priviledge of the houſe, and there died.

COUNS. What ſay you to the *Sicilian veſpers* remembred in the laſt Parliament?

IUST. I ſay, he repented him heartily that uſed that ſpeech, and indeed beſides that, it was ſeditious, this example held not: The *French* in *Sicily* uſurped that Kingdome, they neither kept law nor faith; they took away the inheritance of the Inhabitants, they took from them their wives, and raviſhed their daughters, committing all other inſolencies that could be imagined. The Kings Majeſty is the Naturall Lord of *England*, his Vaſſals of *Scotland* obey the Engliſh laws, if they break them, they are puniſhed without reſpect. Yea his Majeſty put one of his Barons to a ſhamefull death, for being conſenting onely to the death of a common Fencer: And which of theſe ever did or durſt commit any outrage in *England*, but

but to say the truth, the opinion of packing the last, was the cause of the contention & disorder that happened.

COUNS. Why sir? do you not think it best to compound a Parliament of the Kings servants and others that shall in all obey the Kings desires?

JUST. Certainly no, for it hath never succeeded well, neither on the kings part, nor on the subjects, as by the Parliament before-remembred your Lordship may gather, for from such a composition do arise all jealousies, and all contentions. It was practized in elder times, to the great trouble of the kingdome, and to the losse and ruine of many. It was of later time used by King *Henry* the eight, but every way to his disadvantage. When the King leaves himself to his people, they assure themselves that they are trusted and beloved of their kings, and there was never any assembly so barbarous, as not to answer the love and trust of their King *Henry* the sixt when his estate was in effect utterly overthrown, and utterly impoverished at the humble request of his Treasurer made the same known to the House: Or otherwise, using the Treasurers own words. He humbly desired

ſired the King to take his ſtaffe, that he might ſave his wardſhip.

COUNS. But you know, they will preſently be in hand with thoſe impoſitions, which the King hath laid by his own Royall prerogative.

JUST. Perchance not my Lord; but rather with thoſe impoſitions that have been by ſome of your Lordſhips laid upon the King which did not ſome of your Lordſhips fear more then you do the impoſitions laid upon the Subjects, you would never diſſwade his Majeſty from a parliament: For no man doubted, but that his Majeſty was adviſed to lay thoſe impoſitions by his Councell, and for particular things on which they were laid, the advice came from petty fellows (though now great ones) belonging to the Cuſtome-Houſe. Now my Lord, what prejudice hath his Majeſty (his Revenue being kept up) if the impoſitions that were laid by the generall Councell of the Kingdome, which takes off all grudging and complaint.

COUNS. Yea Sir, but that which is done by the King, with the advices of his private or privy Councell, is done by the Kings abſolute power.

JUST. And by whoſe power it is done

done in Parliament, but by the Kings absolute power? Mistake it not my Lord: The three Estates do but advise, as the privy Councell doth, which advice if the King embrace, it becomes the Kings own Act in the one, and the Kings Law in the other; for without the Kings acceptation, both the publick and private advices be but as empty Egg shels: and what doth his Majesty lose if some of those things, which concerns the poorer sort to be made free again, and the Revenue kept up upon that which is superfluous? *Is* it a losse to the King to be beloved of the Commons? If it be revenue which the Kings seeks, is it not better to take it of those that laugh, then those that cry? Yea if all be content to pay upon moderation & change of the Species: Is it not more honourable and more safe for the King, that the *Subject* pay by perswasion, then to have them constrained? If they be contented to whip themselves for the King, were it not better to give them the Rod into their hands, then to commit them to the Executioner? Certainly it is farre more happy for a Soveraigne Prince, that a *Subject* open his purse willingly, then that the same be opened by violence.

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Beſides, that when impoſitions are laid by Parliament, they are gathered by the authority of the Law, which (as aforeſaid) rejecteth al complaints, and ſtoppeth every mutinous mouth: It ſhall ever be my prayer that the King embrace the Councel of Honour and ſafety, and let other Princes imbrace that of force.

COUNS. But good Sir, it is his Prerogative which the King ſtands upon, & it is the Prerogative of the Kings, that the Parliaments do all diminiſh.

JUST. If your Lordſhip would pardon me, I would ſay then, that your Lordſhips objection againſt Parliaments is ridiculous. In former Parliaments three things have been ſuppoſed diſhonour to the King. The firſt, that the Subjects have conditioned with the King, when the King hath needed them, to have the great Charter confirmed. The ſecond that the Eſtates have made Treaſurers for the neceſſary and profitable diſburſing of thoſe ſums by them given, to the end, that the Kings, to whom they were given, ſhould expend them for their own defence, & for the defence of the Common-wealth. The third that theſe have preſt the King to diſharge ſome great officers of the Crown,

Crown, and to elect others. As touching the first my Lord, I would fain learn what disadvantage the Kings of this Land have had by confirming the great Charter, the breach of which have served onely men of your Lordships rank, to assist their own passions, and to punish and imprison at their own discretion the Kings poor Subjects, concerning their private hatred, with the colour of the Kings service. For the Kings Majestie takes no mans inheritance (as I have said before) nor any mans life, but by the Law of the Land, according to the Charter. Neither doth his Majesty imprison any man (matter of practice, which concerns the preservation of his estate excepted) but by the law of the land. And yet he useth his prerogative as all the Kings of *England* have ever used it. The supream reason causeth to practise many things without the advice of the law. As for insurrections and rebellions, it useth the marshall, and not the common law, without any breach of the Charter, the intent of the Charter considered truely. Neither hath any Subject made complaint, or been grieved, in that the Kings of this land, for their own safeties, and preservation

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of their estates, have used their Prerogatives, the great Engine, on which there is written *soli Deo*. And my good Lord, was not *Buckingham* in *England*, and *Byron* in *France* condemned, their Peers uncalled? And withall, was not *Byron* utterly (contrary to the customs and priviledges of the *French*) denyed an advocate to assist his defence? for where lawes forecast cannot provide remedies for future dangers, Princes are forced to assist themselves by their *Prerogatives*. But that which hath been ever grievous, and the cause of many troubles, very dangerous, is, that your Lordships abusing the reasons of state, do punish and imprison the Kings Subjects at your pleasure. It is you my Lords, that when Subjects have sometimes need of the Kings prerogative, do then use the strength of the Law, and when they require the law, you afflict them with the prerogative, and tread the great Charter (which hath been confirmed by 16. Acts of Parliament) under your feet, as a torn parchment or waste paper?

COUNS. Good Sir, which of us do in this sort break the great Charter? perchance you mean, that we have advised the King to lay the new impositions.

JUST. No my Lord: there is nothing in the great Charter against impositions: and besides that, necessity doth perswade them And if necessity do in somewhat excuse a private man *à fortiori*, it may then excuse a Prince. Again the Kings Majesty hath profit and increase of revenue by the imsitions. But there are of your Lordships (contrary to the direct Letter of the Charter) that imprison the Kings Subjects and deny them the benefit of the Law, to the Kings disprofit. And what do you otherwise thereby (if the impositions be in any sort grievous) but *Renovare dolores?* And withall digg out of the dust the long buried memory of the Subjects former intentions with their Kings.

COUNS. What mean you by that?

JUST. I will tell your Lordship when I dare, in the mean time it is enough for me, to put your Lordship in mind, that all the Estates in the World, in the offence of the people, have either had profit or necessity to perswade them to adventure it, of which, if neither be urgent, and yet the Subject exceedingly grieved, your Lordship may conjecture, that the House will be humble suitors for a redress. And if it be a Maxime in policy

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to pleaſe the people, in all things indifferent, and never ſuffer them to be beaten, but for the Kings benefit (for there are no blows forgotten with the ſmart but theſe) then I ſay to make them Vaſſals to Vaſſals, is but to batter down thoſe maſtering buildings, erected by K. *Hemy* the 7. & fortified by his Son, by which the people and Gentry of *England* were brought to depend upon the King alone. Yea my good Lord, our late dear Soveraign Q. *Eliz.* kept them up, & to their advantage, as wel repaired as ever Prince did; Defend me, & ſpend me, ſaith the Iriſh Churle.

COUNS. Then you think that this violent breach of the Charter will be the cauſe of ſeeking the conformation of it in the next Parliament, which otherwiſe could never have bin moved.

JUST. I know not my good Lord, perchance not, for if the Houſe preſs the King to grant unto them all that is theirs by the Law, they cannot (in Juſtice) refuſe the King all that is his by the Law. And where will be the iſſue of ſuch a contention? I dare not divine, but ſure I am that it will tend to the prejudice both of the King and Subject.

COUNS. If they diſpute not their own liberties, why ſhould they then

dispute the Kings liberties, which we call his Prerogative.

JUST. Among so many and so divers Spirits, no man can foretell what may be propounded, but howsoever, if the matter be not slightly handled on the Kings behalf, these disputes will soon dissolve, for the King hath so little need of his Prerogative, & so great advantage by the Laws, as the fear of impairing the one, to wit, the Prerogative, is so impossible, and the burthen of the other, to wit, the Law, so weighty, as but by a branch of the Kings Prerogative, namely, of his remission and pardon, the Subject is no way able to undergo it. This my Lord is no matter of flourish that I have said, but it is the truth, and unanswerable.

COUNS. But to execute the Laws very severely, would be very grievous.

JUST. Why my Lord, are the Laws grievous which our selves have required of our Kings? And are the Prerogatives also which our Kings have received to themselves also grievous? How can such a people then be well pleased? And if your Lordship confess that the Laws give too much, why does your Lordship urge the Prerogative that gives more? Nay I will be bold to say it, that except the Laws were

were better obſerved, the Prerogative of a Religious Prince hath manifold leſs perils then the Letter of the Law hath. Now my Lord, for the ſecond and third, to wit, for the appointing of Treaſurers, & removing of Councellors, our Kings have evermore laught them to ſcorn that have preſt either of theſe, and after the Parliament diſſolved, took the mony of the Treaſurers of the *Parliament*, and recalled and reſtored the Officers diſcharged, or elſe they have been contented, that ſome ſuch perſons ſhould be removed at the requeſt of the whole Kingdom, which they themſelves out of their Noble natures, would not ſeem willing to remove.

COUNS. Well Sir, Would you notwithſtanding all theſe arguments adviſe his Majeſty to call a Parliament?

JUST. It belongs to your Lordſhips who enjoy the Kings favour, and are choſen for your able wisdom to adviſe the K. It were a ſtrange boldneſs in a poor and private perſon, to adviſe Kings, attended with ſo underſtanding a Councell. But be like your Lordſhips have conceived ſome other way, how mony may be gotten otherwiſe. If any trouble ſhould happen,

your Lordſhip knows, that then there were nothing ſo dangerous for a K. as to be without mony: A Parliament cannot aſſemble in haſte, but preſent dangers require haſty remedies. It will be no time then to diſcontent the ſubjects by uſing any unordinary ways.

COUNS. Well Sir, all this notwithſtanding we dare not adviſe the King to call a Parliament, for if it ſhould ſucceed ill, we that adviſe ſhould fall into the Kings diſgrace. And if the King be driven into any extremity, we can ſay to the King that becauſe we found it extremely unpleaſing to his Majeſty to heat of a Parliament, we thought it no good manners to make ſuch a motion.

JUST. My Lord, to the firſt let me tell you, that there was never any juſt Prince that hath taken any advantage of the ſucceſs of Councels, which have been founded on reaſon, To fear that, were to fear the loſs of the bell, more than the loſs of the ſteeple, and were alſo the way to beat all men from the ſtadies of the Kings ſervice. But for the ſecond, where you ſay you can excuſe your ſelves upon the Kings own proteſting againſt a Parliament, the King upon better conſideration may excuſe that fineneſs of yours.

COUNS.

COUNS. How I pray you?

JUST. Even by declaring himself to be indifferent, by calling your Lordships together, and by delivering unto you that he hears how his loving subjects in generall are willing to supply him, if it please him to call a Parliament, for that was the common answer to all the Sheriffs in England, when the late benevolence was commanded. In which respect, and because you come short in all your projects, & because it is a thing most dangerous for a King to be without treasure, he requires such of you, as either misl ke, or rather fear a Parliment, to set down your reasons in writing, which you either misl ked, or feared it. And such as wish and desire it, to set down answers to your objections: And so shall the K. prevent the calling or not calling on his Majesty, as some of your great Councellers have done in many other things, shrinking up their shoulders, and saying, the K. will have it so.

COUNS. Well Sir, it grows late, & I will bid you farewell, only you shall take well with you this advice of mine, that in all that you have said against our greatest, those men in the end shall be your Judges in their own cause, you that

that trouble your ſelf with reformation, are like to be well rewarded, hereof you may aſſure your ſelf, that we will never allow of any invention how profitable ſoever, unleſs it proceed, or ſeem to proceed from our ſelves.

JUST. If then my Lord, we may preſume to ſay that Princes may be unhappy in any thing, certainly they are unhappy in nothing more then in ſuffering themſelves to be ſo incloſed. Again, if we may believe *Pliny*, who tels us that 'tis an ill ſign of proſperity in any Kingdom of ſtate, where ſuch as deſerve well, find no other recõpence then the contentment of their own conſciences, a far worſe ſign is it where the juſtly accuſed ſhall take revenge of the juſt accuſer. But my good Lord, there is this hope remaining, that ſeeing he hath been abuſed by them he truſted moſt, he will not for the future d ſhonour of his judgement (ſo well informed by his own experience) as to expoſe ſuch of his vaſſals (as have had no other motives to ſerve him, then ſimply the love of his perſon and his eſtate) to their revenge, who have only been moved by the love of their own fortunes, and their glory.

COUNS. But good Sir the King hath not been deceived by all. JUST.

JUST. No my Lord, neither have all been trusted, neither doth the world accuse all, but believe, that there be among your Lordships very just and worthy men, as well of the Nobility as others, but those though most honoured in the Common-wealth, yet have not been most imployed. Your Lordship knows it well enough, that three or 4 of your Lordships have thought your hands strong enough to bear up alone the weightiest affairs in the Commonwealth, and strong enough, all the Land have found them to beat down whom they pleased.

COUNS. I understand you, but how shall it appear that they have only sought themselves.

JUST. There needs no perspective glass to discern it, for neither in the treaties of Peace and War, in matters of Revenue, and matters of Trade, any thing hath hapned either of love or of judgement, No my Lord, there is not any one action of theirs eminent, great or small, the greatness of themselves onely excepted.

CO. It is all one, your Papers can neither answer not reply, we can. Besides, you tell the King no news in delivering these Complaints, for he knows as much as can be told him.

JUST.

JUST. For the first my Lord, wh reas he hath once the reasons of things delivered him, your Lordships shall need to be well advised, in their answers there is no sophistry will serve the turn, where the Judge, & the understanding are both supreme. For the second, to say that his Majesty knows and cares not, that my Lord were but to despair all his faithful Subjects. But by your favour my Lord, we see it is contrary, we finde now that there is no such singular power as there hath been, Justice is described with a Ballance in her Hand, holding it even, and it hangs as even now as ever it did in any Kings days, for singular authority begets but generall oppression.

COUNS. Howsoever it be, thats nothing to you, that gave no interest in the Kings favour, nor perchance in his opinion, & concerning such a one, the misl king, or but misconceiving of any one hard word, phrase, or sentence, will give argument to the King either to condemn or reject the whole discourse. And howsoever his Majesty may neglect your informations, you may be sure that others (at whom you point will not neglect their revenges, you will therefore confess it (when it is too late) that you are exceeding sory that

that you have not followed my advise. Remember Cardinall *Woolsey*, who lost all men for the Kings service, & when their malice (whom he grieved) had out-lived the Kings affection, you know what became of him as well as I.

JUST. Yea my Lord, I know it well, that malice hath a longer life, then either love or thankfulness hath, for as we always take more care to put off pain, than to enjoy pleasure, because the one hath no intermission, & with the other we are often satisfied, so it is in the smart of injury & the memory of good turns: *Wrongs are written in marble: Benefits are (sometimes) acknowledged, rarely requited.* But my Lo. we shall all do the K. great wrong, to judge him by common rules, or ordinary examples, for seeing his Majesty hath greatly enriched and advanced those that have but pretended his service, no man needs to doubt of his goodness towards those, that shall performe any thing worthy reward. Nay, the not taking knowledge of those of his own vassals that have done him wrong, is more to be lamented, than the relinquishing of those that do him right, is to be suspected. I am therefore, my good Lord held to my resolution by these, besides the former. The 1, that God would never have blest him

him with so many years, and in so many actions, yea in all his actions had he paid his honest servants with evill for good. The 2d. where your Lordship tels me, that I will be sorry for not following your advice, I pray your Lordship to believe, that I am no way subject to the common sorrowing of worldly men, this *Maxime* of *Plato* being true, *Dolores omnes ex amore animi erga corpus nascuntur*. But for my body, my mind values it at nothing.

COUNS. What is it then you hope for or seek.

JUST. Neither riches, nor honour, or thanks, but I onely seek to satisfie his Majesty (which I would have been glad to have done in matters of more importance) that *I have lived and will die an honest man.*

FINIS.

The Authors Epitaph, made by *himself.*

EVen such is time, which takes in trust
Our Youth, and Joy's, and all we have,
And pays us but with age and dust,
Which in the dark and silent grave,
When we have wondred all our wayes,
Shuts up the story of our dayes:
And from which Earth, & Grave & Dust,
The Lord shall raise me up I trust.